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This Article responds to a series of class action suits filed
against railroads, telecommunication companies, and the federal
government claiming that once railroads abandon their corridors,
all property rights shift to adjacent landowners. This Article
reviews the state law on this matter and offers a theory of how
courts should handle these cases. After discussing the history of
nineteenth-century railroad land acquisition practices, we analyze
the scope of the easement limited for railroad purposes. We then
discuss the role abandonment plays in affecting the rights of third-
party users of these corridors as well as successor trail owners.
We conclude with a theory of railroad easements that interprets
the railroad's powers based on the public participation that helped
create and establish these corridors and the tenuous claims of
adjacent landowners.
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INTRODUCTION
The digital age has arrived in the United States with our
multitude of phone, fax, and intemet lines, satellite TV hookups,
and wireless video conferencing. We can use our cell phones to
send email, we can fax our home videos over the internet, and we
can hear a pin drop talking to our great uncle Al in Pago Pago.
But while we are devising endless ways to save precious time
while still remaining connected, we spend more time in our cars
stalled in traffic jams or driving detours to avoid what seems to
be an endless procession of orange cones, torn-up streets, and
jackhammers laying the millions of miles of fiber-optic cable
necessary to build that information superhighway. One
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commentator called it "the Great Dig of '99."' Nearly 150 years
after the great national surge to link the Atlantic and Pacific
coasts by railroad, deregulation of the communications industry
has led to a high-tech race to the bottom- that is, to the bottom
of our streets and highways.2
As the Washington Post bemoaned, these disruptions are not
simply a matter of inconvenience to motorists due to traffic jams
and lengthy detours.' Technology companies are using public
rights-of-way with little or no compensation and without
comprehensive planning. Combined with the hasty work done by
most fiber-optic contractors, the new maze of underground
utility networks will almost certainly cause periodic service
disruptions and deteriorating streets. "Where this is going to hit
the fan is when all these cities are faced with enormous
reconstruction bills to rebuild their streets .... It's going to
show up in the next three or four years as a huge hit on the local
taxpayer."4
One quick and easy solution has been to locate fiber-optic
cables in railroad corridors where disruptions and licensing costs
are minimal.5 But what rights do railroads have to grant a
license, subeasement, or a lease to a utility company? Not
surprisingly, the rush to wire the country has led to a rush of
lawsuits. With predictions that telecom traffic is expected to grow
eleven-fold by 2002,6 the legal issues raised by the growth of
fiber optics threatens to seriously hamper technological
development and overwhelm our already crowded courts. With
regard to railroad corridors, twenty-five class action suits have
been fied by landowners adjacent to rail corridors challenging
the railroad's ownership interests in abandoned corridors and
the rights of utilities to lay cables in those linear corridors.7
These lawsuits are particularly aimed at those rail corridors that
1. Justin Gillis & Jackie Spinner, A Nation Plugged In and Dug Up: Streets
Scarred in Race to Wire America, WASH. POST, July 15, 1999, at Al.
2. See id. In Washington, D.C., for instance, nine different communications
companies were simultaneously laying cable this summer somewhere in the streets of
the city, often in streets that had just been torn up by a competitor weeks before.
3. See id.
4. Id. (quoting Nicholas Miller, a local government attorney who worked to
defend Prince George's County, Maryland, in a court fight over the government's right
to collect a percentage of gross revenues from the telecom companies for the privilege
of using the public streets).
5. See Frank Wilner, Railroads: Not Just for Trains Any Longer, 6 J. TRANSP. L.
LOGISTICS & POLY 273, 275 (1998).
6. See Gillis & Spinner, supra note 1.
7. See Elizabeth Amon, Working on the RRs: Simple Property Case Sparks 25
Class Actions Against RRs, Telecorns, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 16, 1999, at Al.
200]
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have been converted to recreational trails under the popular
rails-to-trails program. Moreover, the legal team bringing these
suits appears to be gearing up to file at least twenty more class
actions in the next few months.
The plaintiffs in these cases argue that any non-railroad use
of a rail corridor violates the grant that originally conveyed the
corridor land to the railroad. They claim that the railroad
easement cannot accommodate concurrent utility use of
conversion to a trail. Because they involve countless deeds,
numerous parties, and complex issues, these cases could tie up
the courts for years, paralyze the railroad and
telecommunications industries well into the next century, and
cost taxpayers billions of dollars.8 These cases have garnered
enough local and national media attention to give them an air of
credibility that they lack on the legal merits. While the cases
themselves are likely to be unsuccessful, the issues they raise
will only grow more important as development and growth
continue to put tremendous pressures on the environment, and
preservation of land takes a backseat to the transitory interests
of mining, timbering, and ranching.9
8. See generally Amon, supra note 7. For example, in the case of Clark v. CSX
Transportation Inc., No. 29D03-9308-CP-404 (Ind. Super. Ct. Nov. 26, 1997), the
judge imposed a stay on CSX to prevent it from disposing of any of its "abandoned"
corridor land in the State of Indiana, which had a chilling effect on those parcels held
by the railroad in fee simple tifle.
9. Most of these cases have been filed by members of the private property rights
movement, a movement that emphasizes the near-absolute nature of private property
rights and seeks to limit governmental regulation or limitation of those rights. The
property rights movement, a broad coalition of developers, mining companies,
manufacturers, industrialists, and corporate farmers, in concert with such
conservative think tanks as the Cato Institute and the Competitive Enterprise
Institute, has funded extensive litigation challenging a wide variety of environmental
and growth management regulations. The movement has also sponsored legislation
at both the state and federal levels that would require compensation for the effects on
land use rights above and beyond the protections recognized by the due process or
takings clauses of the state and federal constitutions. Property rights advocates have
spurred extensive debate in political circles about the legitimate scope of property
regulations and have pushed for changes in laws that would limit interference with
private land use. When railroads allow radical new uses of their corridors without
consulting the owners of the servient estates, they violate the property rights of the
owners. Some property rights advocates even advocate the self-help methods of
digging up and severing fiber-optic cables when the utility company acquires a
license to lay cable without compensating the fee owner directly. See generally
Charles H. Montange, Fixing the Unbroken in the Federal Railbanking & Trail Use
Statute: A Rejoinder to "Unhappy Trails", 6 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 53 (1990); David
J. Russ, How the "Property Rights" Movement Threatens Property Values in Florida, 9
J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 395 (1994); Glenn P. Sugameli. Takings Bills Threaten Private
Property, People, and the Environment, 8 FORDHAM ENVrL. L.J. 521 (1997); William
Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, The Narratives of Takings, and
[Vol. 27:351
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In this Article, we describe the legal arguments and existing
law at the heart of the current cases. We then survey the
foundation of the railroads' property rights: nineteenth-century
railroad deeds and land acquisition practices. Once this
foundation is established, we focus on the creation, content, and
termination of the easement for railroad purposes. 10 Finally, we
seek to construct a coherent theory of how courts should resolve
these suits to protect the rights of all interested parties: the
landowners, the railroads, the utilities, and the public. Although
we believe that a few situations exist in which the current class
action plaintiffs are legally entitled to a recovery, those cases are
few in number and are best handled through pre-existing quiet
title mechanisms. We argue that the use of the class action
mechanism is inappropriate and may in fact work an
unconstitutional taking of the defendants' property rights.1 We
also discuss the public's rights in these quasi-public corridors to
discover how best to refine our laws on railroad easements to
achieve a balance between the rights of all interested parties.
Compensation Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1151 (1997); Ruth Marcus, Issues
Groups Fund Seminars for Judges; Classes at Resorts Cover Property Rights, WASH.
POST, Apr. 9, 1998, at Al; John Echeverria, The Politics of Property Rights (visited May
1, 2000) <http://www.envpoly.org/papers>.
10. Numerous courts and commentators have grappled with the railroad
easement. Is it an easement that functions like a fee simple, or a defeasible fee, or
some new category of property right that exists somewhere in between and in
contravention of the rule against new estates? See infra Part III.A.
11. Because title to land is a product of state common law, class action suits
may well be inappropriate as vehicles to determine rights that vary dramatically
across state lines. As the leading authority on eminent domain explains,
The question of whether a certain use of land already subject to a public
easement is an additional servitude, thereby entitling the owner of the fee to
compensation for such use.... depends for its answer upon a precise
definition in each case of the limits of the original public easement. The
extent of the easement taken for highways, railroads and other public works
depends upon the statutes of the states and the customs of different parts
of the country. The disagreement among jurisdictions in determining what
constitutes an additional servitude does not necessarily indicate erroneous
conceptions of fundamental principles of constitutional law upon one side or
the other, but merely illustrates the divergence in the character and extent
of certain familiar public easements throughout the United States.
NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 9.04 (Julius L. Sackman ed., 3d ed. 1993). In
the "nationwide class action" certified in Indiana, Hinshaw v. AT&T, No. 29D01 9705-
CP-000308 (Ind. Super. Ct. fied Nov. 6. 1996), AT&T successfully moved to transfer
the case to federal district court, where a subclass of plaintiffs, Indiana landowners,
settled in April 1999.
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THE CLASS ACTION CHALLENGES TO CORRIDOR CONVERSION
The demise of the railroad system has created
unprecedented legal issues. By the end of the year 2000, nearly
fifty cases questioning the use of abandoned railroad corridors
for other public purposes will be working their way through the
courts. These cases challenge two distinct new uses of rail
corridors: 2 conversion of rail corridors for recreational use, and
use of rail corridors to string utility wires or bury fiber-optic
cables. Both types of challenges, however, rely on similar legal
arguments.
A. Rails-to-Trails
Recycling railroad corridors has been a regular practice for
as long as railroads have existed. When corridors are abandoned
because they are no longer profitable, or because the line cannot
accommodate the requisite business, most railroads continue to
hold onto the property for a number of years. In many cases, the
assets from one failing line would be purchased by a more robust
company and reactivated.13 The sale of one railroad's assets,
including real property, to another railroad posed no great legal
difficulties because the use of the land stayed the same. But in
other situations, the rail corridors would be replaced with
highways, canals, tramways, electric trolleys, or tollroads. 14 One
of the first conversions of an abandoned corridor to a trail
occurred in the 1930s when the South Carolina Canal &
Railroad Co. corridor was converted to the Cathedral Isle trail in
South Carolina.15
The rails-to-trails program was born after President Johnson
signed the National Trails System Act in 1968 and Congress,
responding to the alarming increase in railroad abandonments
and the growing need for alternative transportation corridors,
implemented what has come to be called its "railbanking" policy
12. The issues may, of course, overlap in any particular rail corridor. For
example, trail groups have often acquired the railroads' rights through quit-claim
deeds to corridors that may already have existing utility lines or may benefit from the
fees generated by these licenses. We treat the two classes of cases separately,
however, because conversion to trail use ultimately is a question of consecutive uses
after abandonment, while utility use is ultimately a question of concurrent use.
13. Most of the active lines today went through two or three owners.
14. See infra Part V.B (discussing shifting public use doctrine).
15. See Hitchcock Foundation, Cathedral Aisle Trail Brochure. The Hitchcock
Foundation manages the trail as part of Hitchcock Woods.
[Vol. 27:351
HeinOnline  -- 27 Ecology L.Q. 356 2000-2001
PIPES, WIRES, AND BICYCLES
through its amendment of the Trails Act in 1983.16 Under that
statute, the Surface Transportation Board (STB) oversees the
discontinuation of rail services and may preempt the operation of
state property laws to preserve the railroad easements for
possible future reactivation of rail services.'" The STB may also
permit a recreational trail in the corridor so long as the use is
not inconsistent with the preservation of the corridor for possible
future reactivation for rail service. 8 The National Rails-to-Trails
Conservancy was founded in 1986 to take advantage of these
administrative opportunities.19
The principal goal of the rails-to-trails program is to preserve
from fractionation valuable rail corridors that were assembled at
a tremendous cost to the public. By preempting state property
laws, the railbanking statute merely keeps the railroad's property
rights intact during a period of nonuse while the country gets its
transpiration needs figured out. During the period of
railbanking, however, because the railroad's rights continue,
interim trail uses may be made of the corridor, as well as
continuing utility use. These linear corridors make ideal public
parks to link neighborhoods, schools, and shopping areas, and
to link urban centers with suburbs and rural communities.
Probably the greatest success story of the Rails-to-Trails
movement has been the revitalization of innumerable small
towns that nearly died from the construction of interstate
highways. Small towns that had thrived from the boom of
railroad services in the last decade of the nineteenth century and
into the early part of this century became ghost towns as jobs
moved to the cities and workers followed. With the arrival of rail-
trails, many of the quaint, small towns of rural America have
been reborn.20 Every state that has encouraged these greenbelts
has seen a tremendous boom in tourism, a rise in property
values along the corridors, and a rise in the environmental
16. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-1251 (1994); see also Rails-to-Trails Conservancy,
America's Vanishing Rail Network (visited May 1, 2000) <www.railtrails.org/
vansh.html>.
17. 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (1994); see also Montange, supra note 9, at 55-56.
18. 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (1994).
19. The Rails-to-Trails Conservancy is a non-profit environmental organization
that assists in trail conversion by monitoring abandonments, aiding local trail groups
in acquiring the corridor, sometimes funding the land purchase and then reselling it
to local managers, and then aiding with the construction and operation of the trail at
the initial stages. See Rails-to-Trails Conservancy (visited May 1, 2000)
<www. railtrails.org>.
20. Rails-to-Trails Conservancy, Economic Benefits of Rail-Trails (visited May 1,
2000) <www.railstrails.org>.
200
HeinOnline  -- 27 Ecology L.Q. 357 2000-2001
ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY
integrity of their neighborhoods.
Perhaps the biggest boon to the rails-to-trails program was
the passage of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency
Act (ISTEA) in 1991 that mandated ten percent of federal
highway funds be spent on transportation enhancements and
that qualified rail-trails for federal transportation funding. 21 In
the first five years of ISTEA spending, over fifty percent of
enhancement funds, or over $800 million, was spent on rail
trails and bicycle and pedestrian facilities. 22 The nation's
commitment to enhancements on rail trails was renewed when
ISTEA was replaced in 1999 with TEA21 .23
But the rails-to-trails movement is under attack by these
class action suits. Currently, the 200 mile Katy trail, from
Sedalia to Machens, Missouri, is under legal challenge by
adjacent landowners. 24 So, too, is the 321 mile Cowboy Trail
between Chadron and Norfolk, Nebraska. 25 The cases began as
class action challenges to particular corridor conversions, but
have now grown, with the help of funding by conservative
property rights groups like the John M. Olin Foundation and the
National Farm Bureau Association,26 into national class action
suits attacking the railbanking statute under the Takings
Clause. Although the legality of the 1983 NTSA amendment was
upheld by the Supreme Court in the 1990 decision of Presault v.
United States,27 the Court left open the question of whether the
railbanking act worked a taking when it pre-empted state
property rights.28 Their legal arguments are discussed later in
this Article 29 because these arguments have been adopted by
plaintiffs in a newer breed of cases, those that challenge the use
of rail corridors for utilities.
21. Pub. L. No. 102-240, 105 Stat. .1914 (1991).
22. See Rails-to-Trails Conservancy, ISTEA & Trails: Enhancement Funding for
Bicycling and Walking 2 (1996).
23. See Pub. L. No. 105-178, 112 Stat. 107 (1998).
24. See Glosemeyer v. United States, 45 Fed. C. 771 (Fed. Cl. 2000) (challenging
Katy Trail in Missouri); Grantwood Village v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 771 (Fed. C1.
2000); Glosemeyer v. M-K-T RR Co., 685 F. Supp. 1108 (E.D. Mo. 1988), affd, 879
F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1989).
25. See Seger v. United States. No. 4:99-CV-03056 (D. Neb. filed Feb. 15, 1999):
see also infra part V.B (discussing shifting public use doctrine).
26. See Marcus, supra note 9; Ben Rand, Move to Create Trails Facing Legal
Detours, COURIERJ. (Louisville, KY), Aug. 11, 1995, 1B.
27. 494 U.S. 1 (1990).
28. See id. at 11.
29. See infra Part II.C.
[Vol. 27:351
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B. Utility Licenses
A new twist on the rail-trail cases is the recent attack on the
use of rail corridors by utility companies to lay fiber-optic cable
and fuel lines, to string electrical wires, and to install cellular
transmitters."° While the challenges are new, the uses are not;
for over a century, the railroads have been granting rights to
utility companies to string cables and run pipelines in their
corridors. Ever since the telegraph was invented, rails and wires
have moved together across the country, the railroad dependant
on the telegraph for communication to upcoming stations and
switches, and the telegraph dependant on the railroad's corridor
for placement of its poles and wires. Controversy is also not
new- the railroads and utilities have often battled each other
over concurrent use rights in the corridors. For example, some
railroads entered into exclusive license agreements with one
telegraph company and were challenged by another to provide
equal access.3 ' In others, some railroads abandoned corridors
and removed their tracks and ties while continuing to demand
royalties from utility licensors under contracts that may or may
not have been formed prior to abandonment.32 The utilities have
questioned the right of the railroads to continue to demand these
royalties. Adjacent landowners have also disputed the right of
the railroads to authorize utility and other third-party uses on
their corridors.
What is new is the extent of change in the utility industries.
Energy and telecommunications companies face new
technologies, new markets, and new competition, all of which
require increasingly intensive use of linear corridors. And this
comes at a time when we have a national commitment to
preserving rail corridors. Hence, utilities are hoping to piggyback
on the railbanking policies to provide unbroken linear corridors
30. See, e.g.. Hinshaw v. AT&T Comm., No. IP98-1300CH/G (S.D. Ind. filed Sept.
18, 1998); Hallaba v. Worldcom, No. 98-CV-895-H (N.D. Okla. Mar. 31, 2000).
31. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Postal Tel. Co., 217 F. 533 (9th Cir. 1914);
Pacific Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 50 F. 493 (C.C.D. Wash.
1892).
32. See, e.g., Simacek v. York County Rural Pub. Power Dist., 370 N.W.2d 709
(Neb. 1985) (holding that valid utility license granted by railroad prior to its
abandonment terminated upon the railroad's abandonment and removal of trackage):
State Highway Comm'n v. Union Elec. Co., 148 S.W.2d 503 (Mo. 1941) (holding no
right of railroad to grant easement to utility after abandonment, but did not allow
utility's adverse possession claim). But see Champaign Nat'l Bank v. Illinois Power
Co., 465 N.E.2d 1016 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (recognizing that a railroad could give a
perpetual easement to a utility that would persist even after discontinuance by the
railroad).
2000]
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with minimal transaction costs. It is far easier for a utility to
negotiate with a single landowner for access to hundreds of miles
of corridor rather than with individual landowners adjacent to
the corridor. But in the rush to wire the nation, these fiber-optic
companies are not as careful as they should be in determining
whether the railroads have any property interests to sell if they
have discontinued operations.
The new class action suits arise both from the intrusiveness
of these new uses and from the increased visibility of the
"property rights movement."33 Moreover, the utility companies
are logical defendants; they have deeper pockets than most
railroads, and they have been so hasty in wiring the country that
they may have relied on tenuous property rights. But whether
the railroad is authorizing utility use on its corridor or an interim
trail use, these cases raise two legal issues: is the new use within
the scope of the railroad use, and if not, who gets to pay the
adjacent landowner for a taking of her property?
C. The Legal Arguments Against Multiple Use and Conversion of
Rail Corridors
The plaintiffs in both the Rails-to-Trails and utility
challenges argue that nineteenth century grants of land to
various railroads across the country, if only acquired as
easements, did not confer upon the railroads the power to convey
licenses, subeasements, or leases to utility companies to lay
pipelines or string cables or wires.' Furthermore, the plaintiffs
claim that the railroad easement terminates when railroad usage
ends, and that the land must then be unencumbered.35 Any use
of that land for utilities or public trails after abandonment would
thus constitute a taking because such a use imposes an
additional burden on the servient land.3"
33. See Montange, supra note 9, at 64-65: Lawrence P. Hanson, The Recycling of
Railroad Rights-of-Way, 76 MICH. B.J. 430 (1997); Stephen P. Miller, Eminent
Domain- Preseault v. ICC: "Rails to Trails" Act- Section 8(d) Railbanking: An
Authorized "Taking" of a Reversionary Interest?, 21 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REv. 187
(1990); see also supra note 9 and articles cited therein.
34. See Amon, supra note 7, at Al; see also Hinshaw v. AT&T, No. 29 D01 9705-
CP-000308 (Ind. Super. Ct. filed Nov. 6, 1996). This is not a new legal argument,
since the courts have long evaluated whether railroads can authorize others to
engage in activities in railroad corridors.
35. See infra Part V (discussing abandonment).
36. See, e.g., Glosemeyer v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 771 (Fed. Cl. 2000)
(challenging Katy Trail): Hash v. United States, No. CV99-3245-MHW (D. Idaho filed
Dec. 17, 1999) (challenging Weiser Trail); Swisher v. United States, No. 98-1352-KHV
(D. Kan. fied Dec. 22, 1998) (certification overruled Sept. 24, 1999) (attempting to
[Vol. 27:351
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More specifically, class members allege that the scope of an
easement for railroad purposes Is not large enough or diverse
enough to permit recreational trails, sub-surface pipes or cables,
utility poles, or even the removal of tracks and ties. Any such
use would signal the railroad's abandonment of its property
rights, which would then revert to adjacent landowners.37 The
plaintiffs argue further that the laws work a taking insofar as the
federal railbanking provision explicitly preempts state property
rights.3" And insofar as a railroad permits use of the corridor by
recreational trail builders and users or by utility companies, that
railroad is allegedly guilty of slander of title, and the utilities and
trail users of trespass against the true owner. The plaintiffs do
not distinguish between the railroad's rights to allow multiple
uses while operating its services or after it has discontinued rail
services.3 9
On one level, the cases are absurd. The railroads' rights to
their corridor land are determined by state law precedents on
deed interpretation, and ultimately rest on the language in the
individual deed of each parcel. If the railroad owns fee simple
title, it can authorize utility use or sell its parcel to a trail
without reference to adjacent landowners. Thus, the resolution of
disputes over their rights must begin with a quiet title analysis to
determine exactly what interests the railroads hold.4° These class
certify a nationwide class); Seger v. United States, No. 4:99CV3056 (D. Neb. filed Feb.
15, 1999) (challenging Cowboy Trail); Schmitt v. United States, No. IP-99-C- 1852-Y/F
(S.D. Ind. filed Mar. 11, 2000) (challenging Poseyville Trail): see also Montange, supra
note 9, at 69-72.
37. See infra Part V.B (discussing public use of railroad right-of-way); see also
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1987, at A14.
38. See 16 U.S.C. § 1207(d) (1994); see also Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d
1525, 1529, 1549-51 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Sheila K. Bryant, The Constitutionality of Rails-
to-Trails Conversions Under the National Trails Systems Act Amendments of 1983:
Preseault v. ICC, 26 TULSA L.J. 295 (1990); Rita Cain, Unhappy Trails: Disputed Use
of Railroad Rights-of-Way Under the National Trails System Act, 5 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L.J. 211 (1989); Thomas A. Duda, The Use of Discontinued Railroad Rights-of-
Way as Recreational Hiking and Biking Trails: Does the National Trails System Act
Sanction Takings?, 33 ST. Louis U. L.J. 205 (1988); Lawrence S. Lim, Walking the
Line: Rails-to-Trails Conversions and Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Commission,
53 OHIO ST. L.J. 337 (1992). But see Montange, supra note 9; Roger M. Stahl, Smoke
Along the Tracks: The Constitutionality of Converting Rails to Trails Under 16 U.S.C. §
1247(d)() 994). 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 861 (1990).
39. See Hallaba v. Worldcom Network Services, Inc., No. 98-CV-895-H (N.D.
Okla. Mar. 31, 2000) (denying certification of a class against Worldcom for all
landowners adjacent to a rail corridor with Worldcom cable in It); Hinshaw v. AT&T,
No. 29 DO1 9705-CP-000308 (Ind. Super. Ct. fied Nov. 6, 1996). See generally Amon,
supra note 7.
40. See Meighan v. United States Sprint Communications Co., No. 03A01-9308-
CV-00299, 1994 WL 529955, at *3-4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 'Sept. 30, 1994) (noting that
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actions ignore this reality. In addition, class counsel has
traditionally not provided evidence that class members actually
own any interest in the corridors. Various court documents
baldly assert that all railroad corridors are held only as
easements despite state case law to the contrary, and that all
class members have title to the underlying fee even though most
have deeds that explicitly exclude the rail corridor.
It is also crucial to consider the background property law of
the past 150 years. Railroads have conveyed rights to use the rail
corridors to utility companies since the mid-1800s because most
federal and state charters explicitly linked railroad and telegraph
use. Moreover, every state gave utilities eminent domain power to
condemn easements, and that power of condemnation extended
to the land in railroad corridors.41 Multiple use of these corridors
was the rule, not the exception, regardless of whether the
railroads owned their corridor land in fee simple or possessed
only an easement over the land.42 The class action plaintiffs
ignore this history.
Finally, these easements -were not narrowly drawn. Railroad
easements are often construed as general transportation
easements, thus allowing multiple uses and conversion to
highways, canals, and even bicycle trails.4 3 The general rule that
an easement holder may grant subeasements when an easement
is exclusive, as railroad easements are, would seem to resolve
these cases before they even begin.44 Again, the class action
where class actions rest on individual deed interpretations, or land valuations, the
class action mechanism is inappropriate).
41. See, e.g., Mass. St. 1833, ch. 187, § 1; 1849 ILL. LAWS § 2 ; 1903 Fla. Laws
ch. 5211 §§ 1,3,7 (codified as amended, F.S.A. §73.161): Davis v. MCI Telecomm.
Corp., 606 So. 2d 734, 737 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
42. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 175 U.S.
91 (1899); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 163 U.S. 564
(1896); Grand Trunk R.R. Co. v. Richardson. 91 U.S. 454, 468 (1875); Energy
Transp. Sys., Inc. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 606 F.2d 934, 935-37 (10th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Gates of the Mountains Lakeshore Homes, Inc., 732 F.2d 1411 (9th
Cir. 1984). As a Florida District Court of Appeal noted:
A nexus between railroad and commercial telegraph facilities is found
throughout the historical record. Acts of Congress in the 19th Century
required railroads that had been granted right-of-way passage through
United States lands to make their telegraph facilities broadly available for
governmental, commercial and all other purposes. Likewise, the State of
Florida by the Telegraph Act of 1903, ch. 5211, §§ 1,3,7 (codified as FLA.
STAT. § 362.02 (West 1999)) expressly authorized telecommunications lines
in railroad rights-of-way.
Davis v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 606 So. 2d 734, 736 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
43. See infra Part V.B (discussing public use of the railroad right-of-way).
44. See Alan David Hegi, The Easement in Gross Revisited: Transferability and
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plaintiffs ignore unambiguous legal doctrines.
Nevertheless, these class action challenges to railroad
corridor conversions have touched a sensitive spot. For the most
part, there is little case law directly on point. Because the
railbanking policy is relatively new, and fiber-optic technology is
only a recent trend, the use of railbanking corridors for utility
use is a novel situation. While there is a modest body of case law
on multiple uses of railroad easements, that law is problematic
because the nature of common law easements has changed to
recognize the unique exclusivity rights of railroads. It is indeed
odd to think that an easement holder may grant access that the
owner of the underlying land cannot grant. In the cases that
have addressed this issue, the states are split.
45
Moreover, few cases directly address the problems raised by
these class action plaintiffs. Issues of the railroads' subsurface
rights in their easements have been addressed most frequently in
cases regarding mineral rights, which have uniformly been
decided against railroads.46 Analyses of airspace rights have
typically addressed whether electric line or telephone line use
causes aesthetic injuries to the servient landowner.47 For the
most part, utility lines, sewer lines, oil and gas pipelines, and
drainage systems have all coexisted peacefully in railroad
corridors with remarkably little litigation over property rights.
These cases thus address questions heretofore unasked.
They will direct the future growth of the utility industry and have
serious implications for environmental and growth management
controls as well. Increasing urban sprawl makes it difficult for
utility companies to provide vital utility services; central
processing plants must be connected to outlying areas." But the
Divisibility Since 1945. 39 VAND. L. REV. 109 (1986); see also inffra Part III.B
(discussing exclusivity).
45. Compare Energy Transp. Sys. Inc. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 606 F.2d 934, 937
(10th Cir. 1979), and Energy Transp. Sys. Inc. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 619 F.2d 696
(8th Cir. 1980). with Davis v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 606 So. 2d 734, 738 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1992) (authorizing utility's use from grant of right-of-way by railroad), and
Mellon v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 750 F. Supp. 226, 230-31 (W.D. Tex. 1990)
(same).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 112, 120 (1957);
David Ebner, Mineral Ownership Beneath Railroad Rights-of-Way, 31 COLO. MINERAL
L. INST. § 17 1985. For state cases, see, for example, Consumers' Gas Trust Co. v.
American Plate Glass Co.. 68 N.E. 1020 (Ind. 1903); Brookbank v. Benedum-Trees
Oil Co., 131 A.2d 103 (Pa. 1957); Queen Mill & Elevator Co. v. Sanders, 370 P.2d 419
(Kan. 1962).
47. See infra Part III.D.2 (discussing height); Unsightliness of PowerLine or Other
Wire or Related Structure, as Element of Damages in Easement Condemnation
Proceeding, 97 A.L.R.3d 587 (1996).
48. See generally Wilner, supra note 5.
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rail corridors that have always provided convenient locations for
placement of utilities are being dismantled and broken up by
railroad reorganization even as they become ever more essential
to the utility companies.4 9 It is increasingly critical to know
whether states will protect railroad rights, even if only in
easements, to provide utility corridors to the public.5"
These cases also raise vital questions about future
transportation patterns. Many areas already feel the burden of
unrestrained and unplanned growth. cities are on the EPA
blacklist for excessive violations of air quality levels, most
predominantly caused by excessive automobile use." Preserving
rail corridors for alternative transportation venues is not only a
wise policy, but it will become critical in the next few decades.
Railbanking is therefore an important transportation policy.
Many opponents are skeptical; they believe that once a beautiful
linear park is built on a corridor, no trains will ever run there
again. But the Grants Trail in Missouri is currently being
reactivated as a rail line by the STB. Ultimately, whether the
trains are brought back in or trails are allowed to remain on
these corridors, vital public transportation needs can be met by
recycling lands acquired for public use with public money and
through public eminent domain powers. But it is the public that
is most noticeably absent from these lawsuits.
The plaintiffs in these suits also fail to recognize the danger
they are creating for themselves. Weakening the property rights
of the railroads and utilities by misreading deeds or by creating
presumptions against the railroads may benefit local landowners
in these suits. But such tactics also weaken the property rights
of regular, private citizens; such flawed legal interpretation
works against the private easement holder trying to get utilities
from the public highway to his or her house. In the long run,
those who support property rights may rue, rather than
celebrate, these lawsuits.
Plainly, none of these cases can or should proceed without a
clearer understanding of the history and legal structure of rail
49. See generally id.
50. Every state has legislation dealing in some way with abandoned rail
corridors, trail conversions, or utility uses along rail lines. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §
327G.77 (West 1997); WASH. REV. CODE § 64.04.180 (1999); CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE
§§ 2540-2549 (West 1997; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 228:60-a (1999).
51. Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the
Ozone Transport Assessment group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional
Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356 (1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51,
72, 75, 96).
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charter while the engineers were already surveying the line and
laying the track. The law could not keep up with the heady
optimism of expansion or the shattered expectations of collapsed
lines. Much of the law developed after problems evolved, and it
was often narrowly tailored to the circumstances at hand. But
with the benefit of a century and a half, we can begin to identify
patterns and practices and evaluate them for their continuing
vitality.
Determining the property rights in any one railroad line and
its adjoining parcels of land may require an extensive title search
to locate the original granting documents and a thorough
knowledge of nineteenth century case law to determine the exact
nature of the railroad's property interests. The following brief
history, however, identifies the most common acquisition
practices and relevant property interests for the typical railroad.
A. 1830-1860: The Railroads Herald a Bright Future
The completion in 1825 of the Erie Canal demonstrated the
economic benefits of linking the agricultural and industrial
inlands to coastal waterways, and drove every state to seek
federal aid in constructing transportation corridors. 4  A
tremendous burst of internal improvements occurred in the mid-
1830s as a series of canals was built to link the states between
the Mississippi River and the Atlantic Ocean. 5 These canals were
beneficiaries of an innovative federal program in which large
grants of federally owned land would be conveyed to the canal
company or to the state for sale to the general public. The canal
company thereby received necessary funds from the land sales
for construction, and the proximity of local transportation
corridors resulted in significant appreciation in the value of the
land retained by the federal government.56 Thus, although the
land was given away, the economic benefit to the retained lands
easily compensated for the loss, and the government could
subsidize internal improvements without doing the work itself.
These grants also included unrestricted right-of-way access to
the strip of any public land on which the canal was constructed.
Although the railroads were first built in the 1830s, it was 1850
before a railroad was a recipient of this generous government
54. See PAUL GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEvELOPMENT 343 (1983).
55. See id.
56. See Ad. at 341-86. See generally LLOYD MERCER, RAILROADS AND LAND GRANT
PoLICY 3-15 (1982) (explaining the history of the early subsidies and the predictions
for adequate return on the government's investments).
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corridors. In the next Part, we survey the means by which
railroads obtained their rail corridors and examine the various
property rights the railroads generally have in those lands.
Ii
THE HISTORY OF RAILROAD LAND ACQUISITION PRACTICES
Tracing the precise landholdings of all the railroads in the
United States would be nearly impossible; 52 nineteenth century
railroad land acquisition was complex and controversial, and
little has been written on the property rights of and the
relationship between the railroads and the landowners adjacent
to their corridors.5 3 Yet to understand the law of the railroads,
one must understand their history. Railroads received
tremendous government subsidies in the form of federal land
grants, government bonds, state land grants, tax abatements,
favorable legislation, and eminent domain powers. Private capital
also invested heavily in the railroads, speeding expansion and
development in the midwest and western states far beyond the
rate envisioned by politicians and homesteaders. The
enthusiasm for the railroads created a climate in which railroad
moguls and state politicians might be finalizing the terms of a
52. Given the large, interstate railroad companies that have absorbed some lines
and abandoned others, and the countless short-line and branch-line railroads
serving shippers across the country, it would be impossible to trace the precise
landholdings of all the railroads in this country. The Interstate Commerce
Commission came closest when, under the federal 1913 Valuation Act, it attempted
to inventory and value all property of the nation's rail carriers. Act to Regulate
Commerce of 1913, ch. 92, 37 Stat. 701. See generally James D. Jennings, Railroad
Right of Way Appraisal, RIGHT OF WAY, Oct. 1984. at 4. It took over two decades and
hundreds of millions of dollars to complete and produced a series of valuation maps
of the railroads' property holdings. But even these maps are unreliable because some
railroads have not kept them up to date and even when the railroads have been
diligent, the map may lack crucial information. See id. at 5.
53. The majority of railroad histories are concerned with regulation, expansion
and contraction of services, or are individual biographies of the great railroad men.
See, e.g., MAURY KLEIN, THE LIFE AND LEGEND OF JAY GOULD (1986); JOHN F. STOVER,
HISTORY OF THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD (1987): JOHN HOYT WILLIAMS. A GREAT
AND SHINING ROAD: THE Epic STORY OF THE TRANSCONTINENTAL RAILROAD (1988); JAMES
ARTHUR WARD & J. EDGAR THOMSON: MASTER OF THE PENNSYLVANIA (1980); JOHN D.
FORBES, J.P. MORGAN, JR.: 1867-1943 (1981]. Probably the most comprehensive and
informative studies are the ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BUSINESS HISTORY AND
BIOGRAPHY: Vol. 1 RAILROADS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (Robert L. Frey ed., 1988).
and Vol. 2 RAILROADS IN THE AGE OF REGULATION, 1900-1980 (Keith L. Bryant Jr. ed.,
1988). For a good history of the early decades of railroad development, see JOHN F.
STOVER, IRON ROAD TO THE WEST: AMERICAN RAILROADS IN THE 1850s (1978). And for an
excellent study of the linkages between railroads and telegraphs, see ALBRO MARrIN,
RAILROADS TRIUMPHANT: THE GROWTH, REJECTION, AND REBIRTH OF A VITAL AMERICAN
FORCE (1992).
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subsidy."
But the issue of federal financial aid raised some sticky legal
questions. 8  Although canals and railroads are private
corporations, they provided great public benefits. Many believed
the railroads deserved to receive state and federal aid through
grants of land, outright money grants, or loans to pay for land
acquisition and road construction.5 9 But critics asserted that the
federal government lacked the power under the Constitution to
turn federal lands over to private ownership for internal
improvements, even though no one questioned Congress's power
to authorize construction of these roads directly.6" Consequently,
different administrations had different commitments to using
federal lands in the development of privately held railroads and
canals.6 But when the federal government retreated during more
conservative administrations, the states often stepped in to grant
similar land rights to the railroads and to give them eminent
domain powers when they required privately owned land. These
grants of eminent domain powers raised questions, however,
about whether these projects were a legitimate public use if they
57. See GATES, supra note 54, at 358; ISAAC REDFIELD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE UPON
THE LAW OF RAILWAYS 3 (2d ed. 1858). See generally MERCER, supra note 56. In 1850,
following the tradition of the canal grants, the first grant of land was given to a
railroad, in addition to the traditional rights-of-way across public lands that had
characterized railroad aid in the two preceding decades. See Act of Sept. 20, 1850,
ch. 61, 9 Stat. 466; see also PAUL WALLACE GATES, THE ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD AND
ITS COLONIZATION WORKS (1934); THOMAS E. ROOT, Railroad Land Grants: From Canals
to Transcontinentals, 1987 A.B.A. SEC. NAT. RESOURCES L. This grant, originally given
to the state of Illinois but later expanded, was to link Dubuque, Iowa: Chicago,
Illinois; and Mobile, Alabama. Because Illinois was prohibited by its constitution from
building the railroad itself, it turned the land grant over to the Illinois Central
Railroad. See GATES, ILLINOIS CENTRAL, supra; see also HOWARD GRAY BROWNSON,
HISTORY OF THE ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD TO 1870, ILLINOIS STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES, Vol. IV, No. 3 (1915). When the other states did the same, the first major
north-south railway line was built. Mississippi and Alabama conveyed their land
Tights to the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, but that left the states of Kentucky and
Tennessee without grants because there was no publicly held land. The Mobile and
Ohio Railroad, therefore, had to acquire the 164 miles of land needed to traverse
those two states without any federal or state aid. See GATES, supra note 54, at 359-
60.
58. See generally ROOT, supra note 57 (explaining land rights and mineral rights
cases).
59. See generally GATES, supra note 54; see also Frank N. Wilner, History and
Evolution of Railroad Land Grants, 48 ICC PRACTICE J. 687 (1981). Loans were used to
buy land and pay for the construction of the new railroad line.
60. See GATES, supra note 54, at 352.
61. John Quincy Adams' administration was far more forthcoming with financial
assistance than the successive administration of Andrew Jackson. See GATES, supra
note 54, at 352; see also Robert W. Swenson, Railroad Land Grants: A Chapter in
Public Land Law, 5 UTAH L. REv. 456 (1953).
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were to be privately owned. 62 In the end, these issues were
resolved in favor of the railroads and canals who uniformly
received eminent domain powers from the federal government or
the states to facilitate land acquisition in the areas where they
did not receive the land directly from the federal or state
governments; railroads and canals were given, at the very least,
rights-of-way for passage over all public lands. 6 3
Because of tremendous population growth in the 1840s, and
the general public clamor to speed railroad expansion to make
more undeveloped lands accessible, Congress passed a general
law in 1852 giving 100-foot rights-of-way to railroads through all
public lands and authorizing the railroads to remove stone,
earth, and timber from adjacent public lands.' For the next
decade, the midwestern and southern states scrambled for
federal land grants to aid construction of railroads. Grants to
these states consisted of over 27.8 million acres for 50 railroads
with a total length of 8,647 miles.65
Prompted by the 1852 federal right-of-way legislation, most
states enacted general railroad legislation that clarified the rights
each chartered railroad company would possess in the property
it acquired.66 Between 1850 and 1900, every state that enacted
railroad legislation gave the railroads eminent domain powers.
The tremendous public benefit provided by these new roads
easily justified the legislative grant of limited sovereign powers.6 7
62. See GATES, supra note 54, at 360-62; see also MERCER, supra note 56, at 145
(giving an economic rather than a legal analysis of the efficacy of the land grants,
concluding that only some of the transcontinental railroads were economically
rational).
63. For statutes that provided for the sale of public lands to railroads, see, for
example, Act of Aug. 4, 1892, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 28; Mo. REV. STAT. § 388.380 (1853);
N.Y. LAw§ 25 (McKinney 1852).
64. See Act of Aug. 4, 1852, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 28.
65. See GATES, supra note 54, at 362.
66. See W.P. GREGG & BENJAMIN POND, THE RAILROAD LAWS AND CHARTERS OF THE
U.S. (Boston: Little & Brown, 1851) giving all railroad charters from most of the
eastern states, including Maine, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Vermont, New
Hampshire, and Massachusetts.
67. For an excellent survey of the economic benefits of the early railroads, see
J.L. RINGWALT, DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES 106-55
(1888).
There is no doubt that the cash value of the property of the entire country
has been advanced by railways to a sum that very greatly exceeds the cost
of their construction, and it has unfortunately happened that such gains of
land owners and citizens have often occurred on lines that were very
unprofitable to stockholders. In other words, an expenditure of a few billions
of dollars for railways has benefited other persons, who have made no
important investments in the securities of such enterprises, to the extent of
many more billions of dollars.
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At a time when most states had insufficient funds for extensive
public roads and canal systems, the railroads' offer to invest
private capital in a massive public project could hardly be
refused. For a long time, eastern and midwestem states asked
the railroad developers few questions as they handed over the
power to take private land, opened their court systems to
condemnation proceedings, provided tax incentives to particular
lines, and sometimes participated in the construction by
donating public lands for depots and/or facilitating financing
through government bonds and loans.' Between 1845 and 1860,
state governments borrowed over $90 million to finance railroad
construction, and at least one state, Illinois, went bankrupt as a
result.6 9
Land that was already held in private hands had to be
obtained directly from the owners when the railroad's route
could not stay on public lands. 0 The first railroads to be built in
the east were intrastate lines that were built under individual
charters granted to each railroad from the respective state
legislature.7' Once the charter was obtained, the railroads would
send out surveyors to mark the route and land agents to acquire
deeds from the individual landowners.7 2 In some circumstances,
the benefits that would accrue to the landowner from immediate
Id. at 106-07. Additionally, the costs of overland transportation were dramatically
reduced by the construction of railroads. See td. at 154-55. A rather quantitative
economic analysis of the land grants, with 20-20 hindsight, comes from MERCER,
supra note 56, at 144. Mercer concludes that, on all but one railroad line. the
transcontinental land grants were rational in terms of economic efficiency. See id. at
145.
68. See 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BUSINESS HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY, supra
note 53, at xiv (explaining how state and local governments granted liberal railroad
charters, supplied money and credit, and some even built the lines themselves). I also
saw evidence of this in many of the cases I examined in which tax incentives and
government bonds were used to help induce a railroad to locate to a particular city.
See, e.g., Schneck v. City of Jeffersonville, 52 N.E. 212 (Ind. 1898); Chicago &
Calumet Terminal Ry. Co. v. Whiting Hammond & E. Chicago St. Ry. Co., 38 N.E.
604 (Ind. 1894); Nelson v. Haywood County, 11 S.W. 885 (Tenn. 1889).
69. See 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BUSINESS HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY, supra
note 53, at xiv.
70. For instance, when the Mobile and Ohio Railroad was attempting to build its
line, it had to purchase land directly from private landowners in Kentucky and
Tennessee because there were no public lands in those states. See supra note 57;
GATES, supra note 54, at 359.
71. See GREGG& POND, supra note 66; see also REDFIELD, supranote 57, at xx.
72. Sometimes the agents purchased the land in trust for the railroad and later
conveyed the entire corridor to the railroad in a single transaction, and sometimes
they negotiated for the land, prepared the documents in conjunction with the
railroad's legal departments, and then went back out with the checks and the
prepared deeds to finalize the land transaction.
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access to rail services and higher land values was sufficient
consideration to convince the landowner to make an outright
grant of corridor land to the railroad. 3 In other cases, the
necessary land was purchased from the landowner and a deed
given. When a landowner absolutely refused to give up any of his
or her land, eminent domain powers were necessary to allow the
73. See 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BUSINESS HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY, supra
note 53, at xiii (explaining that 'American people welcomed the railroad with
unbounded enthusiasm and invested their savings and supported the promoters who
built the lines across the country."). The sometimes nominal monetary consideration
is often cited by courts as evidence that the railroads did not acquire fee simple
absolute to the land because the only consideration cited was the benefit that would
accrue to the landowner from construction of the road. For instance, in Tompkins v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 79 S.E.2d 41, 42-45 (Ga. App. 1953), the court
interpreted a deed stating, -in consideration of the consequent enhanced value of my
adjoining land and of the benefit to the community by the construction of the...
Railroad... I.... do hereby sell, transfer and convey in fee simple unto the...
Railroad" to convey only an easement, stating, against all rules of logic and deed
interpretation, that the -words 'in fee simple' are descriptive of the extent of duration
of the enjoyment of the easement conveyed." Id. Although this court did not rely on
the nominal consideration for its decision, many courts have. Such an interpretation,
however, ignores the fact that in certain cases, rail access directly from a landowner's
parcel more than doubled the value of the remaining land. See RINGWALT, supra note
67, at 106-07. For a related discussion, see Mason Brayman's paper for the Illinois
Central Railroad Company, explaining that:
It has heretofore been, and is yet to be, a leading object to obtain from all
persons owning, or having interest in, lands to be affected by the location
and construction of the Road, voluntary relinquishment of the privileges
necessary to our operations. It is believed that, in a majority of cases,
property holders, actuated by a generous desire to aid in securing the
important public benefits expected to be derived from the construction of
such a work, and finding their property benefited by fencing, drainage, and
improved facilities of transportation, will freely donate the privileges desired,
or relinquish for merely nominal sums. In cases of special damage to
buildings and improvements, or otherwise, a property compensation is to be
made: it being desirable to deal with parties interested, in a just and liberal
spirit, so as to secure, without resort to the legal means provided, a
satisfactory adjustment of every question which may arise. In all intercourse
with the people along the line- in all negotiations for the privileges which it
may be necessary to acquire, and in resorting to the legal mode of acquiring
them, a careful regard for the rights and feelings, and even prejudices
(should such be encountered) of those whose interests are to be affected, is
to be observed. The dictates of sound policy, no less than of justice, counsel
such a course as will secure the good will and co-operation of the people, so
that the company may arrive at the completion of its great work, so fruitful
of mutual advantages, so prolific of public benefits, free from those
exasperations and prejudices which too often such enterprises.
Mason Brayman, Instructions to Agents Engaged in Securing the Right of Way, etc.
(Mar. 22, 1852) (Mason Brayman Papers at the Chicago Historical Society) (on file
with author). Although not all land agents were as solicitous of the feelings and
prejudices of landowners, the railroads quite obviously knew they were providing a
great benefit to an area.
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railroads to complete their line acquisition.74
On some lines, the railroad would enter into contracts to
purchase the corridor land if and when the line was built.
Occasionally, neither the landowner nor the railroad would
finalize the land conveyance even after construction of the line,
and the only evidence to determine what was conveyed were
these contracts.7" In other cases, the landowner might be
unavailable and the railroad, knowing it had eminent domain
powers, would simply construct the line and wait until the
landowner complained before negotiating the transfer.7 6  In
addition, if the landowner sold his remaining land without
having been paid by the railroad for the amount taken, the buyer
would not have a claim against the railroad; only the original
landowner would retain the claim because the buyer took the
land with notice that it was encumbered by a rail servitude.7 7
Even a single one or two mile stretch of corridor might involve
landowner negotiations of all these different types.
The greatest legacy of this period of railroad development is
the incredible legal quagmire that was created by the haste of
railroad entrepreneurs and the haphazard pattern of state
authorization and oversight. Railroads might have been
operating for decades before land issues were settled. Other lines
might have been chartered and the land purchased, but never
built. Competition or lack of funds often doomed a line after
considerable financial outlays. A subsequent company would
then attempt to purchase the defunct line's assets, including
corridor land, years later. But what most characterizes this
74. If condemnation was required, the railroad instituted condemnation
proceedings and the courts would determine the amount of compensation necessary
through appraisals of three people in the community. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §
13b-256 (1999) (requiring appointment of three appraisers); N.Y. Law §§ 13-18
(McKinney 1852) (requiring five local men of the neighborhood be appointed).
75. The contracts have been held to constitute a transfer of property interests,
even in the absence of a deed. See Burrow v. Terre Haute & L. R. Co.. 8 N.E. 167
(Ind. 1886).
76. See Evansville & T.H.R. Co. v. Nye, 15 N.E. 261 (Ind. 1888) (holding that
railroad acquired land by adverse possession when the railroad entered openly and
notoriously for 25 years before suit was brought).
77. These damage actions were considered personal and did not pass with the
land. See, e.g., id. at 265-66; Indiana, Bloomington & W. Ry. Co. v. McBroom, 15
N.E. 831 (Ind. 1888); Paul v. Connersville & Newcastle Junction R.R. Co., 51 Ind. 527
(Ind. 1875). Many states do not allow the transfer of rights of re-entry or possibilities
of reversion as this would permit a grantor to avoid the workings of the rule against
perpetuities. See CUNNINGHAM, STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, THE LAw OF PROPERTY 153 n.28
(2d ed. 1993). The result, however, is that successors in interest to land encumbered
by railroad use would have few remedies, which is quite reasonable in light of that
fact that they generally took the land with notice of the encumbrance.
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period is the generous state and federal aid, both legislative and
financial, that made possible a network of over 10,000 miles of
transportation corridors east of the Mississippi.
B. 1860-1871: Reckless Expansion
In 1860, the West remained a great, uncharted frontier, but
the California gold rush created an increasing demand to
construct a transcontinental railroad linking the Pacific Ocean
with the rest of the country. Most of the 1850s had been spent
debating the cost, feasibility, desirability, and location of a
potential road." In 1862, with the Civil War imposing
tremendous strain on the nation's railroads, Congress passed a
massive land grant to the Union Pacific and Central Pacific
railroads to construct lines east from San Francisco, California,
and west from Omaha, Nebraska, to meet somewhere in the
middle. 9 This grant was followed in 1864 by the Northern Pacific
grant to link Lake Superior to Puget Sound;80 in 1866 by the
Southern Pacific grant to link Springfield, Missouri, to southern
California;"1 and in 1871 by the Texas Pacific Railroad grant to
link El Paso, Texas, to San Diego, California.82
All in all, between 100 and I 10 million acres of federal land
were promised to the transcontinental railroads between 1862
and 1871. Federal land grants to states for railroads in the
midwest and southern states also increased during the 1860s.83
Nationally, approximately 130 million acres were granted to the
states or directly to the railroads from federally held public
lands, a large percentage of which is still retained by the
78. See GATES, supra note 54, at 362-68.
79. Pacific Railroad Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 489, amended by ch.
216, 13 Stat. 356 (1864). The statute authorized a capitalization of $100 million from
stock subscriptions, authorized loans of almost $100,000 per mile in 30-year
government bonds for construction, and granted the railroad a 400-foot right-of-way
through the public lands and 10 odd numbered sections of land for each mile of road
constructed. This amounted to a checkerboard belt of land extending five, ten, or
twenty miles in width on both sides of the road.
80. Act of July 2, 1864, ch. 217, 13 Stat. 365, amended by Resolution, 16 Stat.
378 (1870).
8 1. The Southern Pacific grant was actually made to the Atlantic and Pacific
Railroad, which went bankrupt in 1875 and construction was picked up by a variety
of other railroads, including the Atcheson. Topeka, the St. Louis and Atlantic &
Pacific Railroad Company Incorporated. See Act of July 27, 1866, ch. 278, 14 Stat.
292.
82. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 122, 16 Stat. 573.
83. See GATES, supra note 54, at 384-85; FRANK WILNER, RAILROAD LAND GRANTS:
PAID IN FULL, U.S. OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS (1984).
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railroads to this day.'
Tension between the railroads and the public arose quickly
in the western states. Many westerners wanted railroads and yet
still wanted inexpensive land available for development. As the
railroads eventually took title to all their lands, the land available
for homesteading was greatly reduced if the railroads did not
turn the land over for public use quickly enough.85 Attitudes
turned from "warm friendship to outright hostility" when
westerners found that the railroads were not especially prompt
in bringing their lands to market.8 6 When western settlers joined
the Grangers,87 who were fighting for federal regulation of the
railroads, the tide of public opinion finally shifted from welcome
encouragement to suspicion and outright hostility.88 The 1871
Texas Pacific was to be the last federal grant to the railroads of
lands west of the Mississippi.
The 1860s and 1870s brought tremendous competition
among the non-land-grant railroads in the eastern and
midwestern states.89 Labor strikes in the 1870s also caused great
strains on shippers.90 With greater competition came cutthroat
railroad practices that ultimately hurt the shipping and traveling
public. Because some carriers would provide rebates to certain
shippers and not to others, the shippers naturally complained.
As a result, groups such as the Grangers began to put pressure
on state and federal representatives to cut back on the railroads'
privileges. Even many railroad executives favored federal
regulation because individual railroads would routinely
undermine local pooling and apportionment agreements. 91 By
1870, individual states began to respond by imposing greater
liabilities on railroads if they failed, and stringent requirements
84. See generally WILNER, supra note 83.
85. See GATES, supra note 54, at 380.
86. Id. at 380.
87. The Grangers were a coalition of farming interests in the midwest who were
frustrated by the discriminatory pricing and unreliable schedules of the highly
competitive railroads. See td. at 380-81; see also SOLON BuCK, THE GRANGER
MOVEMENT 9 (1913); GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROAD AND REGULATION 1877-1916, 127-54
(1965). The Grangers were also responsible for a variety of state railroad regulatory
schemes that were upheld by the Supreme Court in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113
(1876).
88. See GATES, supra note 54, at 380-81; Swenson, supra note 60, at 459.
89. For an excellent history of the decade before federal regulation and the
cutthroat competition between railroads, see KOLKO, supra note 87, at 7-29.
. 90. See 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BUSINESS HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY, supra
note 53. at xvii.
91. See Kolko, supra note 87, at 26-44.
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for discontinuation and abandonment of lines.92
C. Post-1871: The Glow Fades
The overall result of the explosive growth and rapid
contraction of rail services was a profound shift in attitudes
toward the railroads beginning in the 1870s. In some states, this
shift did not become fully entrenched until the early 1900s. But
it eventually happened in all states- when the great rewards
promised by the railroads failed to materialize, landowners,
politicians, and investors began to view the railroads as
government pork at the expense of taxpayers.93 The states were
nearly uniform in cutting back on the railroads' powers of
eminent domain starting in the 1880s and ending in the 1920s.94
Some states, like Indiana, specifically amended their railroad
legislation to no longer allow the railroads to acquire by
condemnation fee simple title to the corridor land, but merely
easements, though the ability of the railroad to purchase fee
simple title remained intact.95 Other states imposed limits on the
railroads' ability to acquire title by adverse possession or to
purchase land in fee simple.9 6 And still other states left the land
acquisition powers intact but tightened up their laws on
92. Even before passage of federal regulations imposing rate limits and standard
employee practices, certain states had begun to grow disenchanted with the railroads
and had reduced their powers under state legislation. For instance, Indiana reduced
the railroads' authority to condemn corridor land to easements rather than fee simple
in 1905. See 1905 Ind. Acts ch. 48 § 1. Illinois also amended its eminent domain
statute to remove the language that the railroad will be "seized in fee." See 1849 Ill.
Laws § 22, as amended by 1871-72 Ill. Laws § 17.
93. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BUSINESS HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY, supra note
53, at xix (explaining that between 1873 and 1897 one-third of U.S. railroad mileage
was in receivership and reorganized by banking moguls such as J.P. Morgan). By
1900. seven big financiers owned nearly two-thirds of railroad mileage, resulting in
harsh criticism and passage in 1906 of the Hepburn Act, ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584
(1906). See KOLKO, supra note 87. at 127-54.
94. In Ohio, for example, a railroad could conderrmn a fee simple absolute. See
Pittsburgh & W. Ry. Co. v. Garlick, 20 Ohio C.C. 561 (1900). But by 1946, a railroad
could only acquire an easement by condemnation. See Hinman v. Barnes, 66 N.E.2d
911 (Ohio 1946). And in New York, a railroad acquired a base fee or terminable fee in
People ex rel. Bryan v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 127 N.Y.S. 858 (N.Y. App. Div.
1911), but could only obtain an easement seven years later in Mechanicville & Ft.
Edward R.R. Co. v. Fitchburg Ry. Co., 170 N.Y.S. 476 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1918), affd, 128
N.Y.S. 904 (N.Y. App. Div. 1919).
95. See IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-12-11 (Michie 1999); Texas Co. v. State ex reL.
Coryell, 180 P.2d 631 (Okla. 1947) (holding that territorial statute limited power of
railroad to take by eminent domain any interest greater than an easement).
96. See, e.g., Meyer v. Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago, & St. Louis Ry. Co., 113
N.E. 443 (Ind. Ct. App. 1916; Gulf Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brandenberg, 167
S.W. 170 (Tex. Ct. App. 1914).
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abandonment so that land held as easements would be
extinguished if the railroad did not continue to operate and
maintain the corridors. 7
While we are not concerned here with the 1887 federal
regulation of interstate carriers and shippers, 98 the increased
control by both state and federal governments, as well as more
stringent judicial scrutiny, hit the railroads at a time when they
were already reeling from vicious competition among themselves
and negative public opinion. The media and later historians
perpetuated the image of the railroads as a government-
subsidized monopoly. As one historian described it:
Gradually, as knowledge of how railroads were being financed
permeated to the general public, the whole affair of railroad
promotion, both the honest and the otherwise, was lumped
together to make a gigantic and national scandal which has
ever since been a milepost in many American history books,
many of which have showed maps displaying thick, sinister
lines of black indicating the proportion of the public domain
that had been granted to railroads. Historians revolted at the
exposes of the sharp railroad promoters, wrote angry texts
that for the past sixty years have been accepted as gospel in
our schools and colleges. Because the historians were angry
and because also they really did have reason for anger, many
a textbook has been unfair to the railroads and to the
administrations that made the land grants.99
With the Hepburn Act 1" and increasing federal regulations
in the first decades of the twentieth century, the railroads were
unable to recover from the additional competition of trucking
after the Great Depression.101 The last half of this century,
therefore, has been spent trying to save the railroads from the
effects of political and legal disfavor. 102
The history of the railroads is a fascinating study in the
97. This trend can be seen in judicial decisions finding no abandonment after
one year under a set a facts that would give rise to a finding of abandonment twenty
years later. Compare Durfee v. Peoria Decatur & Evansville Ry. Co., 30 N.E. 686 (Ii.
1892), with Chicago & E. Illinois R.R. Co. v. Clapp, 66 N.E. 223 (i1. 1903); compare
Barlow v. Chicago Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 29 Iowa 276 (Iowa 1870), with
Vandewater v. Chicago Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 153 N.W. 190 (Iowa 1915).
98. Interstate Commerce Clause Regulations Act, Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat.
379 (1887).
99. STUART HOLLBROOK, THE STORY OF AMERICAN RAILROADS 156 (1947).
100. Act of 1906, ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584.
101. See 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BuSINESS HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY, supra
note 53, at xxi-xxii.
102. See generally RAILROAD REVITALIZATION AND REGULATORY REFORM (MacAvoy &
Snow eds., 1977).
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failures and successes of capitalism and laissez-faire
economics. 10 3 By connecting various population groups in the
nation, the railroads had a tremendous effect on the cultural
diversity of this country."04 It should come as no surprise,
therefore, that land acquisition practices and the corresponding
property laws dealing with state and federal regulation would be
complex and variable.' Case law affecting railroad property
rights seems to reflect a fairly steady decline since the 1870s in
the judicial protection of the railroads' property rights and
interests. Although much of that animosity may have been
justified at the turn of the century, now is the opportunity to
rethink the role of the railroads in the next century of land use
development and regulation.
D. What the Railroads Own
Railroads most commonly acquired property through
condemnation, private grant, state or federal grant, or
prescription. 0 6 In principle, the railroads could acquire at least
six different types of property interests: a fee simple absolute, a
fee simple subject to a condition subsequent (with a right of re-
entry in the grantor), a fee simple determinable (with a possibility
of reverter in the grantor), a perpetual or unlimited easement, a
103. As Paul GATES states:
It was the land grants that persuaded capitalists to invest in securities of
the railroads and enabled the railroads to advance far beyond the zone of
settlement, to be the true pioneers in opening up new areas to growth. That
some were built too far in advance of need must be conceded, especially in
the light of their subsequent bankruptcy. The strenuous immigration
promotion campaigns undertaken by the land grant railroads were felt all
over Europe and in the older states. The results are to be seen In the rapid
settlement of the West which, it had been earlier thought, would take one or
two centuries. By 1890, the Superintendent of the Census could say: 'The
Frontier is gone." The rush of new states into the Union in 1876, 1889,
1890, 1896, 1907, 1911, and 1912, the vast outpouring of the new West in
wheat, other grains, and animal products all were made possible by the
railroads, and they in turn by the land grants. Later generations were to
question the wisdom of the policy but few could have foreseen the
subsequent problems in advance.
GATES, supra note 54, at 38 1.
104. See JOHN HOYT WILLIAMS, A GREAT AND SHINING ROAD: THE Epic STORY OF THE
TRANSCONTINENTAL RAILROAD (1988).
105. See Hanson, supra note 33; Wilner, supra note 5: Charles Montange,
Conserving Rail Corridors, 10 TEMPLE ENVrL. L. & TECH. J. 139 (1991).
106. See BYRON K. ELLIOTT & WILLIAM F. ELUOTr, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF
RAILROADS 1291 (1897): Philip Danielson, The Real Property Interest Created in a
Railroad Upon Acquisition of its "Right of Way". 27 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 73 (1954).
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limited or conditional easement, or a license.0 7 Some states,
however, limited the types of property interests the railroads
could acquire through adverse possession or condemnation.10 8
Throughout most of the 19th century, courts made fine
distinctions among the various types of property rights the
railroads could acquire. But by 1900, anti-railroad animus
caused many courts to hold that all ambiguities and
presumptions were to be resolved in favor of the grantor
landowners. 9 The result was that many courts simply imposed
a binary structure on railroad title disputes: either the railroad
acquired fee simple absolute title, allowing it to do virtually
anything it wanted with its land, even if it had discontinued
services and abandoned certain parcels, or the railroad acquired
merely an easement or a right-of-way" 0 over the original
landowner's land, extinguishable under principles of
abandonment.' This binary structure elides important
differences among the different property interests and their
methods of acquisition.
1. Property Interests in a Rail Corridor
On a continuum of property interests, the largest interest a
railroad could acquire is a fee simple absolute, and the smallest
interest a railroad could acquire is a license. Just as any
landowner may impose conditions and limit a grant of land, so,
too, did many of the landowners who negotiated to sell to the
railroads. Often landowners would condition grants on a time
limit for construction of the line," 2  on operation of rail
services,"' on providing certain fencing, or on providing certain
107. See NICIHOLS', supra note 11, § 11.01[a] (discussing property rights a railroad
may acquire).
108. See 1871-72 Ill. Laws § 17 (limiting rights under condemnation).
109. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
110. The term "right-of-way" has two common meanings. To avoid confusion, we
will limit use of the term as much as possible and instead substitute the two
synonyms: "easement" or "corridor" where appropriate.
111. For a quick introduction to the case law on railroad deed interpretation, see
J. Connelly, What Constitutes Abandonment of a Railroad Right of Way, 95 A.L.R.2d
468 (1964); A.E. Korpela, Deed to Railroad Company as Conveying Fee or Easement, 6
A.L.R.3d 973 (1966).
112. Typical language would be "grantor conveys and warrants the following
described land ... but if the railroad is not constructed within two years the land
reverts back to me."
113. A reverter clause would explain that if the railroad use were to cease, the
land would revert to the grantor, or the clause might limit the use of the property to
"railroad purposes."
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rail services.1 14 These various conditions have been interpreted
either as precatory language that places no limit on the grant, as
a condition that limits the grant to some type of defeasible fee
with a future interest in the grantor, or as an easement for
surface use, especially where mineral rights were explicitly
reserved.
Although each railroad line used its own form deed, most
railroad corridors held a wide variety of these types of interests,
corresponding to the wishes and desires of individual
landowners. In most cases, the railroad would use a fee simple
absolute deed and simply add any conditions or limitations to
the habendum clause to create a defeasible fee. While the term
easement was commonly known, it was rarely used because the
common law easement of the nineteenth century did not permit
the easement holder to have exclusive rights in the land.
Railroads required such exclusivity for the safety and function of
the line." 5 Use of the term easement did not generally appear in
original railroad deeds until the turn of the century, and they
were most frequently used when a successor railroad needed a
wider corridor and sought to widen a pre-existing line by 50 or
100 feet.
The fact that a mid-nineteenth century deed would appear in
the form of a defeasible fee or an easement, however, did not
mean that courts would interpret the railroads' property
interests according to strict rules of deed construction. Until the
1880s, in most land disputes between the railroads and original
grantors, the railroads won because either the land granted was
found to be in fee simple absolute, or the railroads' exclusivity
needs required a strong property interest. As public enthusiasm
for the railroads waned, however, so did judicial deference. Not
until the turn of the century did the case law invoke the
presumption against the grantee railroad as the drafter of the
deed or the presumption in favor of easements. As railroads
began to fail, or as they provided fewer services than expected,
courts began to interpret the original granting documents strictly
and narrowly. If the railroad was still operating, it would be
deemed to hold only the smallest property right possible
consistent with its operational needs.' If it had abandoned its
114. For example, the grantor could condition the grant on the construction of a
depot within a particular distance or on the promise to stop the train at the grantor's
farm for loading or unloading crops and supplies.
115. See Midland Valley R.R. v. Sutter, 28 F.2d 163 (10th Cir. 1928).
116. See Brinker v. Union Pac. D. & G. Ry. Co., 55 P. 207 (Colo. App. Ct. 1898);
James v. Indianapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co., 91 111. 554 (1879).
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line, courts often found that the grant had conveyed a mere
easement that was extinguished by abandonment. This turn-of-
the-century trend continues today.
The sixth possible property right, the license, is relatively
rare as licenses are, by their nature, revocable by the fee owner.
Railroads are reluctant to take only a license if they plan to
invest heavily in affixing structures or improving the land. Any
license, therefore, entails extensive and well-documented
contractual negotiations to address in advance, and hopefully
avoid, the possibility of revocation. 117
2. Methods of Acquisition
When a railroad acquired its land from a private landowner
by a private grant, it usually obtained a deed or a contract
stating the type of interest it was acquiring. In some instances,
however, the railroad may have been unable to obtain a deed
because the landowner was either unable or unwilling to grant
one. Some of these parcels were simply acquired by prescription
and a note to that effect appears in all valuation charts filed with
the Interstate Commerce Commission. Some railroads lost all
their original granting documents through fires and floods, and
they have had to reconstruct their landholdings from courthouse
records. In other instances, the courthouse itself burned, leaving
the only reliable records with the railroad. If the railroads were
unable to locate granting documents in the 1920s and 1930s
when they compiled their valuation charts, these parcels were
denoted as acquired by adverse possession. If they acquired their
parcels by condemnation or by state or federal land grant, that
too was noted.
As a general rule, parcels acquired by private grant, either
deed or contract, may take the form of any of the six property
interests outlined above. Acquisition through any of the other
three methods, however, may be limited because they are
fundamentally conveyances by operation of law or state action.
Some states have restricted the interests the railroads could
acquire through adverse possession or condemnation to limited
easements.'18  Others find that parcels acquired through
prescription are narrowly defined to the minimum land
necessary for actual use, even when the allowable width
identified in the charter or general right-of-way statute is
117. See Danielson, supra note 106, at 73.
118. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
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greater. 1 9
For lands obtained by federal grants, the property interest in
the corridor itself will be limited to an easement or a defeasible
fee, though the land acquired for resale will be a fee simple
absolute. The United States Supreme Court held that pre-1871
railroads did not receive the mineral rights underlying their
corridors, but that they received a "limited fee" or defeasible fee
interest.120 The 1875 Act has been interpreted to have conveyed
to the railroads exclusive easements that included subsurface
rights, though not mineral rights. 2 '
State grants of land took one of two forms. First, they could
be direct grants from state-owned lands of either fee simple title
or easements in which the interest conveyed is determined by
the granting documents or state statutes. Second, the grants
could be federal government grants that passed first through
state hands, as did the Illinois Central grants. Where the federal
government gave the land to the states to turn over to the
railroads, the interests will be interpreted under the rules
governing federally granted rights-of-way. 22  Lands granted
directly by the states, however, will vary according to the railroad
charter, municipal agreements, or state statute. Some states
mimicked the 1852 federal right-of-way statute by providing
state right-of-way grants as well.
Courts will allow the railroads to acquire any interest by
private grant on the assumption that the parties may freely
contract to buy or sell any interest in land they choose. But
where land is acquired by the railroads through operation of law
119. See Meyer v. Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co., 113 N.E.
443 (Ind. Ct. App. 1916).
120. See United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 112, 118-19 (1957).
121. See Great N. Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 279 (1942). Although
the federal courts had a rather difficult time explaining that post-1875 -rights-of-
way" were easements while pre-1871 "rights-of-way" were limited fees, it is generally
agreed that the difference is not particularly meaningful in terms of the railroad's
exclusive use and control of the land; rather, it originally made a difference only in
terms of mineral rights. The courts do seem clear, however, that the limits imposed
on the pre-1871 grants are of duration only, while the limits imposed on the post-
1875 railroad easements are potentially of scope and duration. Compare Northern
Pac. Ry. v. Townsend, 190 U.S. 267, 271 (1903) (holding the railroad's interest in pre-
1971 charter rights of way to be a "limited fee"), with Great N. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 315 U.S. 262, 278 (1942] (holding that post-1875 right-of-way grants are of
easements only). The Department of the Interior interprets the post-1875 easements
to be, for all practical purposes, a new estate that falls somewhere between a
common law easement and a defeasible fee. See DEPT OF THE INTERIOR, PROPOSED
INSTALLATION OF MCI FIBER OPTIC COMMUNICATIONS LINE WITHIN SOUTHERN PACIFIC
TRANSPORTATION CO.'s RAILROAD RIGHT-OF-WAY (1989). available at 1989 WL 434834.
122. See City of Maroa v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 592 N.E.2d 660 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
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or state action, they may be limited to only the minimum
property interest necessary for their purposes. Determining the
minimum interest needed, the railroad's purposes, and the
grantor's intent entails rules of deed construction that vary
dramatically from state to state.
3. Construction of Railroad Title Documents
Deed interpretation of nineteenth-century railroad
documents is a complex process, implicating many
considerations and policies, including the use behind the grant,
the current state of railroad operations, and the legal
implications for future heirs of future interests. While no
configuration is consistent throughout all state courts, most
railroad title disputes involve recurring concerns.
The fee simple absolute is the most complete property
interest that can be held by private landowners. Most states had
statutes in the mid-nineteenth century that outlined the
language necessary or sufficient to create such an estate.
Typically, the instrument would "convey and warrant" the "land"
described in the text that followed, with no limitations on use or
duration. Defeasible fee interests use the same granting
language but include a limitation on use (for example, "for
railroad purposes") or duration (for example, "so long as the
railroad is built within five years") in the habendum clause.
Easements are generally created by language that grants a right,
rather than the land itself, such as a right-of-way or a right to
construct and operate a railroad. A limited use easement is
further limited by use (for example, "so long as used for railroad
purposes"). Courts, however, dislike analyzing the subtleties
attendant on these different estates and often will impose a
binary structure on railroad title disputes: either the railroad
acquired a fee simple absolute or a limited use easement.
Everything in between drops out even when those middle
interests more accurately reflect the intentions of the original
parties. 12 3 For example, one court simply explained that: "when
the granting clause of a deed declares the purpose of the grant to
be a right-of-way for a railroad the deed -passes an easement
only, and not a fee with a restricted use, even though the deed is
in the usual form to convey a fee title."
1 24
123. See, e.g., Daugherty v. Helena & N.W. Ry.. 252 S.W.2d 546 (Ark. 1952);
Askew v. Spence, 79 S.E.2d 531 (Ga. 1954).
124. King County v. Squire Inv. Co., 801 P.2d 1022, 1024 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990)
(quoting Swan v. O'Leary, 225 P.2d 199, 201 (Wash. 1950)). See generally Korpela,
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If a railroad acquired a perpetual or general easement, then
the easement exists in perpetuity, regardless of whether or not
the company operates a railroad on the land. 25 These rare
perpetual or general easements are found only where no
language in the grant specifies the type of use the railroad may
make of the land.'26 The holder of such an easement can
expressly abandon the easement, but a court will not imply
abandonment when the easement holder changes or abandons
its use. With a limited use easement, however, the railroad's
property interest will terminate upon cessation or change in
use. 127
Additionally, most courts construe grants in the context of
the actual use to which the land has been put. Where the
railroads constructed buildings such as depots and warehouses,
most courts presume that ambiguous deeds conveyed fee simple
absolute to the railroads, inferring that the parties intended a fee
simple conveyance if the grantor permitted the railroad to build
permanent buildings. 2 ' But where an identically worded deed
conveys land for the rail corridor,129 courts will often construe
the grant to convey only an easement on the so-called public
policy that:
Transaction costs are minimized by undivided ownership of a
parcel of land, and such ownership is facilitated by the
automatic reuniting of divided land once the reason for the
division has ceased. If the railroad holds title in fee simple to
a multitude of skinny strips of land now usable only by the
owner of the surrounding or adjacent land, then before the
supra note 111 (discussing cases finding easements).
125. See, e.g., Graham v. St. Louis Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co., 65 S.W. 1048
(Ark. 1901); Randolph v. Martin, 100 So. 2d 198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958);
Champaign Nat'l Bank v. Illinois Power Co., 465 N.E.2d 1016 (InI. App. Ct. 1984);
Housing Eng'g Co. v. David M. Andrews Co., 40 A.2d 368 (Md. 1945); Norfolk & W.
Ry. Co. v. Bremco Mills, Inc., 288 N.E.2d 868 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1971): Cruzan v.
Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R. Co., 303 P.2d 313 (Okla. 1956).
126. See JON W. BRUCE & JAMES M. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES
IN LAND § 9.01 (1988); Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United States, 733 A.2d 1055, 1064
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999).
127. See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 126, § 9.02.
128. Land to be used for depot or station purposes will almost always be held in
fee by the railroads. See, e.g., Askew v. Vicksburg, Shreveport & Poe Ry. Co., 132 So.
510 (La. 1931); Hale v. Davis, 195 S.E. 523, 524 (Va. 1938).
129. In 1871, Congress amended its land grant statute to limit such grants to
easements only for corridors, though not for buildings and other fixtures. General
Railroad Right of Way Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 152, 18 Stat. 482 (codified at 43
U.S.C. § 934 (1994)). Similarly, the Indiana general assembly amended its eminent
domain statute in 1905 to limit railroads to taking only easements in corridor land,
though their rights to take full fee title for other lands remained unimpaired. See IND.
CODE ANN. § 32-11-3-1 (Mitchie 1999).
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strips can be put to their best use there must be expensive
and time-consuming negotiation between the railroad and its
neighbor- that or the gradual extinction of the railroad's
interest through the operation of adverse possession. It is
cleaner if the railroad's interest simply terminates upon
abandonment of railroad service. A further consideration is
that railroads have eminent domain powers, and they should
not be encouraged to use those powers to take more than
they need of another person's property- more, that is, than a
right of way.... 130
Courts construe a grant to avoid finding defeasible fees for
similar policy reasons. With a defeasible fee, the possibility of
reversion remains in the original grantor and usually passes to
his or her heirs rather than to successors in interest of the
adjoining land."' Locating lost heirs over time becomes difficult,
and so judges often construe to avoid such fees:
The evils resulting from the retention in remote [owners of the
titles in the strips of land over which railroads runJ which for
many years are valueless because of the public easement .. ,
and which then become valuable by reason of an
abandonment of the public use, have led courts to strange
constructions to include the fee of such.., strips in [the]
deeds of the abutting lots. And modem decisions are even
more radical in this regard than the older cases. '3 2
In addition, even when the deed evinces clear intent to
convey fee title by using the requisite statutory fee language,
some courts will rule against the railroads out of what can only
be described as general anti-railroad animus.'3 3
Some states have addressed this problem by statute,
130. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Lewellen, 666 N.E.2d 958, 962 (Ind. Ct. App.
1996), affd, 682 N.E.2d 779 (Ind. 1997).
131. See Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United States, 733 A.2d 1055, 1064 (Md.
1999); Stuart v. Fox, 152 A. 413 (Me. 1930); Garry v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Ry. Co., 378 P.2d 609, 611 (N.M. 1963): McDonalds Corp. v. Dwyer, 432 S.E.2d 165
(N.C. Ct. App. 1993); King County v. Squire Inv. Co., 801 P.2d 1022 (Wash. Ct. App.
1990); Wood v. Board of County Comm'rs, 759 P.2d 1250 (Wyo. 1988).
132. Paine v. Consumers' Forwarding & Storage Co., 71 F. 626, 632 (6th Cir.
1895); see also, e.g., Jones v. Lane, 669 So. 2d 161 (Ala. 1995): Rogers v. Pitchford,
184 S.E. 623 (Ga. 1936); Tallman v. Eastern Illinois & Peoria R.R. Co., 41 N.E.2d 537
(Ill. 1942); Ross, Inc. v. Legler, 199 N.E.2d 346 (Ind. 1964); Sherman Petroleum
Exploration, 132 S.W.2d 768 (Ky. 1939). Despite the desire to limit a railroad's
interests to an easement, the public's interest in these quasi-public parcels is
undermined. See infra Part II.C (discussing unified theory of multiple-use railroad
easements).
133. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Lewellen, 666 N.E.2d 958 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996),
affd, 682 N.E.2d 779, 782 (Ind. 1997) (citing "public policy" reasons for ruling
against railroad); see also DANAYA C. WRIGHT, PRIVATE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC WAYS, 746-
52 (1997).
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transferring title in the reversionary future interest to the
adjoining landowner. 3 However, at least one state's law has
been held to work an unconstitutional taking of the heir's
property rights. 135 The better approach is to interpret the deed to
convey fee simple absolute to the railroad, or a defeasible fee that
converts to a fee simple absolute through destruction of the
reversion by either the marketable title act or the performance of
the condition for a sufficient period (thus satisfying and
destroying the condition).
Judges who believe they are making things simpler by
consistently finding that railroad corridor instruments always
convey easements are mistaken. Numerous cases detailing the
nature of the easement granted to railroads under federal land
grants have held that the "easements granted thereby were not
intended to be construed within the traditional definition of an
easement." 3 6 The nature of railroad use demands that the
servient fee owner has something less than a fee subject to an
easement, and the easement owner has something closely
134. Marketable Title Acts have been enacted recently to extinguish contingent
remainders and possibilities of reversion in an effort to limit dead hand control. See
CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 77, at 855-58 (2nd ed. 1993); see also, e.g., McKinley
v. Waterloo R.R. Co., 368 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1985) (extinguishing reversionary
interests as of date of marketable title act, thus converting the railroad's defeasible
fee interest into fee simple absolute).
When the original grantor conveyed a strip of land for the railroad, often
bisecting his land, the remaining pieces would generally be sold later as separate
parcels, identifying one boundary by the edge of the railroad corridor. These
subsequent conveyances would generally not include a description of the land
underlying the railroad corridor. The presumption arises, therefore, that the grantor
retained the reversionary interest in the railroad corridor, which passed to his heirs
and was not included in later conveyances of the retained land. See NICHOLS', supra
note 11, § 21.0513][b] (stating that in "order to be certain of the accurate
interpretation of the originating grant, one must check to see if it was modified or
extended. Additionally, one must also carefully examine the language of the deeds
conveying the adjacent right of way to be certain the railroad right-of-way has not
been excluded. An express exception within a deed, by conveying property 'less' than
the railway right-of-way, is a clear and plain expression of the intent to exclude the
right-of-way from the deed transfer." (citations omitted)); see also, e.g., King County
v. Squire Inv., 801 P.2d 1022 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990); McDonalds Corp. v. Dwyer, 432
S.E.2d 165, 166 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993); Stuart v. Fox, 152 A. 413 (Me. 1930); Paul v.
Connorsville & Newcastle Junction R.R. Co., 51 Ind. 527 (Ind. 1875).
A handful of state statutes, however, will give the adjoining landowner title to
the centerline of the rail corridor upon abandonment. See, e.g.. IOWA CODE ANN. §
327G.77 (WEST 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-12-10 (Mitchie 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
1-44.2 (1999).
135. See McDonalds Corp. v. Dwyer, 432 S.E.2d 165, 170-71 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993);
Cary Ent. v. CSX Transp. Inc., No. 95-03311 -CH (Mich. 29th Cir. Ct. Apr. 19, 1996).
136. Puett v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 752 P.2d 213, 216 (Nev. 1988) (citing Idaho v.
Oregon Short Line R.R. Co., 617 F. Supp. 207 (D. Idaho 1985), for a lengthy history
of the nature of railroad rights-of-way).
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approaching fee title. Fitting the interests into common-law
categories is counter productive.
While it is understandable that private corporations, using
eminent domain powers, should not be allowed to abuse their
rights at the expense of private landowners, nearly a century and
a half has elapsed since many of these interests were acquired.
Rural farms, bisected by a corridor, are now residential
subdivisions with an undeveloped greenbelt providing
recreational and utility services. When the trains did not
discontinue operations until the past decade or so, the land
rights of the railroads and the adjacent landowners had
coexisted, in most cases, for over 100 years. Many landowners
may have come and gone in that time and successive deeds may
have dropped references to the railroad corridor. Quieting the
interest in the long-term user makes sense on many different
levels.
Property law doctrines, first and foremost, try to prevent
upsetting settled expectations. Finding fee title in the railroad
would further the public policy of quieting title that underlies our
doctrines of adverse possession, the rule against forfeitures,
marketable title acts, the rule against perpetuities, and rules
against transfers of future interests. This is especially true when
there is little, if any, expectation on the part of adjoining
landowners to receive the windfall of a rail corridor. 1
37
Moreover, a strong public interest exists in preserving these
corridors for trails and utilities. Perhaps the strongest policy
motive in favor of the railroads is that evidenced by federal
regulations concerning railroad services and the abandonment of
rail corridors. Many of these corridors were assembled with
public funding, public land, and eminent domain powers. They
are, in a fundamental way, public assets. To the extent that deed
construction can further protect the public's interest, especially
when the cost to landowners is minimal, the courts have an
obligation to realize that the public is a party to these cases as
well. When landowners do not have title to the corridor land,
heirs of the grantor are long gone, and the corridor can continue
to provide vital public utility, recreational, environmental, and
transportation services, there is no reason to continue the
century-old anti-railroad animus that prevailed in the days of
137. A similar argument was upheld at one stage of the lengthy Preseault
litigation, and it has been held that a landowner lacking a deed has no right to
challenge a railroad's title. See King County v. Squire Inv. Co., 801 P.2d 1022, 1027
(Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that adjacent landowner had no interest in railroad's
right-of-way).
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frontier expansion. Precedents lose their legitimacy when times
change.
E. What the Railroads Can Do with What They Own
Few title disputes occur regarding land actually and
currently being used by a company for its railroad. 13 Modem
cases overwhelmingly involve ownership of the land after the
railroad has abandoned services and removed its tracks and
ties. 39 When a railroad is found to hold a fee of some sort, the
railroad will usually retain its property after discontinuation of
rail services. Easements, however, are more likely to be deemed
abandoned upon such discontinuation. But what rights a
railroad has to authorize additional uses on the corridor, either
pre- or post-abandonment, is a matter of much contention.
If the railroad holds its interest in fee simple absolute, its
rights are unaffected by abandonment. 40 It can alienate or
encumber its land without limitation and can make whatever use
of its land that is consistent with inherent limitations on title
and background principles of nuisance law. If the railroad ceases
to operate on the land or even removes its tracks and ties, it still
owns the land and may continue to use it for any purpose or
may choose to sell it without considering neighboring
landowners.' 4
A railroad that acquired a defeasible fee, either a fee simple
subject to a condition subsequent or a fee simple determinable,
may use the land subject to the conditions of the deed- usually
138. Many cases do address whether the underlying fee owner may reoccupy part
of a railroad easement that is currently left unused so long as she does not interfere
with the part being used. See, e.g., Mellon v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 750 F. Supp.
226 (W.D. Tex. 1990); Buhl v. United States Sprint Comm. Co., 840 S.W.2d 904
(Tenn. 1992).
139. See, e.g.,. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Lewellen, 682 N.E.2d 779, 782 (Ind.
1997); King County v. Squire Inv. Co., 801 P.2d 1022 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990);
Glosemeyer v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 879 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1989).
140. An adjacent landowner may acquire title through adverse possession if she
meets the requisite statutory requirements. See, e.g., Erie R.R. Co. v. Kaplowitz, 137
N.Y.S.2d 261 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954); Simacek v. York County Rural Pub. Power Dist.,
370 N.W.2d 709, 713 (Neb. 1985]. Of course, if the use is permissive by the railroad,
no prescriptive rights will accrue to the landowner. See, e.g., Chicago & S.E. Ry. Co.
v. Wood, 66 N.E. 923 (Ind. Ct. App. 1903). And of course, if the railroad only holds an
easement, the fee owner's nonpermissive use of the easement cannot be adverse
because the fee owner already owns the fee. See, e.g., Southern Ry. Co. v. Vann, 216
S.W.2d 727 (Tenn. 1919).
141. See Eldridge v. City of Greenwood, 503 S.E.2d 191, 209 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998)
(recognizing free availability right that comes with fee simple absolute in land); Tazian
v. Cline. 686 N.E.2d 95 (Ind. 1997): O'Dess v. Grand Trunk Western RR. Co., 555
N.W.2d 261 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
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that the railroad use the land only to operate a railroad. As long
as the railroad fulfils the deed conditions, it may also authorize
concurrent use by utilities.142 The railroad's present interest may
terminate when it stops using the land to provide rail services,
and the owner of the reversionary rights of the original grantor
may be able to re-enter and reclaim title to the land if the future
interest has survived the state's marketable title act.43 In
addition, common law presumptions against forfeitures may also
defeat the grantor's future interest, as may rules preventing the
alienation of certain future interests. 144 But if the future interest
survives, it will determine upon cessation of railroad use. While
non-railroad uses were permissible during the period of the
railroad's ownership, such uses may become trespasses once the
reversionary interest is triggered.
If the railroad held only an easement, then its use of the land
may be limited in type and duration; the railroad may also lack
the power to transfer its rights to other owners.
145
Discontinuation of rail service may amount to abandonment of
the easement, allowing the owner of the underlying fee to use
and occupy the previously burdened land without restriction. 1
46
Non-use of a perpetual easement, however, will not cause
abandonment, though third party utility or trail use may have
exceeded the scope of the easement. Discontinuing rail service,
therefore, is much more significant in the context of easements
than it is in the context of fees.
14 7
Even when courts have reduced the quiet title issue to the
binary choice between fee simple absolute and easement, they
have consistently recognized that the easement is bigger, more
142. See Taylor Inv. Co., v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 322 P.2d 817 (Kan.
1958).
143. See Brookbank v. Benedum-Trees Oil Co., 131 A.2d 103. 112 (Pa. 1957).
144. Farrell v. Hodges Stock Yards, Inc.. 343 So. 2d 1364, 1371 (La. 1977); Wood
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 759 P.2d 1250 (Wyo. 1988); Paul v. Connorsville &
Newcastle Junction R.R. Co., 51 Ind. 527 (Ind. 1875). In some states, possibilities of
reversion are nontransferable on the grounds that contingent future interests are
bare expectancies. See Denver & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. School Dist. No. 22, 23 P. 978,
980 (1890).
145. The typical easement is for railroad purposes, which limits the easement
holder to operating a railroad on the land. However, whether the courts will interpret
that limitation broadly or narrowly is a matter of state law. See infra Part III.D.2.
(discussing Incidental Use Doctrine); see also BRUCE & ELY, supra note 126, § 9.02.
146. See infra Part V (discussing abandonment).
147. As discussed later, however, abandonment is an incredibly complex issue, as
abandonment of the easement is often confused with discontinuance of rail services
and the removal of the line from federal Surface Transportation Board (STB)
jurisdiction. See id.; see also Marc A. Sennewald, The Nexus of Federal and State Law
in Railroad Abandonments, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1399 (1998).
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extensive, and exclusive as against the fee owner than most
private easements and public utility easements. 4 ' A railroad
easement is even more exclusive against the fee owner than a
highway easement. The owner of the fee underlying the highway
can still drive on the highway as a member of the public, but the
only way the owner of the fee underlying the railroad may enter
her burdened land is to buy a ticket and ride the train through
it. In fact, courts have had great difficulty defining the railroad
easement because it so closely resembles the exclusive dominion
and control of fee simple ownership. This difficulty is especially
pronounced when the railroad has acquired its interest under
eminent domain or by private grant; in these cases, the railroad
usually will have paid the full fair market value for fee title. 49
Therein lies the heart of this study. When the railroad holds
only an easement, does the exclusive character of the easement
and its extensive scope confer upon the railroad the power to
grant licenses or subeasements to utility companies or allow
recreational trail use? Does that power depend on whether the
railroad acquired its easement through purchase, through
eminent domain, or from a federal grant? What happens to
utility rights when the railroad abandons? What happens if a
railroad discontinues rail services and has the line removed from
federal jurisdiction, but continues to claim ownership of the
easement and maintains or pays taxes on it?150 The rights of
utilities in rail corridors are tremendously unstable in the
absence of any consistent rulings on these issues."'1
Because of the importance of rail corridors for utility services
and the growing demand for rails-to-trails conversions, the
question of the railroad's power to grant these utility licenses or
148. See infra Part III.B (discussing exclusivity).
149. Although modem landowners often claim that the railroad paid less than fair
market value for land when they paid only $100 or $200 for a 100-foot-wide strip of
land running over 20 or 40 acres, this often amounted to two or three times the fair
market value of unimproved land or farmland. For instance, in Indiana, the average
value of an acre of farmland in 1870 was $28, in 1880 it was $31, in 1890 it was
$37. in 1900 it was $39, and n 1910 it was $75. See INDIANA CROP & LIVESTOCK
REPORING SERVICE, HIsTORIC CROP SuMMARY, 1866-1969, at 142 (1974) (citing
Economic Research Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Farm Real Estate Developments).
150. See generally AMON, supra note 7. As the lead attorney for these class action
cases explained, he and the rest of his co-counsel are attempting to set up a land
cooperative, complete with a federal patent, that would allow the cooperative to
license utility uses in these corridors. That would seem to necessitate some sort of
control over an extensive portion of these corridors, lands that he claims should be
returned to the adjacent landowners.
151. Witness the twenty-five class action suits filed against the railroads and
utilities. See AMON, supra note 7, at Al.
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subeasements takes on new significance. 52 The recent spate of
class action cases, therefore, implicates a wide variety of state
and federal statutes, common law, and public policy regarding
railroads, railbanking, trail use, and utility services, and raises
profound questions about the rule against creation of new
estates. It is simply not enough to say that the utility license
stands or falls on the strength of the railroad's property rights.
Until we have a better sense of the exact scope and nature of the
railroad's property rights and the conditions under which those
rights might be extinguished, we will be unable to ascertain what
rights the utilities acquired and whether or not they must also
negotiate with individual landowners who may or may not have
coterminous rights in the rail corridor. In the next Part, we
explore the scope, duration, and use of the railroad easement.
III
THE LIMITED EASEMENT FOR RAILROAD PURPOSES
The cardinal rule in property law is that one cannot sell what
one does not own. In property law parlance, we refer to property
rights as a bundle of sticks, where fee simple title is envisioned
as ownership of the entire bundle. The owner of the bundle can
sell or give various sticks to different people, or can divide
ownership over time by designating who will own the various
sticks in the bundle at various times. The same is true if one
only owns a few sticks from the bundle, as with an easement. If a
railroad owns only an easement in a parcel of land, it cannot sell
something greater than that easement to someone else without
unjustly converting the property rights of the fee owner. But the
railroad can sell all of its sticks to someone else, as when it
conveys to a successor railroad all of its property along a given
line, or it can sell one or two sticks and retain the remaining
sticks. 153
But to say that a railroad easement owner can sell part of its
easement while retaining the rest does not tell us whether it can
sell the right to string wires or lay pipelines to a utility. We must
first determine whether the right to string wires or pipes was a
stick in the railroad's small bundle in the first place. If not, that
right remains with the underlying fee owner. To answer that
question, we must analyze the scope of the railroad easement.
152. See generally Wilner, supra note 5 (discussing importance of rail corridors for
utilities).
153. See NICHOLS'. supra note 11. § l1.01[21[c]; CUNNINGHAM ETAL., supra note 77,
§ 8.10.
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This Part attempts to deduce a coherent theory about the
nature, parameters, and powers of the limited railroad
easement."5 On the one hand, the railroad easement is exclusive
in a way that most easements are not. The railroads have
exclusive rights to possession of their corridors and may exclude
the fee owner from access to her land. On the other hand,
railroads do not have unlimited development rights because the
railroad easement is limited to railroad use. The owner may not,
for example, operate a petunia farm on the corridor. The key task
is to locate the boundary between the railroad's exclusive control
and the restrictions placed on the corridor's use. That boundary
determines the answer to numerous questions:
* May the railroad lease corridor land to a private company
that operates warehouses, loading docks, or a
restaurant for train passengers?
* May it authorize construction of telegraph lines that will be
used to send communication signals to stations and
switches to regulate train traffic? If so, may it allow the
telegraph company to also send private, non-railroad-
related communications for profit?
" May it authorize water lines or drainage culverts to
minimize run-off from the artificial roadbed
embankments?
" May it extract gravel from the easement to build its bed?
" May it extract coal, oil, or titanium from its easement to
sell for profit to fund the railroad? How far below the
surface may it dig and how high in the air may the
trains, water towers, communications lines, bridges, or
other structures reach?
* May it operate one hundred trains an hour without owing
damages to the servient landowner?
" May a logging railroad take up its tracks and ties and sell
the easement for operation as a logging road?
* What, if anything, can we learn from the publicly-owned
street and highway cases where utilities are frequently
located along street rights-of-way?
" What expectations and rights do adjacent landowners have
in railroad corridors if their deed does not include the
rail corridor?
154. The limited railroad easement must be distinguished from the general
easement. If there is no use restriction, then divisibility is permitted so long as the
burden on the easement is not unreasonably increased. It is only when the scope is
limited to certain uses that deviation from that use is a violation of the easement and
may work an extinction. See Hegi, supra note 44, at 134.
(Vol. 27:351
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e What effect, if any, do the different types of easement,
whether by private grant or by federal grant, have on
the ability of the railroads to authorize third-party use
of their corridors?
Certainly we cannot exhaustively answer all of these
questions in detail for every state. Most states have not
addressed more than one or two of these questions. What
follows, therefore, is a general summary of the state of the law
with regard to many of these issues with the purpose of drawing
forth a coherent set of rules that will allow judges and lawyers in
future cases to better delineate the parameters of the railroad's,
the utility company's, the landowner's, and the public's rights in
these valuable corridors. The fiber-optic and rails-to-trails cases
are merely the catalyst for a much broader discussion of how the
legal system should regulate the competing needs of private
property owners, developing areas requiring necessary utilities,
and those who wish to use these corridors for high-speed trains
or as trails and greenways into the next century.
A. A Right-of-Way by Any Other Name...
The principal difficulty in interpreting what property rights
the railroads have acquired in their corridors comes from the
dual meaning of the term "right-of-way." The term means, first, a
right of passage or a right to come onto someone else's land, and,
second, a railroad or street corridor.155
When the term "right-of-way" is used in the first sense, it is a
legal term of art referring to a right to pass over someone else's
land. This legal definition most closely resembles an easement,
although technically an easement is broader than a right-of-way
because it permits the owner both to pass across the land and to
use the land in certain ways, as in constructing and operating
trains. A true right-of-way derives from old English traditions
allowing passers-by to traverse one's land to reach public
roads." 6 The passer-by is not entitled, by virtue of the right-of-
way, to plant petunias or run livestock if the right is simply a
155. See BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1489 (4th ed. 1968) (explaining that the term
"right-of-way" is sometimes "used to describe a right belonging to a party to pass over
land of another, but it is also used to describe that strip of land upon which railroad
companies construct their road bed, and, when so used, the term refers to the land
itself, not the right of passage over it.").
156. See WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 301 (1938) (explaining
the difference between a footway, a packe, and prime way (a footway plus a way for
animals), and a via or aditus (a footway plus a horseway plus a cartway).
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right of passage.' 7
The second meaning of right-of-way refers to the actual
physical stretch of land on which the railroad has constructed its
roadbed. In the nineteenth century, this second meaning was the
one most often used. Indeed, the common deed language of the
time usually conveyed and warranted "the following real estate: a
right of way."
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the dual nature of the
term right-of-way in the context of railroad uses in Joy v. City of
St. Louis."'58 Judges, scholars, and commentators have since cited
the term's dual meaning as the leading cause of ambiguity and
litigation in railroad property cases. 59 Unfortunately, because
the federal railroad land grants use the term "right-of-way," as do
most state statutes and a large percentage of private deeds, the
so-called ambiguity is unlikely to disappear any time soon."
Courts in the past few decades have not ameliorated the
problem. Rather than engage the canons of construction, the
recent trend has been to interpret any mention of the term right-
of-way anywhere in the deed to imply that an easement was
intended, even when the term clearly refers to the physical
corridor and the deed uses statutory fee simple language.'6 ' For
instance, one court explained that "[wihere, by instrument or
deed, land is purportedly conveyed to a railroad company for the
laying of a rail line, the presence of language referring, in some
manner to a 'right of way' operates to convey a mere easement
notwithstanding additional language evidencing the conveyance
of a fee."' 62
But a conveyance of a fee simple is consistent with the term
right-of-way in the granting clause when the term is used in its
second meaning, "physical corridor." Courts fail to recognize the
duality of the term "right-of-way" and therefore often
misinterpret clear language conveying fee simple title to the
157. The passerby might even be prevented from stopping, resting, or picnicking
along the way.
158. 138 U.S. 1, 44 (1890).
159. See generally Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Lewellen, 682 N.E.2d 779 (Ind.
1997); Danielson, supra note 106, at 74; Korpela, supra note 111, § 5 (discussing
relevant cases).
160. See WRIGHT, PRIVATE RIGHTS, supra note 133, at 741; Danaya C. Wright,
Trains, Trails and Property Law: Indiana Law and the Rails-to-Trails Controversy, 31
IND. L. REv. 754 (1998).
161. See, e.g., Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Lewellen, 666 N.E.2d 958, 962 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1996) (holding that public policy reasons beyond the deed language may
derogate from the grant), affd, 682 N.E.2d 779 (Ind. 1997).
162. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Roberts, 928 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).
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land. 163 The federal courts themselves contributed to this
confusion when they held that the pre-1871 land grants
conveyed defeasible fees and the 1875-Act grants conveyed
merely easements, even though the term "right-of-way" was the
term used in both acts to describe the property right conveyed to
the railroad. 1" The courts' distinction was based not so much on
the dual meaning of the term right-of-way but on changing
definitions of legal easements to more appropriately include both
characteristics of a railroad right-of-way. In fact, the term
easement was rarely used in the nineteenth century when
referring to railroad rights-of-way because a common-law
easement generally did not convey exclusive rights to the land.
The second meaning of the term right-of-way most often
arises in the habendum or descriptive clauses of a deed when
references are made to the entire corridor or roadbed, as when
the grantor reserves a grade crossing across the corridor or the
railroad agrees to fence the corridor. 16 This sense of the term is
also common in fee simple deeds that use the existing corridor
as a spatial reference (for example, "convey and warrant a strip
of land, fifty feet on each side of the XYZ right-of-way") or use it
to describe the actual land conveyed in the deed (as in "convey
and warrant the following real estate: the right-of-way fifty feet
wide").6 In the latter use, especially, the term cannot mean
"right-of-way" as "right of passage"; when taken together with the
fee simple terms of the deed, the term must have been used in
its second sense, meaning the land or rail corridor itself.
Because many nineteenth-century instruments only used
the term right-of-way, and did not use either the term fee simple
or easement, courts must continually attempt to deduce intent
163. In Lewellen, 682 N.E.2d at 780-82, the deed "[c]onvey[s] and [wiarrant[s] to
the [Railroad] the Land, Right of way, and Right of Drainage," and the Indiana
Supreme Court interpreted the deed to convey only an easement when what was
clearly intended was fee simple in the corridor land, a right of access across the
landowner's remaining land to reach the corridor for construction and maintenance,.
and a right to be free of liability for drainage onto the remaining land. The mere
presence of the term right-of-way, which the court noted was a smaller interest than
fee simple in the land, became the all-consuming issue.
164. Compare Northern Pac. Ry v. Townsend, 190 U.S. 267, 271 (1903) (holding
right-of-way means a limited or defeasible fee), with United States v. Union Pac. R.R.
Co., 353 U.S. 112, 119-20 (1957) (holding right-of-way to be an easement).
165. See Faus v. City of Los Angeles, 431 P.2d 849, 854 (Cal. 1967) (reference to
fencing the right-of-way): Bouche v. Wagner, 293 P.2d 203, 207-09 (Or. 1956)
(reference to a grade crossing over the right-of-way).
166. See, e.g., Johnson v. Valdosta, Moultive & W. R.R. Co., 150 S.E. 845. 846-47
(Ga. 1929) (conveying a "strip of land sixty feet wide for a railroad right of way");
Cruzan v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 303 P.2d 313, 314 (Okla. 1956)
(conveying land identified by reference to "the outer lines of the right-of-way").
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from a highly ambiguous term.'67 The most general rule one can
derive from existing case law is that, if the term right-of-way
appears in the granting clause, even if it merely refers to the
physical corridor, the deed will most likely be construed to
convey an easement.'68 If the term appears in the habendum or
descriptive clauses, the courts disagree; some find that an
easement was intended, others that a fee simple was intended.
Only absence of the term altogether, with clear fee simple or
easement language, leads to a straightforward interpretation of
the deed, though even this rule was not followed in some
cases. 1
69
Though the modem trend seems to be to interpret right-of-
way simply to mean an easement, courts have agreed that the
railroad easement is a unique and difficult-to-define property
right that does not clearly fit into the easement or fee
categories. 70 As the Supreme Court has noted: "A railroad right-
of-way is a very substantial thing. It is more than a mere right of
passage. It is more than an easement."'' But it is not a fee. It
has been called a "limited fee,"'72 a "perpetual easement,"'73 a
"right-of-way easement,"'7 4 and an "exclusive easement,' 1 75 but
167. For instance, in Tompkins v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 79 S.E.2d 41, 45
(Ga. Ct. App. 1953), the term "fee simple" appeared in the granting clause but the
court construed the deed to convey only an easement, holding that the "words 'in fee
simple' are descriptive of the extent of duration of the enjoyment of easement
conveyed," while in City of Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court. 914 P.2d 160 (Cal.
1996), the court held that the railroad had received a fee simple because the term
"easement" was available to more accurately reflect the intent of the parties if they
had meant to limit the conveyance to just a right of use. In our own research, we
found that over fifty percent of deeds along a short line in Indiana were fee simple
absolute deeds that did not even use the term right-of-way. There were also clear
easement deeds that did not use the term either.
168. Although we believe this to be sloppy adjudication, it comports with the
presumption that ambiguities in deeds are to be decided against the drafter, which in
most cases was the railroad.
169. See, e.g., Tompkins v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 79 S.E.2d 41 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1953); Ex rel State Highway Comm'n v. Union Electric Co., 148 S.W.2d 503 (Mo.
1941) (interpreting the grant to be an easement despite the fact that the term "fee
simple" appeared and there was no use of the term right-of-way).
170. See infra Part [II.B (discussing exclusivity).
171. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 195 U.S. 540, 570 (1904).
172. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Townsend, 190 U.S. 267, 271 (1903).
173. Pratt v. Griese, 409 P.2d 777, 779 (Kan. 1966); Randolph v. Martin, 100 So.
2d 198, 198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
174. AG Farms, Inc. v. American Premier Underwriters, Inc., 695 N.E.2d 882, 885
(Ill. App. Ct. 1998); see also Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United States, 733 A.2d 1055,
1063 (Md. 1999).
175. Forwood v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 1998 WL 136572, at *4 (Del. Ch.
1998); see also City of Maroa v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 592 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992).
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no court has clearly indicated the differences, if any, between
these. Initially the courts seemed more likely to interpret
ambiguous deeds for "railroad right-of-way" to be some form of
defeasible fee. But by the early twentieth century, both federal
and state courts had turned toward labeling the interest as an
exclusive easement rather than a defeasible fee.
In 1893, with reference to federally granted rights-of-way,
the Supreme Court characterized one railroad's right-of-way
interest as "more than an ordinary easement" and likened it to a
fee insofar as it had the "attributes of the fee, perpetuity and
exclusive use and possession: also the remedies of the fee, and,
like it corporeal, not incorporeal property."'7 6 In 1898, the Court
held the railroad's interest in a pre-1871 land grant to be a fee
rather than a mere right of passage.17 7 But the Court
acknowledged that although the interest looked like a fee, the
appellant could justifiably disagree with that label. In 1903 the
Court developed yet another term, "a limited fee,"'7 8 because the
grant was limited insofar as "the road shall be . .. used [only] for
the purposes designed."17 9  The right to alienate upon
discontinuation of rail services was retained by the government.
But payment of substantial consideration justified interpreting
the grant to convey a fee interest rather than an easement.
Hence, at least in pre-1871 grants, the courts interpreted the
railroad's interest to be a defeasible fee with a condition of
reverter if railroad use ceased.
In 1904 the same language and analysis was applied to a
railroad interest under a state grant. 8 ' The Court cited the "more
than an easement" and "attributes of the fee" language from New
Mexico v. United States Trust to find that a railroad's right-of-way
was protected from condenmation by a telegraph company. 18 1 In
1942, however, the Court found that grants under the 1875 Act
constituted easements and not fees, though it recognized that
the easement was not limited the way common-law private
easements are, but, as later cases affirmed, carried with it the
"right to exclusive use and occupancy of the land.'1 2 As the
Tenth Circuit hypothesized, the
concept of 'limited fee' was no doubt applied in Townsend
176. New Mexico v. United States Trust Co., 172 U.S. 171, 183 (1898).
177. See i at 182.
178. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Townsend, 190 U.S. 267, 271 (1903).
179. Id.
180. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 195 U.S. 540 (1904).
181. Id. at 570.
182. State v. Oregon Short Line R.R. Co., 617 F. Supp. 207. 212 (D. Idaho 1985).
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because under the common law an easement was an
incorporeal hereditament which did not give an exclusive
right of possession. With the expansion of the meaning of
,easement' to include, so far as the railroads are concerned, a
right in perpetuity to exclusive use and possession the need
for the 'limited fee' label disappeared.'8 3
In other words, as courts expanded their common-law
easement doctrines to allow for exclusivity, railroad rights-of-way
came to be labeled easements rather than defeasible or limited
fees. This change has had a profound impact on railroad
litigation in this century."
State courts have had an equally hard time labeling the
railroad's interest, especially in light of the fact that most
railroad deeds did not use either of the terms "fee simple" or
"easement" but often mimicked the Supreme Court's
characterization with regard to the type of interest being
conveyed. In 1928, the Eighth Circuit analyzed the law of Kansas
on railroad property interests and quoted extensively from
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., noting
that:
A railroad's right of way has, therefore, the substantiality of
the fee, and it is private property, even to the public, in all
else but an interest and benefit in its uses. It cannot be
invaded without guilt of trespass. It cannot be appropriated in
whole or part, except upon the payment of compensation. In
other words, it is entitled to the protection of the
Constitution, and in the precise manner in which protection
is given. It can only be taken by the exercise of the powers of
eminent domain. 18
5
Although the state courts have not extensively debated
whether the railroad right-of-way fits within the traditional
estates of fee simple, defeasible fees, or easements or the niceties
of corporeal and incorporeal hereditaments, they have spent a
significant amount of time actually interpreting deeds to convey
either easements or fees simple absolute.'8 6 State courts
commented frequently that the railroad's right was the same
"whether it be characterized as an 'easement' or 'right-of-way,"'
and that, even though the deed purported to convey fee title, only
183. Wyoming v. Udall, 379 F.2d 635, 640 (10th Cir. 1967).
184, See generally Korpela, supra note 111 (summarizing railroad title cases).
185. 195 U.S. 540, 570 (1904).
186. See, e.g., Davis v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 606 So. 2d 734, 738 (Fla. Dist. App.
Ct. 1992); State v. Union Electric Co., 148 S.W.2d 503 (Mo. 1941). The most
thorough compilation of state cases on this issue appears in Deed to Railroad
Company as Conveying Fee or Easement Korpela, supra note 111.
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an easement would be recognized because of statutory or grant
limitations on the property interests the railroads could acquire
by condemnation or grant."18
In any event, the modem trend is to call a "right-of-way" an
"easement," and to construe railroad property rights as
easements whenever there are limitations on the grant or
purposes to which the land may be put. Even though the courts
call the "right-of-way" an "easement," however, they recognize
that it is a special easement, unique to the railroad context,
which gives exclusive use and possession to the railroad.
B. Exclusivity
In outlining the scope, burden, uses, duration, and general
parameters of the railroad easement, the most important feature
seems to be its exclusive character. Unlike all other private
easements and most commercial easements, the railroad
easement is exclusive as against the fee owner. In non-railroad
cases, the fee owner can use the easement located on her land;
she may drive on the driveway or have a picnic under the power
line poles of a utility easement. The only restraint on the fee
owner's use of her own fee is non-interference with the easement
owner's use rights in the encumbered land. But this is not the
case with a railroad easement or certain other easements in
gross for commercial purposes.'88  Exclusivity, one court
explained, "refers to the exclusion of the owner and possessor of
the servient tenement from participation in the rights granted,
not to the number of different easements in and over the same
land." 89 Thus, an exclusive railroad easement allows for
exclusion of the fee owner, though the easement owner may
permit multiple uses on the land so long as those uses do not
exceed the reasonable limitations on scope or burden of the use.
For the federal railroad grants, the easements are deemed to
be "a right in perpetuity to exclusive use and possession." 90 The
reasons for the exclusivity of the railroad easement are many. As
the Eighth Circuit explained:
The railroad, charged with the performance of public duties
which it cannot evade, and with liabilities which it cannot
limit, should, for its own protection as well as in the interest
187. Davis, 606 So. 2d at 738.
188. See Henley v. Continental Cablevision, Inc., 692 S.W.2d 825 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985).
189. Davis, 606 So. 2d at 828.
190. Wyoming v. Udall, 379 F.2d 635, 640 (10th Cir. 1967).
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of the public, be accorded the free use of its right of way,
undisturbed by the claims of adjoining owners to a partial
occupancy or use.... An easement granted to a railway is
essentially different from any other. The nature of railway
service requires exclusive occupancy. A railroad company is
held to the highest degree of care, and the exercise of this
care necessarily requires that it should have complete
dominion over its right of way. It is bound to prevent
obstructions from being placed on its tracks, and is required
to keep them fenced in, and free from rubbish or other
combustible materials. The duties of a railway company are
due to the public as well as to individuals, and these duties it
must perform at its peril. The rules which apply to the use of
streets or highways fail, when applied to railroads, because
the necessities of their use are different. The railroad must
have the exclusive possession and control of the land within
the lines of its location, and the right to remove everything
placed or growing thereon, which it may deem necessary to
remove to insure the safe management of its road. 19'
To give security to their passengers and workmen and to
discharge their duties as public carriers, railroads are held to the
highest accountability in the performance of their duties and
therefore require unquestioned exclusivity with regard to
physical control over the corridor."9 2 Consequently, a railroad
company may bring an action in ejectment, which is unique
among easement holders.'9 3 Moreover, because the easement is
exclusive, servient landowners who desire private grade
crossings must seek approval from the railroad even though they
own the underlying fee.' 94 Even unauthorized use of the grade
crossing over a period of time will not entitle the servient
landowner to prescriptive rights; the railroad does not own the
fee, and it is only the fee owner against whom adverse
possession can be acquired.'9 5 So long as the railroad continues
to maintain the road, the owner of the servient estate has no
right to use or occupy the surface of the land burdened by the
easement without the railroad company's consent.
191. Midland Valley R.R. Co. v. Sutter, 28 F.2d 163, 166 (8th Cir. 1928) (citations
omitted).
192. See C. CLARKE, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH 'RUN wrrH LAND'
INCLUDING LICENSES, EASEMENTS, PROFITS, EQUITABLE RESTRICTIONS AND RENTS 83-84
(2d ed. 1947).
193. See Comment, Railroad Right of Way- Nature of the Interest- Easements-
Ejectment, 30 OR. L. REV. 380, 380-84 (1951); see also BRUCE & ELY, supra note 126,
§ 1.06131.
194. See Puett v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 752 P.2d 213, 217 (Nev. 1988).
195. See id. at 215.
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It follows that, if the servient estate owner has no right to
use or occupy the railroad's easement, she may not authorize a
third party to do so. Exclusivity is equally strict as against the
servient owner as against assignees, licensees, lessees, or
secondary easement holders. Ironically, while the courts are
consistent in stating that a railroad easement is exclusive as
against the servient estate owner, a small handful of states have
allowed very limited landowner use of unused portions of a
railroad easement, a doctrine we call the "landowner-use rule."
196
But even in these states, landowners are not permitted to
construct permanent structures in the unused portions of the
easement,'97 drill for oil or gas in the easement,198 or even enclose
pasture land by a fence in a way that might give rise to a claim
against the railroad for adverse possession. 199 Furthermore, in
the states applying the landowner-use rule, landowners were
permitted to use or occupy portions of railroad corridors only
when the railroads had abandoned those portions under state
law,2 0° when the railroads had essentially waived their rights to
complain about trespasses by allowing continuing infringement
by others,2' when the railroads had maintained private grade
crossings and therefore would be liable for injury caused
thereon, 20 2 or when the deeds to the railroads reserved for
landowners certain uses on the easement. 2 3 Hence, even in the
states that purport to follow the landowner-use rule, the uses are
usually limited to agricultural uses or uses that do not interfere
with the railroads. °4 Moreover, later cases diminish the strength
196. These states- North Carolina, South Carolina, Kansas, and Tennessee-
often recite a rule that sounds relatively broad, but the cases do not bear out the full
extent of the rule. The rule is often articulated as 'the owner of the fee in a railroad
right of way has the right to use so much thereof as is not in the actual use and
occupancy of the railroad company, provided the use be not inconsistent with the
claim of right of way for the railroad purposes." Atlanta & Charlotte AirLine Ry. Co. v.
Limestone-Globe Land Co., 96 S.E. 188, 190 (S.C. 1918); see also, e.g., Midland
Valley R.R. Co. v. Corn. 21 F.2d 96 (D. Kan. 1927); Harvey v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co.,
207 P. 761 (Kan. 1992); Atlantic Coast Line R-R. v. Bunting, 84 S.E. 1009 (N.C.
1915); Mobile & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Donovan, 58 S.W. 309, 312 (Tenn. 1900).
197. Southern Ry. Co. v. Vannet, 216 S.W. 727 (Tenn. 1919).
198. See Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. Marietta Oil Corp., 102 F.2d 603 (5th Cir.
1939); Midland Valley R.R. Co. v. Jarvis, 29 F.2d 539, 541 (8th Cir. 1928);
Consumers Gas Trust Co. v. American Plate Glass Co., 68 N.E. 1020 (Ind. 1903).
199. See Southern Ry. v. Beaudrot, 41 S.E. 299, 299 (S.C. 1902).
200. See Midland Valley R.R. Co. v. Corn, 21 F.2d 96 (D. Kan. 1927).
201. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Bunting, 84 S.E. 1009 (N.C. 1915).
202. See Miller v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 77 S.E. 748, 748-49 (S.C. 1913).
203. See Mobile & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Donovan, 58 S.W. 309, 313 (Tenn. 1900).
204. Even where agricultural uses were allowed in the easement, the railroad was
not held liable for damages to crops within the easement caused by spraying of weed
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of the landowner-use rule, and even those states that had
adhered to it at the beginning of the century had shifted to the
strict exclusivity rule by mid-century." 5  Under the strict
control chemicals by the railroad. See Bivins v. Southern Railway Co., 102 S.E.2d
128, 133 (N.C. 1958).
205. See Bivins v. Southern Ry. Co., 102 S.E.2d 128 (N.C. 1958). The only recent
cases that purport to follow the landowner-use rule are two questionable decisions
from the late 1970s regarding the rights of servient estate owners to authorize
location of coal slurry pipelines across railroad easements. See Energy Transp. Sys.,
Inc. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 606 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1979) (ETSI X); Energy Trans.
Sys., Inc. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 619 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1980) (ETSI VIII). Although
the courts allowed the servient landowners to authorize use by the coal company
against the railroad's wishes, the discussion focused not on the issue of exclusivity
but entirely on surface versus subsurface rights in a railroad easement and
ownership of the minerals underlying the easement, an issue not particularly
contentious. The fee owner is always held to have retained the mineral rights under
railroad easements. See, e.g., United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 112, 120
(1957). It was primarily the mineral rights issue that caused the federal courts to
adjust their interpretation of federally granted rights-of-way as limited fees or
easements. For a thorough analysis of the law governing federally granted rights-of-
way, see generally RooT, supra note 57.
In the ETSI cases, it seems important that the pipeline's interference with the
railroad easement would be minimal, as It merely transversed the easement and did
not lie parallel to it. One motivation for the decision may be that Union Pacific had
routinely allowed other pipelines to cross the corridor and merely objected to this one
because it directly competed with Union Pacific.
Notably, the courts did not engage the question of how the surface owner
might be able to restrict access to the subsurface until abandonment, even though it
could not authorize removal of minerals itself. That issue was extensively discussed
by the Supreme Court of Indiana in Consumers Gas Trust Co. v. American Plate Glass
Co., 68 N.E. 1020 (Ind. 1903]. In Consumers Gas Trust Co., the court acknowledged
that even though the railroad did not own the mineral estate, it could prevent a
lessee of the servient owner from tapping into it by virtue of its exclusive control over
the surface. See idl. at 1021; see also Midland Valley R.R. v. Sutter, 28 F.2d 163 (10th
Cir. 1928); Plattner & Joharnson, Railroad, Grants, and Condemnation: Title and
Interest Acquired in Railroad Rights-of-Way, 37 N.D. L. REV. 266 (1961). The servient
owner would simply have to wait to extract the minerals until the railroad abandoned
or gave a license to allow the access.
Because the ETSI cases are of questionable logic and authority, and because
they rely on the 1875 Act railroad grants rather than private grants, they have not
been followed in any later cases. Moreover, the vitality of these cases is questioned in
the Tenth Circuit decision in Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co. v. Early. 641 F.2d 856
(10th Cir. 1981), in which the court held that Union Pacific had acquired a fee
interest in the land, therefore including the mineral rights, in a situation
indistinguishable from the grants in ETSI V!II and ETSI X. The only deviation from the
rule announced in Consumers Gas Trust, that the mineral estate holder must wait
until abandonment if the surface easement holder denies access, was in Missouri-
Kansas-Texas R.R. Co. v. Freer, 321 S.W.2d 731 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958), in which the
grantor had reserved in the deed the right to mine on the railroad's easement.
Arguably, this is what happened in the ETSI cases. The landowner-use
language was a readily available rule which the court used to justify punishing the
railroad for its anti-competitive and discriminatory behavior. The court turned to a
short-hand rule of very limited application which conceivably was not intended to
apply to such a case rather than decide against the railroad on the grounds that its
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exclusivity rule, even growing crops or permitting livestock to
graze along the easement is strictly forbidden. 20 6
It is unclear whether the landowner-use rule still has any
vitality in light of the 1928 Eighth Circuit decision in Midland
Valley R.R. Co. v. Sutter.2 7 That decision was one in a lengthy
series of disputes between the railroad, which had leased certain
portions of its easement to a company that was drilling for gas
and had placed a gas pipeline along the railroad corridor, and
the servient landowner, who had granted mineral rights to
another gas company who sought to drill on the railroad
easement as well. In deciding the issue, the Eighth Circuit went
through a lengthy discussion of the landowner-use rule, noting
that the
decisions of the national courts and of a majority of the state
jurisdictions... are to the effect that the railroad company is
entitled to the exclusive use and possession of its right of
way, and that the owner of the servient estate has no right to
occupy the surface of the land conveyed for right of way, in
any mode, or for any purpose, without the railroad company's
consent.208
Besides being the majority view, and more in line with the nature
of the railroad easement in light of its public carrier duties, the
court in Sutter effectively nullified the minority rule with regard
to interstate carriers, at least, under a theory of federal
preemption. 20 9
denial of permission to cross its track was because the coal slurry pipeline directly
competed with the railroad and was not based on legitimate reasons, since it allowed
other pipelines to traverse its tracks. See Randall Napier, Coal Slurry Pipelines and
Railroad Crossings: Court Decisions Favor the Pipeline Sponsors, 18 Hous. L. REv.
1075 (1981).
206. See Chicago Great Western R.R. Co. v. Zahner, 177 N.W. 350, 351-52 (Minn.
1920); Wilmot v. Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. Co., 24 So. 701, 702 (Miss. 1899).
207. 28 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1928).
208. Id. at 165 (citing cases that follow the strict exclusivity rule from Minnesota,
Mississippi, Vermont, Pennsylvania, Indiana. New York, Connecticut. Illinois. and
Alabama).
209. As the court noted:
We are inclined to the view that the question is one of general
jurisprudence, and that we are not bound to follow the Kansas decisions. An
interstate commerce railway system adequate to the country's needs is
today recognized to be a national necessity.... In order to provide such a
system, recognized safety measures must be followed in the maintenance of
the roadbed and right of way. The railroad company is engaged in interstate
commerce. It serves, not only residents of Kansas, but people generally
throughout the country. It is enjoined to exercise a high degree of care by
general law. In addition to this, it is subject to certain regulations and
requirements by the Interstate Commerce Commission with reference to
safety in the maintenance of its right of way and the operation of its trains.
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The landowner-use cases are not only in the minority
because they contravene the exclusivity rule, but also because
they have virtually disappeared through the preemption of Sutter
and general disuse. The few cases that allowed the servient
landowner some limited access to the surface of the easement
arose in special circumstances such as waiver, reservation of the
right in the grantor, or limited agricultural uses.21 ° But although
most courts have seen clearly that the issue is one of exclusivity,
and that possession of the mineral estate, for example, simply
has to wait until the railroad use ceases, a few recent cases
articulated the issue in terms of ownership of certain
quantitative physical dimensions of the land rather than the
qualitative rights to engage in particular uses.2 1' This view of a
railroad easement is unsatisfactory. Railroad easement use
simply cannot be viably limited by physical dimension, and
simplistic legal analysis muddies the area further.2 12 At the very
least, however, the courts are unanimous that a railroad
easement, even though it is the weakest property interest
available to the railroads, entails exclusive control over the
surface of the easement, and extends to include possible future
use even when the railroad is using only a portion of the
easement.2"'
The basic reason for the majority rule is that exclusive possession is
necessary to enable the railroad company to safely conduct its business and
meet the duty of exercising that high degree of care which the general law
and administrative rules enjoin upon it. In the performance of those duties,
imposed by general law and a national administrative tribunal for the public
welfare, it should not be hampered by interference through the use of its
right of way by the owners of the servient estate, although such use might
be justified under the principles announced in local decisions .... It follows,
therefore, that the principles of general law rather than local decision
should determine the character of the rights of way granted in the instant
case. Regard for the welfare of the public, the patrons, and the employees of
the railroad company, in our opinion, compels such a conclusion.
Id. at 167-68. This case effectively reversed the earlier decision in Midland Valley R.R.
Co. v. Corn, 21 F.2d 96 (D. Kan. 1927). That same year, in another case involving the
same set of players, the Eighth Circuit followed Sutter without a lengthy repetition of
the necessity for the strict exclusivity rule. See Midland Valley R.R. Co. v. Jarvis, 29
F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1928).
210. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Bunting, 84 S.E. 1009 (N.C. 1915) (waiver);
Mobile & O.R. Co. v. Donovan, 58 S.W. 309 (Tenn. 1900) (reservation in deed);
Atlanta & C.A.L. Ry. Co. v. Limestone-Globe Land Co., 96 S.E. 188 (S.C. 1918)
(agricultural uses).
211. See, e.g., ETSI VI//, 619 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1980); EST! X, 606 F.2d 934 (10th
Cir. 1979); Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co. v. Freer, 321 S.W.2d 731 (Mo. Ct. App.
1958).
212. See supra note 205.
213. This rule extends so far that a servient landowner could not engage in
HeinOnline  -- 27 Ecology L.Q. 402 2000-2001
PIPES, WIRES, AND BICYCLES
C. Physical Dimensions of the Easement
Although every state conceives of the easement in terms of
physical boundaries- width, depth, height, and length- few
states limit their analyses of railroad easements to these
dimensions. Some states emphasize the physical boundaries of
the easement, 14 while others emphasize the easement holder's
use.21 For the former, encroachments of the appropriate
boundaries cause conflicts that are easily resolved. Did the
servient landowner's livestock trespass onto the railroad's
easement? Did the railroad's wheels cause sparks that flew
beyond the boundaries of the easement?
The states that define an easement by its use find
encroachments more difficult to analyze because the courts often
must ask whether multiple uses can be consistent with one
another.21 6 In some cases, multiple use is simply not possible.
Where the servient landowner owns the mineral estate under the
easement, but the railroad has exclusive control of the surface,
the servient landowner may be able to extract the minerals from
wells or mines only if access points are located outside the
easement. If she cannot do so, then she may have to wait until
the railroad has abandoned its easement before she can enter
and extract her mineral property.2 17 Even where the courts view
the scope of the easement in terms of the railroad's use, physical
dimensions are still relevant. Almost any court analyzing an
excavation along an easement that had been abandoned and converted to a
recreational trail through the federal process of railbanking, which preserves rail
corridors for possible future reactivation, even though the excavation did not hamper
the trail. The Preseault Court reasoned that the federal policy of preserving rail
corridors required that servient landowners be held to that standard, even when the
corridor was currently being subjected to a less-burdensome use. State v. Preseault,
652 A.2d 1001 (Vt. 1994).
214. See, e.g., Bivens v. Southern Ry. Co., 102 S.E.2d 128, 133 (N.C. 1958)
(noting that spraying outside the width of the easement would subject railroad to
liability even though it is entitled to spray weeds within easement).
215. See, e.g., Farmers Grain & Supply Co. v. Toledo Peoria & W. R.R., 44 N.E.2d
77 (Ill. App. Ct. 1942) (holding that railroad's airspace rights would be limited to the
kind of use regularly made on this particular railroad and the freight regularly
carried and would not be extended because of an unusual need that might arise to
carry taller freight).
216. See, e.g., Consumers Gas Trust Co. v. American Plate Glass Co., 68 N.E.
1020 (Ind. 1903) (concerning fee owner's lease of the fee for a pipeline); Williams v.
New-Albany & Salem R.R. Co., 5 Ind. I I I (Ind, 1854) (concerning livestock injuries);
Kershaw Motor Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 134 S.E. 377 (S.C. 1926) (concerning
injuries to an automobile trespassing on the easement).
217. See, e.g., Consumers Gas Trust Co. v. American Plate Glass Co., 68 N.E.
1020 (Ind. 1903) (preventing servient owner's lessee from drilling on railroad's right-
of-way).
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easement must inquire into the width, depth, and height of the
easement.
The width of the corridor is a creature of the grant or deed
language, and the law encompassing it has been relatively
uncontroversial. 18 Similarly, very few cases have addressed the
height of the corridor, while those cases that have addressed
height usually involve the ancillary concern of the aesthetic
rights of servient landowners to a clear view, which has been
obstructed by telephone and electric lines and poles.219 The
railroad corridor depth, on the other hand, creates fierce
litigation when valuable mineral deposits exist under the corridor
to which many parties assert rights. 220 Additionally, parties
assert rights to the non-mineral subsurface of the railroad
corridor because this land is valuable to utilities, who use the
subsurface of the linear corridor to locate pipelines and cables,
and to servient or abutting landowners, who may wish to cross
the corridor with pipelines or electric wires to serve the land on
the other side of the tracks.22' The subsurface issue is sometimes
confounded with drainage issues where the railroad
embankment may have altered drainage patterns in an area and
servient landowners desire culverts or livestock tunnels to link
land that was bisected by a railroad bed.222
1. Width
The width of a railroad corridor is spelled out either by a
grant (where railroads received the corridor by grant from the
federal government or from a state or municipality) or by a deed
(where railroads purchased land directly or acquired it through
eminent domain proceedings). A land grant to the railroad by
Congress or by a state, no matter what property interest the
railroads took in the land, specifies the width of the rail corridor,
which is usually one hundred or two hundred feet.223 Where the
railroad purchased a property interest from a landholder directly,
218. See infra Part III.C. 1 (discussing width boundaries).
219. See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing height boundaries).
220. See infra Part III.C.3 (discussing depth boundaries).
221. See infra Part III.C.4 (discussing fiber optics).
222. See, e.g., Touchberry v. Northwestern Ry. Co., 70 S.E. 424 (S.C. 1911).
223. See, e.g.. Act of July 27, 1866. ch. 278, 14 Stat. 292 ("mhe right of way
through the public lands be, and same is hereby, granted to the said Atlantic and
Pacific Railroad Company, its successors and assigns, for the construction of a
railroad... [sjaid way is granted to said railroad to the extent of one hundred feet in
width on each side of said railroad where it may pass through the public domain."
(emphasis added)).
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or took an interest by eminent domain, the deed granting the
corridor to the railroad specifies the physical width measurement
of the railroad corridor and may also include the metes and
bounds description of the strip in relation to the rest of the
grantor's land. 4
Unlike state and federal grants, deeds from individual
landowners occasionally do not specify the width of the railroad
corridor that is granted. This may even occur in eminent domain
proceedings. In these cases, presumptions are made as to the
intended width. One such presumption is that the width of the
railroad corridor is equal to the amount the railroad could
receive through condemnation.2 Another presumption has been
to impose the statutory width granted in the railroad's charter.226
Courts may look beyond the four corners of an ambiguous deed
to extrinsic evidence, such as the erection of telephone poles and
fences, valuation maps of railroad properties prepared pursuant
to Interstate Commerce Commission requirements, and
testimony given by railroad employees to determine the width of
the railroad's easement.227
A railroad engaged in activities just outside the width of the
corridor and on the property of an abutting landowner or
servient estate is guilty of trespass, as is the abutting landowner
or servient owner who engages in activity within the railroad
corridor."' When a railroad sprays weed killers and pesticides
224. See Tazian v. Cline, 686 N.E.2d 95, 96 (Ind. 1997).
[Slaid parties... do grant and convey and warrant... a strip of land fifty
feet in width on West side of railroad over, across, and through the following
described tract of land situated in the county of Allen and State of Indiana,
viz.: The South West Quarter of Section Two (2). Township Thirty-one (31)
North, Range Twelve (12) East, formerly owned by William... Hawley
deceased deeded by Win. E. Hawley to S.C. Evans recorded record 55, page
438 said strip of ground to be on and along the central line of said railroad
as the same shall be finally located on such tract of land and of such width
on each side of said central line as the final location of said railroad by said
company shall determine.
Id. at 96.
225. See Brown v. Alabama Great So. R.R. Co., 544 So. 2d 926 (Ala. 1989). As the
Brown Court noted, "In any event, in Alabama Midland Ry. v. Brown, 98 Ala. 647, 13
So. 70 (1893). we recognized that a grant of a railroad right-of-way of a non-specified
width should be construed as 'not exceeding 100 feet,' as that was the width that a
railroad company could acquire through condemnation." Id. at 928.
226. See Southern Ry. Co. v. Vann, 216 S.W. 727, 729 (Tenn. 1919).
227. See, e.g., Stevenson v. St. Louis Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co., 188 S.W. 832
(Ark. 1916) (holding that deed to railroad without width easement conveys to
telephone poles only); Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Taylor, 175 S.W. 26 (Ky. 1915)
(holding that deed lacking width conveys easement to established fenceline).
228. See infra notes 224-25.
2000]
HeinOnline  -- 27 Ecology L.Q. 405 2000-2001
ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY
along its easement, it will be liable for harm to the servient
landowner's crops outside the easement, but not those within
the easement.229 Conversely, a landowner will be guilty of
trespass even for growing crops within the easement because the
railroad has rights to exclusive possession of the easement
surface for the requisite width."'
Sometimes a servient landowner's concurrent use of unused
portions can give rise to a claim in adverse possession. Clearly,
the servient owner cannot adversely possess against an
easement owner because the servient owner already has title to
the land at issue.23 1 But some courts will allow an adverse and
non-permissive use by the servient owner for the statutory
period to ripen into an unburdening of the servient estate.2"2 The
majority rule states, however, that any adverse use, even against
currently unused portions of an easement, is contrary to public
policy; the railroads have public carrier duties and may need to
expand onto currently unused land at some later date.233
Conversely, a railroad can only rarely adversely possess against
adjoining landowners. Where the railroad constructed its
roadbed without obtaining written title to the land or to an
easement, any adverse use will be limited to the extent of the
actual use.23 4 Similarly, the adverse use most often will give rise
only to a prescriptive easement, not fee simple title, because the
railroad is deemed to need only an easement. 5
A governmental entity that condemns part of a railroad
corridor must pay for the entire width of the corridor, even
229. See Bivens v. Southern Ry. Co. 102 S.E.2d 128 (N.C. 1958).
230. See Chicago Great Western R.R. Co. v. Zahner, 177 N.W. 350, 351 (Minn.
1920).
231. SeePuett v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 752 P.2d 213, 215 (Nev. 1988).
232. See Wilmot v. Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. Co., 24 So. 701, 702 (Miss. 1899.
233. See, e.g.. Allard Cattle Co. v. Colorado & S. Ry. Co., 530 P.2d 503 (Colo.
1974); Southern Ry. v. Beaudrot, 41 S.E. 299 (S.C. 1902); Southern Ry. Co. v. Vann,
216 S.W. 727. 731 (Tenn. 1919; Mobile & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Donovan, 58 S.W. 309
(Tenn. 1900).
234. See Hoffman v. Zollman, 97 N.E. 1015. 1017 (Ind. Ct. App. 1912): St. Louis
S.W. Ry. Co. v. Davis, 87 S.W. 445, 446 (Ark. 1905). But see Waggoner v. Wabash
R.R. Co., 56 N.E. 1050 (Ill. 1900) (allowing a larger tract of land to be acquired by
adverse possession than that actually used).
235. See Consumers Gas Trust Co. v. American Plate Glass Co., 68 N.E. 1020,
1021 (Ind. 1903). Some states have altered this by statute. Ironically, South Carolina,
a state that strongly protects landowners against the railroads, passed a statute in
1845 that provided that if a railroad entered land without obtaining title, built its
road, and occupied it for two years without the landowner complaining, that
railroad's tite would ripen into a fee simple. See 1845 S.C. Acts 2953, §11; Eldridge
v. City of Greenwood, 388 S.E.2d 247, 248 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989) (acknowledging fee
simple deeds in an 1845 statute).
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portions that are currently unused by the railroad.2 36 Because of
the possible future needs of the railroad, any adverse claims
against it should be limited, and the railroad's interests in the
entire width should be protected against encroachments by
landowners and condemnation by governmental entities.23 7 At
the same time, when the railroad adversely possesses against a
landowner, the interest taken and the corresponding width of the
corridor should be the minimum necessary for the safe and
reasonable operation of the road, even if that width is greater
than that actually occupied by the tracks and ties.
2. Height
Railroads generally have exclusive air rights over the railroad
corridors 238 and, in most states, exclusive rights to grant leases
or licenses to utility companies to place poles and wires in their
easements.23 9 The servient landowner may not recover for
potential aesthetic injury, nor may she recover when the poles
reach higher than the trains that pass through the airspace.2 40
Furthermore, electric and telecommunications companies
generally have statutory power to condemn easements along
railroad corridors, regardless of the railroads' property
interests. 24' This condemnation power is limited to uses
compatible with the railroads. Some statutes, for example,
require that the utility lines be located a minimum distance from
the centerline of the railroad tracks.
42
236. See People ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 148 Cal.
Rptr. 535 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
237. See, e.g., Graham v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co.. 65 S.W. 1048
(Ark. 1901); Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Village of Hartland, 88 N.W. 423 (Minn.
1901); West Va. Bd. of Regents v. Fairmont, Morgantown & Pittsburgh R.R. Co., 189
S.E.2d 40 (W. Va. 1972).
238. See Chicago Union Station Co. v. Korzen, 422 N.E.2d 62 (111. App. Ct. 1981).
239. See Mobile & Ohio R.R. v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 46 S.W. 571 (Tenn. 1898).
240. See Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Lawley, 126 S.E. 273 (Ga. Ct. App. 1925); see
also Unsightliness of Powerlines, supra note 47. In Lawley, the railroad was held not
liable for injuries to highway workers installing an overpass over a railroad track but
under a high-voltage electric line in the railroad corridor. The railroad was held to
have the power to grant to the electric company the right to place the high-voltage
lines even though the lines obviously reached higher than the needs of the train, as
the railroad acquiesced in construction of a highway bridge between the tracks and
the electric lines. See Lawley, 126 S.E. at 274.
241. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. North Am. Telegraph Co., 230 F. 347 (8th Cir.
1915); Ohio Edison Co. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 486 N.E.2d 103, 105 (Ohio. Ct.
App. 1984); Davis v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 606 So. 2d 734, 737 (Fla. Dist. App. Ct.
1992).
242. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 175.590 (detailing special provisions for
condemning railroad property).
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The railroads' exclusive control over the use and occupation
of the surface of the land entitles them to damages when their
property interests are invaded.24 3 In a utility condemnation, the
railroad, not the owner of the servient land, is entitled to
compensation. This suggests that the scope of the railroad's
easement includes the utility subeasement or license. Railroads
are also entitled to damages in eminent domain when an aerial
easement is taken against their will. 244 Railroads have been
compensated for aerial easements taken for elevated train use,
crane use, and elevator use, as well as utility use.245 The West
Virginia Supreme Court has concluded that a railroad's airspace
should be limited to the height of the lowest tunnel regularly
used, but the court noted that if the railroad can show that it
"reasonably intends to employ new technology which will, in the
foreseeable future, cause its airspace to be of greater than
nominal value to it," it will be entitled to compensation for
encroachments on that larger airspace.2 4 6
Airspace rights create the same difficulty as subsurface
rights. If the railroads have exclusive control over the surface,
the servient landowner simply cannot permit third-party users to
trespass into the airspace or subsurface of the land. Moreover,
since the railroads often contracted for telegraph services and
included in their contracts provisions that upon abandonment
by the telegraph company the poles and wires would become the
personal property of the railroad, the railroads have reasonable
claim to the airspace rights over their corridor for electric or
telecommunications use.
3. Depth
Railroads undeniably have the right to use and occupy the
surface of the railroad easement but generally do not have the
right to extract the minerals underlying the easement.2 47
However, the extent to which railroads (and others) may use and
243. See Dep't of Transp. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 148 Cal. Rptr. 535 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1978) (involving takings issue).
244. See West Va. Bd. of Regents v. Fairmont Morgantown Pittsburgh R.R. Co.,
250 S.E.2d 139, 145 (W. Va. 1978).
245. See Farmers Grain & Supply Co. v. Toledo, P.&W. R.R., 44 N.E.2d 77 (Iln.
App. Ct. 1942); Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Centerville Telephone Co., 186 S.W. 90
(Tenn. 1916): Citizens' Telephone Co. v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. R.R. Co., 233 S.W.
901 (Ky. Ct. App. 1921).
246. West Va. Bd. of Regents, 250 S.E.2d at 145.
247. See Midland Valley R.R. Co. v. Sutter, 28 F.2d 163, 164 (8th Cir. 1928):
Consumers Gas Trust Co. v. American Plate Glass Co.. 68 N.E. 1020 (Ind. 1903).
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occupy the non-mineral sub-surface of the railroad corridor is
uncertain because most states articulate the railroads' property
rights in terms of use, not physical dimensions.2 4 Hence, where
telegraph lines are necessary to send signals to upcoming
stations, the presence of telegraph poles and wires clearly
constitutes a railroad purpose within the scope of the easement,
regardless of whether they are above ground or buried beneath
the surface of the corridor.2
4 9
Unless they hold title in fee simple absolute or fee simple
determinable, railroads generally do not have the right to extract
minerals underlying the railroad corridor, whether they acquired
their corridors from a private landowner by adverse possession
or from a federal grant. 5 0 In the leading case on federal grants,
United States v. Union Pacific,21 the Supreme Court held that the
Union Pacific Railroad Company did not acquire the mineral
rights to the lands underlying the right-of-way granted in the
Pacific Railroad Act,2"2 even though the grant was construed to
pass a limited or defeasible fee.2 53 The court so held for three
reasons. First, drilling for minerals under the railroad right-of-
way was deemed not a "railroad purpose" within the meaning of
the Act, which had granted the land to the railroad for "railroad
purposes."2' 4 Second, Section 3 of the Act excepted "mineral
lands" 25 5 from the grant of "every alternate section of public
land,"25 and the Court found that that exception should apply
equally to the railroad corridor itself.2 57 Lastly, the Court found
248. See infra Part III.D.2 (discussing incidental use doctrine).
249. See id.
250. See United States v. Union Pac. R.R Co., 353 U.S. 112, 113-14, 118-20
(1957): Great N. Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262 (1942); Wyoming v. Udall, 379
F.2d 635 (10th Cir. 1967); Midland Valley R.R. Co. v. Sutter, 28 F.2d 163, 164 (8th
Cir. 1928); Consumers Gas Trust Co. v. American Plate Glass Co., 68 N.E. 1020,
1021 (Ind. 1903).
251. 353 U.S. 112 (1957).
252. Union Pacific Railroad Act, July 1, 1862, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 489.
253. See Union Pac., 353 U.S. at 118-20.
254. Id. at 114 ("It would seem that, whatever may be the nature of Union Pacific's
interest in the right of way, drilling for oil on or under it is not a railroad purpose.").
255. Id. at 115-16 ("It is, therefore, wholly in keeping with the federal policy that
prevailed in 1862, when the present right of way was granted, to construe 'mineral
lands' to include mineral resources under the right of way.").
256. It was the practice of Congress at the time of the western railroad grants to
give railroads alternating blocks of land along the railroad corridor every ten miles.
See Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 672 (1979) ("Land surrounding the
railroad right-of-way was divided into 4checkerboard' blocks. Odd-numbered lots were
granted to the Union Pacific.").
257. See Union Pac., 353 U.S. at 115 ("But the exception in § 3 [which dealt with
the alternating land grants adjacent to the right-of-wayl is not limited merely to a few
enumerated sections any more than it is limited to § 3. The proviso makes sense if it
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that it was the policy of the United States to reserve mineral
rights for itself.2 58 While United States v. Union Pacific technically
extends only to the railroad corridors granted by the Pacific
Railroad Act, the holding is highly persuasive in any case dealing
with the mineral rights of federal railroad grants because that
Act is similar to every other pre-1871 federal railroad grant.2"9
The consistency in doctrine regarding mineral rights does
not carry over to doctrines regarding non-mineral subsurface
rights. To begin with, the cases disagree on how to distinguish
the "surface" of a railroad corridor from the "non-mineral
subsurface," or "strata" of a railroad corridor. Most courts
differentiate "surface" from "subsurface" or "underlying lands,"2 6 °
but some have found that "surface" and "subsurface" rights are
really the same thing.26
Conflict over the subsurface arises in two ways. First,
conflict arises when the easement owner grants a subsurface
lease or license to a third party, and the servient landowner
claims that the use is an additional burden requiring
compensation. Second, conflict arises when the servient owner
authorizes a third party to use the subsurface of the corridor in a
way that interferes with the easement owner's surface use. As
discussed above, most states forbid the servient landowner to
authorize any third-party use of the corridor. Even the minority
landowner-use states allow the servient landowner to grant
subsurface easements in narrowly drawn situations.2 62
is read to reserve all mineral rights under the right of way, as well as to reserve
mineral lands in the alternate sections of public land granted in aid of the
construction of the road.").
258. See id. ("The reservation of the mineral resources of these public lands for the
United States was in keeping with the policy of the times.").
259. See Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 122, 16 Stat. 573; General Railroad Right-of-
Way Act, Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 152, 18 Stat. 482 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 934 (1994)); Act
of July 27, 1866, ch. 278, 14 Stat. 292. If the corridor is held by the railroad in fee
simple determinable (as all railroad corridors granted before 1871), the granting party
(the federal government) or their successor in interest merely has a future right of
possible reversion in the mineral estate as well as in the surface.
260. See Energy Transp. Sys., Inc. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 606 F.2d 934 (10th Cir.
1979); Idaho v. Oregon Short Line R.R. Co., 617 F. Supp. 207 (D. Idaho 1985).
261. See United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 112, 131 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("'Surface' could not, of course, mean merely the area
that is seen by the eye. To say that it means the visual area and an indeterminate
depth- x inches or x feet- necessary for support is to ask the Court to rewrite
legislation and to cast upon it administrative tasks . . . ."); see also Mellon v.
Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 750 F. Supp. 226, 230 (W.D. Tex. 1990) [citing Chugach
Natives, Inc. v. Doyon, Ltd., 588 F.2d 723, 728 (9th Cir. 1978)).
262. The ETSI decisions are the exception and, for the reasons stated, are of
questionable precedential value. See supra note 205; see also supra notes 200-203.
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The federal courts have stated that federal grants to the
railroads are to be construed in favor of the railroads, making it
clear that the railroads have the right to use and occupy so
much of the non-mineral subsurface of the railroad corridor as is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the grant: operating a
railroad.2 63 Undoubtedly, railroads have the right to construct
the railroad itself in the easement and may also construct any
appurtenances necessary to the operation of that railroad, such
as depots, elevated roadbeds, station buildings, water tanks,
machine shops, side tracks, and tuMouts. 264 Most of these
structures have foundations well below the surface of the
corridor. Where railroads need land thousands of feet deep-
such as tunnels burrowed through mountains- they have
always had a right to use and occupy it.
2 5
Federal administrative interpretations of the statutes also
support the railroads. The United States Department of the
Interior's Office of the Solicitor issued a memorandum regarding
the rights of railroads to the non-mineral subsurface of their
corridor land.2 66 In that memorandum, the acting solicitor
concluded that in the pre-1871 land grants, the railroads
acquired a defeasible fee which did not include the minerals, but
did include the non-mineral subsurface. The acting Solicitor
concluded that the 1875 easements also included the non-
mineral subsurface. An easement usually will not include
subsurface rights if they are not distinguishable from mineral
rights, but the Department determined that the easement's
exclusivity made the railroad's present interest tantamount to fee
simple. Moreover, the granting statute did not except the
subsurface estate, and the Department's administrative
interpretations of the statute recognized subsurface rights in the
railroads. Finally, railroad authorization of third-party uses of
their corridor is a long-standing custom. 267 With respect to
263. See Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 683 (1979) (quoting United
States v. Denver & Rio Grande Ry. Co., 150 U.S. 1, 14 (1893)) ("[Sluch legislation
[railroad grants] stands upon a somewhat different footing from merely a private
grant, and should receive at the hands of the court a more liberal construction in
favor of the purposes for which it was enacted. .. ").
264. See Denver & Rio Grande Ry. Co., 150 U.S. at 8.
265. See, e.g., McIlvaine v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 568 So. 2d 462 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1990); Norton v. City of Gainesville, 86 S.E.2d 234 (Ga. 1955); Hudson &
Manhattan R.R. Co. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 96 N.E. 435 (N.Y. 1911).
266. See generally PROPOSED INSTALLATION, supra note 121.
267. There is no question that pipe and wire uses both bisect and run
longitudinally along nearly every railroad corridor in the country, and many of these
lease agreements are a hundred years old or more. To the extent that the law adopts
a policy of not disrupting well-settled property expectations, the long-term use of
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federal railroad grants, therefore, the railroads are given wide
discretion to authorize third-party uses of their subsurface
corridor.
State law is more equivocal, whether the railroads obtained
easements by state grant, private deed, eminent domain, or
adverse possession. Three recent cases-from Texas, Florida,
and Tennessee- have directly addressed the rights of railroad
companies to authorize the use of their corridor for laying fiber-
optic cable without compensation to the servient landowner.268 In
only two of the cases was the railroad held to have that power
under an easement for railroad purposes." 9 In a fourth case, a
Maryland Court of Appeals held that, when a city condemns a
railroad corridor using its power of eminent domain, it need not
compensate the railroad for the lost revenues of utility royalties
because the railroad "had no right to enter into agreements with
utilities for installation of their lines or pipes" and was thus owed
no compensation.27 ° Although only one of these cases was
decided with reference to the surface/subsurface distinction
rather than a generic use rationale, the different outcomes reflect
a fundamental difference in the way different courts address the
railroad's power to grant utility access on their easements.
In Mellon v. Southern Pacific Transport Co., 271 the District
Court for the Western District of Texas held that a railroad may
grant a subeasement to a fiber-optic company to lay buried
cables in the railroad corridor without compensating the servient
owner. 72 The court cited a series of cases protecting the
railroad's rights in the non-mineral subsurface, including a case
requiring that the railroad's permission be obtained to locate an
underground gas pipeline on the corridor, 273 a case holding that
these corridors by multiple parties would suggest that the parties, judges, legislators,
and lawyers all believed multiple uses were within the scope of the railroad easement.
268. See Mellon v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 750 F. Supp. 226, 229-30 (W.D.
Tex. 1990) (railroad has power); Davis v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 606 So. 2d 734 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (railroad has power); Buhl v. United States Sprint Comm. Co..
840 S.W.2d 904, 912 (Tenn. 1992) (no such power). See discussion infra Part III.D.3.
269. See id.
270. D.C. Transit Systems, Inc. v. State Roads Comm'n, 270 A.2d 793, 800 (Md.
1970). But see Ohio Edison Co. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 486 N.E.2d 103 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1984).
271. 750 F. Supp. 226 (W.D. Tex. 1990).
272. See id. at 231 ("This Court finds the right-of-way surface includes the non-
mineral topsoil that would be occupied by a buried fiber optic line, and the fiber optic
cable is an authorized incidental use which is not inconsistent with railroad uses and
does not burden the subservient estate retained by the Plaintiff.").
273. See Lo-Vaca Gathering Co. v. Missouri Kan.-Tex. R.R. Co., 476 S.W.2d 732,
739 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
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the subsurface estate refers to the mineral estate while the
surface estate refers to the remainder of the non-mineral estate
including subsoil,2 74 and a case holding that the railroad could
not make any use of the mineral estate but could authorize uses
of the remainder of the right-of-way. 5 The Mellon court found
that the "right-of-way surface includes the non-mineral topsoil
that would be occupied by a buried fiber-optic line."276 In
essence, the Mellon court seems to have followed the customary
real property distinctions between surface and mineral estates.
2 77
Two years later, a Florida court of appeals resolved a similar
dispute between MCI and servient landowners. Applying a state
statute authorizing telephone and telegraph lines on railroad
rights-of-way, the court found that the placement of fiber-optic
lines in the corridor's subsurface imposed no additional
servitude.2 7
That same month, however, the Supreme Court of
Tennessee, a state that has traditionally adopted the landowner-
use rule, ruled against Sprint Communications and in favor of
servient landowners on similar facts in the MCI case. 9 But even
the Tennessee court stated that under the railroad easement,
'The company has the free and perfect use of the surface of the
land so far as is necessary for all its purposes, and the right to
use as much above and below the surface as may be needed."8 '
At the very least, the surface estate always includes as much
subsurface depth as is required to support the surface uses."1
In any event, state courts have not consistently defined the
terms "surface" and "subsurface," making it impossible to
determine the exact depth of any railroad easement. In the
majority of states, a railroad easement appears to include
everything in the subsurface except the mineral estate because
the surface estate requires subjacent support. Only in the
minority of states does the depth issue seem to create problems
274. See Chugach Natives. Inc. v. Doyon. Ltd., 588 F.2d 723, 728 (9th Cir. 19781.
275. See United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 112 (1957); Great N. Ry.
Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 279 (1942).
276. 750 F. Supp. at 231.
277. This distinction is drawn usually to guarantee to the owner of the surface
estate enough subsurface to provide adequate subjacent support. See CUNNINGHAM ET
AL., supra note 77, at 423-24.
278. See Davis v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 606 So. 2d 734 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
279. See Buhl v. United States Sprint Comm. Co., 840 S.w.2d 904 (Tenn. 1992):
see also D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. State Roads Comm'n, 270 A.2d 793 (Md. 1970).
280. Buhl, 840 S.W.2d at 909.
281. A corollary of this conclusion is that the owner of the mineral estate may not
remove the minerals if doing so causes the surface to collapse.
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for courts, in part because those states may continue to follow
the landowner-use rule. And while landowner control over the
mineral estate is hard to reconcile with the exclusivity rule,
restricting the courts' focus to the parameters of the use alone
does not solve the problem.
The difficulty the courts have had in determining the extent
of the railroads' rights in the subsurface are complicated by the
ongoing conflation of physical restrictions with use restrictions.
A South Carolina court, for example, found that a railroad went
beyond the scope of the easement's depth when it permitted
another railroad to construct a tunnel underneath its tracks
which did not connect to the first railroad's tracks.282 Because
the competing railroad use was not the railroad use authorized
in the original grant, the tunneling was held to be an additional
servitude.28 3 Was this an additional servitude on the servient
land because the tunnel strayed beyond the railroad use of the
easement or because it exceeded the physical depth allowed by
the easement? Would it have changed the outcome if the second
railroad had simply crossed at grade? Because the court did not
specify, it is unclear if the violation was in use or depth, which
contributes to the doctrinal confusion in this area.
As a matter of logic and traditional property law, however,
the Department of the Interior's position seems the more
intelligible rule given the conflicting issues. If a railroad has
exclusive control over the surface, and presumably enough
subsurface to guarantee subjacent support, it would seem to
have the right to authorize utility use within the physical domain
encompassed by those rights, which would certainly include the
three or four feet necessary to lay a fiber-optic cable. Thus,
exclusivity and subjacent support rights would favor the
railroad. In addition, because the railroad has exclusive rights to
the surface, the fee owner would not be entitled to authorize a
trespass by a utility company onto the surface of the railroad's
easement for construction and laying of the cable. On the other
hand, from the perspective of the railroad's "use," the cable may
arguably be beyond the scope of the easement.
D. Scope of the Easement
The scope of an easement is in part defined by its width,
depth, and height: the physical boundaries inside which the
282. See Cayce Land Co. v. Guignard, 134 S.E. 1 (S.C. 1926), cited in Eldridge v.
City of Greenwood. 388 S.E.2d 247 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989).
283. See id.
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easement owner may use the land. 284 Use outside those
boundaries constitutes a trespass. But the scope of an easement
also includes the kind of use envisioned by the original granting
parties, and easements will be limited to any use explicitly stated
in the grant. Thus, a driveway easement will be limited to ingress
and egress purposes while a utility easement will be limited to
the location of utility lines. Whether utility lines could be located
on the driveway land depends on how narrowly or broadly the
use is interpreted. If ingress and egress are interpreted broadly
to include all necessary people and things that must reach the
dominant estate, then electricity or phone communications seem
as much a part of ingress and egress as the mail delivery person
or the ambulance. People must be connected to the outside
world, bring certain things into their homes, and take other
things out. If an easement is interpreted narrowly to include only
vehicular traffic, however, then a homeowner could receive
information by mail but not by telephone or email. The central
issue for railroad easements is whether or not permitting a utility
to jointly occupy the rail corridor is an additional servitude for
which the servient landowner should be compensated. Thus, the
question becomes whether the granting parties intended the
easement to be a multi-use public transportation corridor or a
narrowly-defined railroad bed.
1. Telephone and Telegraph Cases
Courts have long held that when a railroad company holds a
railroad corridor as an easement "for railroad purposes only,"
and constructs telephone poles and wires 8 5 that are used solely
to facilitate the operation of the railroad, the telephone poles and
wires do not constitute an additional burden or servitude on the
underlying fee.28 This holding applies whether the railroad or a
284. See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 112, § 7.02.
285. "Telephone lines or wires" as used herein also denotes "telegraph lines or
wires."
286. See Right and Measure of Compensation to Owner of Fee when Telegraph or
Telephone Line Is Erected Along Railroad Right of Way or Highway, 8 A.L.R. 1293
(1920); see also NICHOLS', supra note 11, §§ 3:11.01[2][e], 5:16.0714]; Atlantic & Pac.
Tel. Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 2 F. Cas. 176 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1874);
Mayor of the City of Canton v. Canton Cotton Warehouse Co., 36 So. 266 (Miss.
1904); Phillips v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 41 S.E. 1022 (N.C. 1902). rev'd on other
grounds, 42 S.E. 587 (N.C. 1902); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Smith, 18 A. 910, 912-
13 (Md. 1889); Hodges v. Western Union Tel. Co., 45 S.E. 572 (N.C. 1903); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Rich, 19 Kan. 517 (1878); Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Lilly Borough,
56 A. 412 (Pa. 1903): Taggart v. Newport St. Ry. Co., 19 A. 326 (R.I. 1890); St. Louis,
Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Cape Girardeau Bell Tel. Co., 114 S.W. 586 (Mo. Ct.
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third party operates the phone line.2"7 Clearly, the railroad must
be able to communicate with upcoming stations and trains to
monitor traffic and must be able to send signals to switches. But
the states differ on whether a telephone company may also use
those same rail corridor phone lines to send additional non-
railroad communications.
In the nineteenth century, the original and preferred method
of communicating between stations was the telegraph line.2 8' As
a result, some railroads constructed and operated their own
communications lines while others contracted with Western
Union or other telegraph companies to provide this important
service.2 89 To make the investment worthwhile, however, most
telegraphs expanded to provide communication services to the
general public as well. While the railroad industry remained
relatively static, the commercial telegraph business exploded in
the later decades of the 19th century. As the public use
increased, the courts did not view the mixed railroad/public
commercial use as presenting any legal problem. As the Ninth
Circuit explained in 1914, "[iln the present age of progress, the
telegraph is as essential to the needs and comforts of the public
as the railroads themselves."290
As public telegraph services and communication facilities
became public necessities and the railroad corridors were
recognized as the most efficient locations for new telegraph lines,
Congress and the state legislatures granted eminent domain
power to the telegraph companies to force the railroads to allow
them access to their corridors.29' Furthermore, when competing
telegraph companies sought access to the railroad corridor
already burdened with one telegraph, the courts uniformly held
any exclusivity provisions in the railroad's contract with the
established telegraph company void as against public policy. 292
App. 1908).
287. See, e.g., Cape Girardeau Bell Tel. Co., 114 S.W. at 587 ("[Tihe railroad
company may construct and maintain such telephone or telegraph line on the right of
way for its own purpose, or it may take a partner into the enterprise, or contract with
another to erect and maintain the line and furnish the required telephonic or
telegraphic service to the end of transmitting intelligence with respect to the
operation of it trains, carriage of traffic, passengers and other needs of it calling.").
288. See generally MARTIN, supra note 53.
289. See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Postal Tel. Co., 217 F. 533 (9th Cir.
1914): Pacific Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 50 F. 493 (C.C.D.
Wash. 1892).
290. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Postal Tel. Co., 217 F. 533, 538 (9th Cir. 1914).
291. See, e.g., Pacific Railroad Act, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 489; Florida Telegraph Act' of
1903, ch. 5211, §§ 1, 3, 7: OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4931.06 (Banks-Baldwin 1999).
292. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Postal Tel. Co.. 217 F. 533 (9th Cir. 1914);
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The importance of telegraph services and the public benefits of
fostering competition justified forcing the railroads to allow
multiple telegraph lines on the poles so long as there was no
interference with their railroad operations.2 93 Because the lines
and poles already existed for railroad purposes, the stringing of
additional lines was seen as only a nominal burden, while
creating a separate utility corridor for competitors was clearly
wasteful and inefficient to the public's need for additional
services. A telegraph company that wanted to provide services
could do so most efficiently by simply exercising eminent domain
against a recalcitrant railroad.29 4
But the overriding question is whether the railroads may
authorize telegraph or telephone use on their corridors when the
communications use is partly or entirely commercial and not
railroad related. 95 Both because the railroads brought the
telegraph to rural areas, and because the railroads were forced to
allow competing telegraph companies access to the corridors, the
majority rule has been that telegraph lines (and their modem
equivalent, telephone lines) are fully consistent with an easement
for railroad purposes.29 6 As Judge Sanborn for the Eighth Circuit
explained:
A railway company, which has become the owner of a railroad
which it is operating and of a right of way appurtenant
thereto, has the exclusive right to the use of that right of way
for telegraph purposes as well as for railroad purposes. If
after the application of so much of the use thereof as the
maintenance of its own railroad and telegraph requires there
remains a surplus use of that right of way either for telegraph
purposes or for railroad purposes, it may lease or'permit that
use, or any part of it, for a valuable consideration for any
purpose which does not interfere with its operation of its own
Pacific Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 50 F. 493 (C.C.D. Wash.
1892).
293. See id.
294. In fact, the Ninth Circuit held that a railroad was unable to grant an
exclusive right to one telegraph company under a pre-1871 grant, even though the
railroad held a defeasible fee. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Postal Tel. Co., 217 F.
533 (9th Cir. 1914). Yet the telegraph company had to pay the railroads for the value
of the utility easement taken because the right to license telegraph use was seen as a
valuable property right inhering in the railroads. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v.
North Am. Tel. Co., 230 F. 347 (8th Cir. 1915) (holding that the telegraph had to pay
railroad for rights it acquired by eminent domain).
295. In some cases, the railroads' independent communications system provided
communication access for smaller rural communities. See id. at 276-77.
296. See, e.g., Campbell v. Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co., 158 S.W. 1085 (Ark.
1913): Sioux City v. Missouri Valley Pipe Line Co., 46 F.2d 819, 826 (N.D. Iowa 1931)
(citing related cases).
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railroad and telegraph and its discharge of its duties to the
public so to operate them. This right of a railroad company to
lease or permit the surplus use of its right of way, or of its
property, is its private property and it is often very valuable
property.
297
In a handful of states- the same states that followed the
landowner-use rule to defeat the railroad's exclusivity rights-
the courts have refused to recognize the railroad's rights to grant
access to telegraph companies for solely commercial telegraph
use.298 In Tennessee, the Supreme Court stated that a railroad
"cannot license the appropriation of... such right of way to
private business purposes, nor to public purposes, except so far
as needful, and helpful to the operation of the road itself."299
Ignoring the exclusivity problem, the court baldly stated that:
[ilt is almost everywhere held that the erection of a line of
telegraph over the right of way of a railroad company, not to
be used in the operation of the railroad, but for purely
commercial purposes, imposes an additional burden on the
fee, and the landowner is entitled to additional compensation
from the telegraph company.3 ° °
But this runs counter to the competition cases mentioned earlier
because when the court forced a railroad to accept two telegraph
company lines on its corridor, the second presumptively was
297. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. North American Tel. Co., 230 F. 347, 349 (8th Cir.
1915). This rule is further supported by the common practice that the railroad would
acquire title to the poles and wires of any telegraph that abandoned its line. See
generally Wilner, supra note 5.
298. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. Co.,
237 S.W. 64 (Tenn. 1922).
299. Mobile & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 46 S.W. 571. 572 (Tenn.
1898).
300. Western Union TeL, 237 S.W. at 65. Likewise, in Maryland, a state that has
sometimes followed the landowner-use rule, the court of appeals held in American
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Smith- 18 A. 910 (Md. 1889), that the construction of a telephone
line used solely for commercial purposes along a railroad right-of-way is an
additional burden for which the servient fee owners must be compensated. The court
stated:
[We entertain no doubt whatever as to the right of a railroad company to
construct on and over its right of way a telegraph or telephone line, for its
use in the operation of its road and dispatch of its business; .... But, on
the other hand, if this is not the motive for its construction, and the main
object in constructing it is to establish an extensive line of telegraph and
telephone communication through this and other states, for general
commercial purposes, for the use and benefit of the defendant, and such a
line is not reasonably necessary for the purposes of the railroad, then it will
be a new easement, and put a new and additional burden upon the land, for
which the owners are entitled to compensation.
Id. at 913.
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purely commercial with no railroad use."'1
Where the telephone or telegraph line is used for "mixed
purposes" (that is, both railroad and commercial/non-railroad
uses), most states hold that no additional servitude is created.0 2
However, when a line in the railroad easement is used solely for
commercial/non-railroad purposes, whether by the railroad itself
or a third party lessee, an additional burden or servitude may be
created in those landowner-use states for which the servient fee
owner is entitled to compensation.
0 3
In contrast to the telephone and telegraph line cases, the
courts do not analyze the type of service offered by an electric
company in disputes over electric lines in rail corridors. This
approach makes little sense; electricity is just as necessary to
operating a railroad as communication services. Yet the courts
simply assert that either electric lines constitute an additional
burden30 4 or they do not." 5 The distinction cannot be explained
by assuming that electric utilities constitute a special class
because courts analyzing analogous street easements do make
fine distinctions about electric use.3 0 6 It is true that electric lines
301. See supra note 292.
302. See Mississippi Inv., Inc. v. New Orleans & N.E.R. Co., 188 F.2d 245 (5th Cir.
1951); Mitchell v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 51 N.E.2d 271 (Il. 1943); Dickman v.
Madison County Light & Power Co., 136 N.E. 790 (Ill. 1922); Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co. v. Bigler, 563 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
303. See generally Western Union Tel. Co. v. Rich,, 19 Kan. 517 (1878); Canadian
Pacific Ry. Co. v. Moosehead Tel. Co., 76 A. 885 (Me. 1910): American Tel. & Tel. Co.
v. Smith, 18 A. 910, 913 (Md. App. 1889); St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v.
Cape Girardeau Bell Tel. Co., 114 S.W. 586 (Mo. Ct. App. 1908); Nicoll v. New York &
N.J. Tel. Co., 42 A. 583 (N.J. 1899); Phillips v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 41 S.E. 1022
(N.C. 1902), rev'd on other grounds, 42 S.E. 587 (N.C. 1902); Hodges v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 45 S.E. 572 (N.C. 1903); Teeter v. Postal Tel. Co., 90 S.E. 941 (N.C.
1916); Query v. Postal Tel.-Cable Co., 101 S.E. 390 (N.C. 1919); Righlt and Measure of
Compensation. supra note 286; see also NICHOLS', supra note 11, §§ 3:11.01[21[e],
5:16.07141 (discussing right of utilities in rail corridors).
304. See Tompkins v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 79 S.E.2d 41, 47 (Ga. Ct. App.
1953); Muncie Elec. Light Co. v. Joliff, 109 N.E. 433 (Ind. Ct. App. 1915).
305. See State Highway Comm'n v. Union Elec. Co., 148 S.W.2d 503 (Mo. 1941).
306. In the situation of utility lines in streets and highways, the courts engage in
lengthy discussions of whether or not electric lines have a mixed use- lighting the
streets as well as providing commercial services- which they do not do for telephone
or telegraph lines in streets. The cases are exactly reversed. In railroad corridors.
there is lengthy analysis over telephone line use and not over electric use; in streets
there is lengthy analysis over electric line use and not over telephone line use. But in
both cases, the majority of courts view utility use, even when there is no street or
railroad use, to be within the scope of the easement. A 1958 A.L.R. article concluded
that courts in eleven states (Alabama, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts,
New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia) and
the federal courts have adopted the general rule that electric lines fall within the
scope of street or highway easements because the transmission of electricity is not
fundamentally different from travel on public highways. See R.D. Hursh, Electric Light
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arrived relatively late; but while electric companies received the
power of eminent domain, their activities did not come with the
same type of legislative imprimatur conferred on the telegraph
companies.
The utility line cases are therefore a mixed bag. The federal
courts and a majority of states have adopted a rule consistent
with the railroad's exclusivity rights- the railroad easement is
recognized as a valuable property right, nearly a fee, and carries
with it the valuable right to license access to others. The
railroad's power over the easement land is deemed extensive
enough for it to allow any use not inconsistent with railroad use.
The courts that focus on types of uses by telegraph or telephone
companies, on the other hand, limit utility uses to those
necessary to the railroad use. If the telegraph use is partly for
the railroad with incidental commercial use, it clearly falls within
the scope of the easement, but where the use is unrelated to the
railroad's operations, except to bring in revenues, then a
minority of states will fmd that it falls outside the scope of the
easement. This distinction ignores the exclusivity of the
railroad's easement and was followed only in landowner-use
states despite the fact that the landowner could not authorize
the utility use on her own without infringing on the railroad's
rights to control the surface of the easement. 30 7 This approach
dramatically increases transaction costs for utilities, as utilities
are forced to negotiate with, and compensate, both the railroad
and the owner of the servient land, neither of which would be
able to authorize the utility use independently.
of Power Line in Street or Highway as Additional Servitude, 58 A.L.R.2d 525 (1958). In
nine other states (California, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New
Jersey, Tennessee, and Wisconsin), electric lines are not deemed to create an
additional servitude where the lines have some direct relationship to the use of the
street, as for lighting the street or operating electric street railways. See id. Ohio and
Montana fid no additional servitude from electric lines located in urban areas when
the use of the lines is directly related to use of the street. See id. Only five states
(Georgia, Louisiana, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Texas) take the position that
power lines are always additional servitudes in street and highway easements. See id.
This view is also changing as more and more states face challenges by landowners
regarding additional utility servitudes along already burdened rights-of-way and
recent cases show they too are adopting the majority view that public thoroughfares
are reasonably subject to a variety of necessary public uses, from transmission of
electricity and intelligence to transportation of people and cargo. A cursory review of
cases since 1956 reveal that even more states are adopting the majority view that
power lines do not create additional servitudes. Utah. Arkansas. Pennsylvania,
Delaware, New Hampshire, and Idaho appear to have adopted the majority view that
utility lines are not additional servitudes.
307. With the demise of the landowner use rule, however, this distinction should
also fall into desuetude.
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2. Incidental Use Doctrine
The primary justification for allowing railroads to utilize
unused portions of their easements for generating revenue has
come to be called the "incidental use doctrine.""0 8 This doctrine
states that a railroad may use its easement to conduct not only
railroad-related activities, but also any other incidental activities
that are not inconsistent and do not interfere with the operation
of the railroad. This means that where a railroad leases part of
the corridor to a third party for a warehouse, grain silo, retail gas
station, or utility corridor for commercial, non-railroad purposes,
that lease should impose no additional servitude on the servient
estate for which compensation might be sought.
The incidental use doctrine first arose in the 1875 U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Grand Trunk Railroad Co. v.
Richardson,a"9 in which the Court held that non-railroad
structures could be located on a railroad right-of-way:
It must be admitted that a railroad company has the
exclusive control of all the land within the lines of its
roadway.... we are not prepared to assert that it may not
license the erection of buildings for its convenience, even
though they may be also for the convenience of others. It is
not doubted that the defendant might have erected similar
structures on the ground on which the plaintiffs buildings
were placed, if in its judgment the structures were convenient
for the receipt and delivery of freight on' its road. Such
erections would not have been inconsistent with the purposes
for which its charter was granted. And, if the [railroad]
company might have put up the buildings why might it not
license others to do the same thing ... 310
The doctrine was applied to federally-granted rights-of-way
in United States v. Union Pacific Railroad3"' in 1957 and has been
cited innumerable times in state cases since. For example, in
Mitchell v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.,3" 2 the Supreme Court of
Illinois held that no additional servitude was created where a
railroad leased land to a gas station which sold gas at retail and
shipped gas in bulk using the railroad. 3 The majority of courts
308. See, e.g., ELLIOTr, supra note 106, § 938.
309. 91 U.S. 454 (1875).
310. Id. at 468-69.
311. 353 U.S. 112 (1957).
312. 51 N.E.2d 271 (Ill. 1943).
313. See Ad at 274 ("No compelling reason is advanced by plaintiff, or in the
authorities cited by him, satisfactorily explaining why, if a bulk, or wholesale, station
is allowed to be operated on a railroad right of way, the owner of the bulk station, in
addition to selling wholesale, cannot likewise properly include facilities for selling at
2000]
HeinOnline  -- 27 Ecology L.Q. 421 2000-2001
ECOLOGY LA W QUARTERLY [Vol. 27:351
have allowed railroads to lease unused land for warehouses," 4
billboards,31 5 lumberyards,1 6 and livestock facilities.31 7 They have
also used the incidental use doctrine to validate leases for
telegraph, telephone, electric lines, and even trails.31 8 Ironically,
even the few states that followed the landowner-use rule and
construed railroad easements narrowly against the railroads
have generally allowed railroads to lease land for warehouses."
But a few uses have been held to go beyond the permissible
incidental ones. Retail gas stations with no connection to the
railroad have been held to be additional servitudes,"2 ° as have a
private gin,3 2 ' a tobacco warehouse,3 22 and a second, unrelated
railroad.3 23
The incidental use doctrine is the most expansive
formulation of a railroad's property right and is consistent with
the exclusive nature of the railroad easement. The test for
allowing an additional use is that the use be "not inconsistent"
with the railroad's use.3 24 Because the easement is so exclusive
as to be nearly equivalent to the fee, the railroad is clearly within
its rights to lease land for its necessary operations, such as
facilities that provide coal, gas, oil, water, or electricity to run its
trains. 325 For example, the railroad can license McDonalds to
retail.-).
314. See, e.g., Mississippi Inv. Inc. v. New Orleans & N.E. R.R. Co., 188 F.2d 245
(5th Cir. 1951); Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Marrieta Oil Corp., 22 F. Supp. 279 (W.D.
La. 1937); Oregon Short Line R.R. Co. v. Ada County, 18 F. Supp. 842 (D. Idaho
1937]; Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Maxey, 77 S.E. 801 (Ga. 1913); Coit v. Owenby-
Wafford Co., 81 S.E. 1067 (N.C. 1914): Turner v. Texas & New Orleans Ry. Co., 59
S.W.2d 239 (rex. Cir. Ct. App. 1933).
315. See, e.g., Bozarth, McCord & McCrary v. Oklahoma Dep't of Transp., 812
P.2d 815 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991).
316. See, e.g., Johnson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 274 N.W. 581 (Neb. 1937).
317. See, e.g., Hastings v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 126 N.W. 786
(Iowa 1910).
318. See, e.g., City of Sioux City v. Missouri Valley Pipe Line Co., 46 F.2d 819. 826
(N.D. Iowa 1931); Burnier v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 611 A.2d 1366 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1992); Fort Worth & Rio Grande Ry. Co. v. Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co.,
71S.W. 270 (Tex. 1903).
319. See, e.g., Sparrow v. Dixie Leaf Tobacco Co., 61 S.E.2d 700 (N.C. 1950);
Shelton v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 90 S.E. 751 (S.C. 1916); City of Knoxville v.
Kaiser, 33 S.W.2d 411 (Tenn. 1930).
320. See In re Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 127 F.2d 1001 (7th Cir. 1942); Mitchell, 51
N.E.2d 271 (Ill. 1943).
321. See Bond v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co., 160 So. 406 (La. 1935).
322. See Dixie Leaf Tobacco, 61 S.E.2d at 700.
323. See Blakely v. Chicago, Kan. & Neb. Ry. Co., 51 N.W. 767 (Neb. 1892).
324. See, e.g., City of Knoxville v. Kaiser, 33 S.W.2d. 411 (Tenn. 1930).
325. See, e.g., State Hwy. Comm'n v. Union Elec., 148 S.W.2d 503 (Mo. 1941)
(electric lines); Mize v. Rocky Mountain Bell Tel. Co., 100 P. 971 (Mont. 1909)
(ditches); Luedeke v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 231 N.W. 695 (Neb. 1930) (gasoline);
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operate a restaurant for passengers in its depot.121 It can lease
land for construction of livestock pens, 327 gins for grain,3 28 or
cranes for heavy freight. 29 In the process, the owners of these
facilities, who use the railroad for their business, may also sell
commercially to the non-railroad public, as when nearby workers
go to McDonalds for lunch.3 0
The justification for allowing these incidental uses is three-
fold: (1) the use is nominal compared to the already burdensome
railroad use; (2) the easement gives the railroad exclusive use
rights to the land, so no one else could authorize the third party
uses; and (3) the use is a railroad use insofar as it relates in
some way to the railroad's business. Because railroad easements
are so large and burdensome, any incidental uses are usually so
minimal compared to the primary rail use that damages would
be nominal.
The rule requires that the use must be "incidental," not
completely unrelated to rail use. Hence, warehouses that
provided storage for the railroads' shippers or telegraph lines
that provided communication for the railroad clearly met the
requirements of the incidental use doctrine.331 The courts
disagree, however, over whether a lease to a third-party user that
merely generates income for the railroad's general operating
budget, without some non-economic connection, meets the
requirement. An Oklahoma appeals court, for example, upheld a
billboard lease in a railroad easement, simply restating the
general rule that "[a] railroad company may lease its property
which is not required for railroad operations to other parties for
commercial use."3 32 But a telegraph line unconnected to the
railroad was held to be an additional servitude: in Tennessee.3 33 A
North Carolina court even explained how to draw that fine line
Fort Worth & Rio Grande Ry. Co. v. Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co., 71 S.W. 270 (Tex.
1903] (telegraph lines).
326. See, e.g.. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Mitchell, 74
Ill. App. 602 (Ill. App. Ct. 1897); John Hamilton v. Annapolis & Elk Ridge R.R. Co., 1
Md. 553 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1852).
327. See Colt v. Owenby-Wofford Co., 81 S.E. 1067 (N.C. 1914).
328. See Mitchell v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 51 N.E.2d 271 (Ill. 1943).
329. See Robertson Coal & Coke Co. v. Rothey, 162 A. 332 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1932).
330. See Mttchell, 51 N.E.2d at 274 ("No compelling reason. . . why, if a bulk, or
wholesale, station is allowed to be operated on a railroad right of way, the owner of
the bulk station... cannot likewise. . . sell[] at retail.").
331. See Mellon v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 750 F. Supp. 226 (W.D. Tex. 1990).
332. Bozarth, McCord & McCrary, v. Oklahoma Dep't of Transp., 812 P.2d 815,
816 (Okla. Ct. App, 1991).
333. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Nashville. Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. Co.,
237 S.W. 64, 65 (Tenn. 1922).
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between primary railroad use and incidental commercial use in
terms reminiscent of the distinction between public and private
owners in the "public use" prong of takings jurisprudence. 334
That court stated:
When the use by third parties is primarily for the benefit of
the railroad as a common carrier, then it is for railroad
purposes even though incidental benefits flow to the private
user. On the other hand, if the use is primarily private in
nature, the fact that the railroad is incidentally benefited
thereby, through the acquisition of a new customer or
increased shipments, does not convert it into a railroad
use. 
335
Despite the line-drawing problem, the modem trend
arguably focuses less on the relationship between the railroad
use and the third-party use, and instead validates any uses that
are "not inconsistent" with railroad use.
33 6
To avoid the primary/incidental use distinction, a few courts
look instead to the original intention of the parties, though these
intentions usually were not made very clear in the original
instruments.337 Where the servient landowner retains access
rights to drill for minerals, for instance, the railroad clearly could
not authorize its own lessee to do so. 335 Or, where the landowner
specifically included a provision for permitting his hotel to
remain on the burdened land, he was permitted to maintain the
yard, fence a garden, and plant trees on the railroad's
easement.33 1 In other words, some grantors have explicitly
reserved rights that would otherwise fall under the incidental use
rights of the railroad. Perhaps the best rule is that all incidental
uses are permissible unless explicitly retained by the grantor.
Making it the presumption that all use rights are conveyed
334. See Sparrow v. Dixie Leaf Tobacco Co., 61 S.E.2d 700 (N.C. 1950); see also
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 458 (Mich. 1981)
(-[Condemnation for a private use cannot be authorized whatever its incidental
public benefit and condemnation for a public purpose cannot be forbidden whatever
the incidental private gain.").
335. Sparrow, 61 S.E.2d at 703-04.
336. Mellon v. Southern Pac. Transport. Co., 750 F. Supp. 226 (W.D. Tex. 1990);
Garry v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 378 P.2d 609 (N.M. 1963). This is
about as helpful a line to draw as Justice Holmes' enigmatic regulatory takings line,
that interference with property constitutes a taking when it -goes too far."
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
337. See, e.g., Garry v. Atchison. Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 378 P.2d 609 (N.M.
1963).
338. See Missourl-Kan.-Tex. R.R. Co. v. Freer, 321 S.W.2d 731, 737 (Mo. Ct. App.
1958).
339. See Mobile & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Donovan, 58 S.W. 309, 313 (Tenn. 1900).
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unless specifically excepted would certainly reduce litigation. As
one commentator explained:
Landowners usually contest divisibility of easements to gain
the economic advantage of making the transfer to the second
easement holder, rather than allowing the first grantee to
reap the economic benefit of a division. Courts have not been
sympathetic to the landowner's position and... uniformly
have supported the first grantee's right to divide his
easement. 340
Because the intent of the original grantor as to the scope of
the easement is the critical issue, courts will generally allow
incidental uses to which the servient landowner consented over
an extended period of time. The landowner's failure to complain
about a single third-party use may give rise to a presumption
that the intent of the parties was to allow any additional third-
party incidental uses.3 41 Original intent, therefore, can be
gleaned from the ongoing actions of the parties and, when
coupled with the incidental use doctrine, can play an important
role in assessing the divisibility of a railroad easement.3 42
While some courts retain the distinction between railroad
use and purely commercial use, even though it is often
unworkable, the more effective approach is to allow all third-
party uses that are not inconsistent with railroad use on the
ground that the railroad knows best what it can and cannot
allow on the easement consistent with its public carrier duties.
For example, general revenues from third-party uses are
important to the railroad's operations even without non-
economic benefits to the railroad. In addition, the public nature
of the railroad easement would support a broad rule on
divisibility because, as one court noted that "an easement
acquired by the public includes every reasonable means for the
transmission of intelligence, the conveyance of persons, and the
transportation of commodities which the advance of civilization
may render suitable for a highway."3 43
340. Hegi, supra note 44, at 133.
341. See Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Barker, 247 S.W.2d 943,
946 (Ky. 1952).
342. As one commentator explained: "landowners usually contest divisibility of
easements to gain the economic advantage of making the transfer to the second
easement holder, rather than allowing the first grantee to reap the economic benefit
of a division. Courts have not been sympathetic to the landowners' position and ...
uniformly have supported the first grantee's right to divide his easement." Hegi, supra
note 44, at 133.
343. Kentucky & West Va. Power Co. v. Crawford, 16 S.W.2d 1041 (1929).
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3. Modem Fiber Optics and the Current Class Action Suits
Modem disputes between landowners and railroads seem to
lie in the divisibility of railroad easements for the laying of fiber-
optic cables. Fiber-optic cables are the wave of the future; they
are the information superhighway of the twenty-first century.
344
Straight, level-grade railroad corridors and high-voltage power
lines are the preferred locations for fiber-optic cables as they
may run for hundreds of miles without interruption. But as with
the telegraph, and then the telephone, fiber optics are being
challenged in the courts as constituting an additional servitude
on railroad easements.3 4 5
The states are in disagreement as to whether fiber-optic lines
on a railroad easement constitute an additional servitude. Under
the theory of the telegraph cases, fiber-optic uses that devote a
portion to railroad services (for example, where the railroad
leases space to a fiber-optic company in exchange for a
percentage of bandwidths on the cable or a preferential rate for
railroad uses) should not constitute an additional burden on the
servient estate. Under the incidental use doctrine, even pure
commercial/non-railroad fiber-optic uses should not constitute
an additional burden. But of the three cases directly addressing
fiber optics, only two followed the majority rule, while the third, a
Tennessee case, followed the minority rule.34 6
344. See Wilner, supra note 5, at 278 (defining fiber optics as "the pulsing of light
by laser through a dark cable that can carry thousands of digitized voice circuits. The
cable must not break (as light would enter) and it must not be bent (as the light
signal would be compromised). If the cable must be buried, it must be buried beneath
the frost line so that the freeze-thaw cycle does not create kinks in the line that affect
the light signal.").
345. See, e.g., Davis v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 606 So. 2d 734 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992), Calumet Nat'l Bank v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 682 N.E.2d 785 (Ind. 1997);
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Clark, 646 N.E.2d 1003 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Meighan v. United
States Sprint Comm. Co., 942 S.W.2d 476 (Tenn. 1997); Buhl v. United States Sprint
Comm. Co., 840 S.W.2d 904 (Tenn. 1992); Mellon v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 750
F. Supp. 226 (W.D. Tex. 1990).
Ironically, one of the first companies to get into laying fiber-optic cable was
Southern Pacific Transportation (of railroad fame), which created Sprint
Communications and laid hundreds of miles of fiber-optic cables in their own
railroad corridors. The other big players, AT&T and MCI, found rail corridors to be
ideal locations for leasing fiber-optic space. MCI purchased the rights-of-way of the
former Western Union Telegraph Company to bury its cables. See Wilner, supra note
5, at 274-76. Interesting questions arise as to whether the railroad can install these
lines if they own the company laying them. Would doing so violate the "railroad use"
restriction?
346. A recent decision out of the District Court for the Northern District of
Oklahoma, Hallaba v. Worldcom Network Services, Inc., No. 98-CV-895H (order
entered Mar. 31, 2000), denied a motion for class certification of adjacent landowners
against a fiber-optic company, on the ground that there are too many fact and law
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In Mellon v. Southern Pacific Transport Co., the Federal
District Court for the Western District of Texas, on a summary
judgment motion, held that under Texas law no compensation
was due to the servient fee owners of an estate burdened by a
railroad easement when the railroad company, Southern Pacific
Transportation, leased a portion of the railroad easement for the
placement of a buried fiber-optic cable."47 The fiber-optic line was
used primarily for commercial, non-railroad purposes and partly
for railroad purposes. The Mellon court did not cite this mixed
use as a factor in its determination.3 48 Rather, the court relied
heavily on the incidental use doctrine which "allows railroads to
contract with third parties and controls the permissible scope of
railroad authorized right-of-way uses and allows third party
commercial uses of the railroad right of way. ,349 The court found
the incidental use doctrine adequate to deny compensation to
the servient estate owner, even though the use was mixed.3"' The
court also cited other courts that had applied the incidental use
doctrine to other kinds of uses, and it noted that the right-of-way
included the non-mineral subsurface of the easement. 351 It is not
clear, however, whether the same result would obtain were the
fiber-optic line to be used solely for commercial, non-railroad
purposes.
In the second case, Davis v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., a
Florida District Court of Appeals reached the same result as the
Mellon court using a different theory.352 The court upheld a lower
court's ruling that the servient fee owners of a railroad easement
were not entitled to compensation where MCI, pursuant to an
eminent domain statute, buried a fiber-optic cable in the railroad
differences to meet the commonality requirement.
347. See 750 F. Supp. 226 (W.D. Tex. 1990).
348. See id. at 231 (This court finds the right-of-way surface includes the non-
mineral topsoil that would be occupied by a buried fiber optic line, and the fiber optic
cable is an authorized incidental use which is not inconsistent with railroad uses and
does not burden the subservient estate retained by the Plaintiff. Plaintiff has not
demonstrated under the terms of the easement or under controlling law it has
retained an interest in the railroad's easement for which it should receive rents, the
Court finds Plaintiffs arguments unpersuasive.").
349. Id. at 229 (citing Grand Trunk R.R. v. Richardson, 91 U.S. 454, 468-69
(1895)).
350. See id. at 229-30.
351. See id. at 230 (citing Fort Worth & Rio Grande Ry. Co. v. Southwestern Tel. &
Tel. Co., 71 S.W. 270 (Tex. 1903); Citizens Telephone Co. v. Cincinnati, New Orleans
& T.P. R. Co., 233 S.W. 901, 903 (1921)); see also Bozarth, McCord, and McCrary v.
Oklahoma Dep't of Trans., 812 P.2d 815 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991) (citing McCurley v.
City of El Reno, 280 P. 467 (Okla. 1929)) (allowing incidental uses but not mentioned
by the court in Mellon).
352. 606 So. 2d 734 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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easement which ran over the Davis' property. MCI's buried fiber-
optic cable was used primarily for commercial, non-railroad
purposes and partly for the railroad's own communication needs.
But, just as in Mellon, the court did not rely on the mixed use of
the fiber-optic cable when it concluded that the landowner was
not entitled to compensation. Instead, the court in Davis
reasoned that telegraph and telephone uses, and by analogy
fiber-optic uses, were permitted by virtue of a state statute
permitting telegraph companies to lay their lines in the right-of-
way of any railroad in the state and that the fiber-optic use was
even less burdensome than the telegraph use.3 53 The Davis court
also explicitly rejected the incidental use doctrine, but it remains
open whether a Florida court would apply it in a case where a
statutory justification was not available for authorizing the cable
use.
Fiber-optic companies have not been successful in all states.
The Tennessee Supreme Court in Buhl v. United States Sprint
Communications Co. held that the installation of a fiber-optic
cable in a railroad easement constituted a taking of the servient
fee owner's property. 31 The dispositive issue for this court was
that the buried fiber-optic line was used solely for commercial,
non-railroad uses.35 The court stated that, under Tennessee
precedents, the appurtenance must be related to a railroad
purpose, or else a taking would occur.
35 6
The history of the Buhl case, however, is problematic. At
trial, the court granted summary judgment for the railroad and
Sprint Communications, finding the license within the scope of
the railroad easement.35 7 The Tennessee Court of Appeals, in a
353. See id. ("Unlike the many wire lines on Western Union's telegraph poles,
MCI's fiber optic telecommunications cable is less than one inch in diameter, is
buried approximately three feet deep, and is used for telephone and other
telecommunication purposes, both by the railroad for its own communications needs
and by customers of MCI for communications purposes. Certainly, the MCI cable
imposes no greater obstruction along the railroad than the former Western Union
lines.").
354. 840 S.W.2d 904 (Tenn. 1992).
355. See id. at 911 ("The conclusion is that since the telephone cable installed by
Sprint is not used by Southern [the railroad company in question in the
construction, maintenance, or operation of its railroad upon and across the
encumbered property, its construction constituted the taking of an interest in
plaintiffs respective tracts within the meaning of the law of eminent domain.").
356. See id. ("The critical requirement is that the appurtenances be used in
connection with the operation of the railroad upon and across the encumbered
property.").
357. See Kristi Robbins Rezabek, Property Law- Buhl v. U.S. Sprint
Communications Co.: Ascertaining the Rights of Fee Owners on Whose Land a
Railroad Easement Exists, 22 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REv. 843 (1992).
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moment of strange incoherence, found that the license was
within the scope of the railroad's easement but that the
landowners were also entitled to compensation. 358 The Tennessee
Supreme Court was at least consistent in finding that the license
was outside the scope of the easement and therefore that
compensation must be paid, but this conclusion was at odds
with prior Tennessee case law adopting the incidental use
doctrine,3 59 finding that a telephone line in a railroad easement
was a "proper railroad appurtenance,"3"° and finding that
telecommunication lines in a street did not impose an additional
servitude. 3
6 1
Although Tennessee is one of the landowner-use states, it
has held that telegraph use is consistent with railroad use and is
not an additional burden.3 62 Moreover, the Buhl decision is
inconsistent with the wide-spread statutory schemes of most
states to encourage location of utilities and cable television wires
along public highways, pre-existing utility corridors, and railroad
easements where they are least burdensome and most
efficient." s And not surprisingly, Tennessee's openness to these
suits has led to a series of cases filed by landowners that have
yet to be resolved.3"
Harmonizing Mellon, Davis, and Buhl is not possible. In both
Mellon and Davis, the fiber-optic line was a mixed
railroad/commercial line, but neither court cited that fact as a
reason for holding that no compensation was due to the servient
owner. The Mellon court held that no compensation was due
because the placement of a fiber-optic line in the easement was
an incidental use within the scope of the railroad's easement.
The Davis court, on the other hand, held that the placement of
the fiber-optic line was not compensable because it was
authorized by statute and constituted only a nominal burden. In
Buhl, the fiber-optic line was strictly commercial, and that
became the dispositive issue for the court. Mellon, Davis, and
Buhl thus are instructive to courts facing the issue of whether a
buried fiber-optic cable in a railroad easement constitutes an
358. See Buhl v. United States Sprint Comm. Co., 1991 WL 16250 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1991).
359. See City of Knoxville v. Kaiser, 33 S.W.2d 411 (Tenn. 1930).
360. See Mobile & Ohio R.R. v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 46 S.W. 571 (Tenn. 1898).
361. See Frazier v. East Tenn. Tel. Co., 90 S.W. 620 (Tenn. 1906).
362. See Mobile, 46 S.W. 57 1.
363. See generally Rezabek, supra note 357.
364. See, e.g., Meighan v. United States Sprint Comm. Co., 942 S.W.2d 476 (Tenn.
1997); McCumber v. United States Sprint Comm. Co., No. 23,796-Ill (Cocke Co. Cir.
Ct. filed June 6, 1996).
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additional, compensable burden on the servient estate, but they
by no means detail a comprehensive rule that would be
generalizable over a majority of states.
The three fiber-optic cases are particularly unhelpful to the
current spate of class action suits for a number of reasons. First,
nuances and differences in the incidental use doctrine in each
state preclude application of a uniform rule to corridors in all
fifty states. Second, the type of use, whether mixed or purely
commercial, will call forth different state rules on divisibility.
Third, the sheer number and variety of plaintiffs in these class
actions mean that the courts must conduct numerous title
determinations to decide which parcels were granted to the
railroads in fee simple and which as easements, determinations
best left to the quiet title mechanisms already in place in each
state to make exactly these determinations. 36 5 Furthermore,
there is little to be gained for landowners in these disputes
because, even if the fiber optics are held to be an additional use,
the servient fee owner will be compensated only for the difference
in value of the fee before and after construction of the utility
lines.366
Finally, these three fiber-optics cases raise the additional
question of what happens to utility licenses when the railroad
abandons its rail service. This question includes a multitude of
disparate issues about which corridors were abandoned
pursuant to state law, which cables were located prior to
abandonment and which post-abandonment, and which
corridors were protected under federal railbanking. These issues
need resolution so that necessary public services can be
provided without leaving landowners, the railroads, or the utility
companies in limbo for the years it may take these cases to work
365. This issue is particularly divisive in Indiana. See generally WRIGHT, supra
note 133; Wright, supra note 160 (explaining how the law on railroad title makes for
contentious litigation). The issue is divisive in other states as well. See, e.g., Hallaba
v. Worldcom Network Service, Inc., No. 98-CV-895-H (N.D. Okla Mar. 31. 2000).
366. See Right and Measure of Compensation, supra note 286, at n.97; see also
NICHOLS', supra note 11, §§ 3:11.01[2][e], 5:16.0714]; Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v.
Snyder, 95 N.W. 183 (Iowa 1903); Teeter v. Postal Tel. Co., 90 S.E. 941 (N.C. 1916);
Hodges v. Western Union Tel. Co., 45 S.E. 572 (N.C. 1903).
The fee owner is not entitled to an accounting of the profits received from a
telephone company to a railroad company concerning the utility lines in the railroad
easement. See Snyder, 95 N.W. at 183. In one case, the servient landowner was
denied all recovery, even though the telegraph company had wrongfully trespassed by
putting three poles on her land, outside the railroad easement, on the grounds that
the damages were only nominal and the telegraph company was in the process of
relocating the poles back to the railroad easement. See Campbell v. Southwestern
Tel. & Tel. Co., 158 S.W. 1085, 1086 (Ark. 19131.
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through the courts. At this point, however, the fiber-optics cases
follow the majority incidental use rule, an approach we support.
4. Using the Telephone Cases as Precedent
Although at first blush it appears that fiber-optic lines could
be handled in much the same fashion as telephone lines, which
distinguish between commercial and railroad use, a buried fiber-
optic line is quite different from a telephone line. In fact, it might
be more logical to treat buried fiber-optic lines like buried
pipelines rather than like telephone lines strung on poles.3 6 7
The first distinction between telephone lines and poles and a
buried fiber-optic line is physical size and presence. While
telephone lines and poles are tall and imposing, and the lines
strung on them often numerous and cluttered, buried fiber-optic
lines are barely half an inch in diameter, and usually only one
runs within the corridor. In terms of physical size and presence,
the fiber-optic line and its appurtenant structures (repeaters) are
far smaller and fewer in number than telephone lines and
poles. 368
Another critical distinction between telephone lines and
fiber-optic lines is their location. Fiber-optic lines are buried
below ground (beneath the frost line, generally around 36
inches)3 6 while telephone poles and lines sit above ground.
Unquestionably telephone lines and poles are more unsightly
than buried fiber-optic lines. Having a buried fiber-optic line
running 36 inches below the surface of the railroad easement
will likely have little if any effect upon the value of the servient
fee, whereas telephone lines and poles in the railroad easement
might have some measurable negative effect upon the value of
the fee estate. At least in the case of electric powerlines and
poles, such unsightliness is often an element of damages in
easement condemnation proceedings.
370
The telephone line poses numerous possible burdens; it is
unsightly, repair crews might need access to the lines and poles
through the servient estate, and the poles and lines may pose a
danger to people on the land of the servient estate (the poles may
367. Although no legal consequences per se flow from characterizing buried fiber-
optic lines as "pipelines" instead of telephone lines (and poles), such characterization
more accurately comports with the physical and geographical nature of the buried
fiber-optic line.
368. See Wilner, supra note 5, at 273.
369. See id.
370. See generally Unsightliness of Powerline, supra note 47.
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fall and the wires may electrocute).Y In many cases, however,
fiber optics are located within pre-existing gas pipelines so it can
hardly be argued that they are an additional burden.7 2 Laying
the cables might not even require digging up the surface. If the
key to whether a railroad may grant a subeasement is whether
that subeasement imposes an additional burden on the servient
estate, then a fiber-optic cable is one of the least intrusive third-
party uses the railroads have authorized to date.
E. The Scope of the Railroad Easement- Revisited
The scope of the railroad easement is quite extensive. All
states recognize that it is exclusive as against the servient
landowner.3 73 Even the four states that adopted the landowner-
use rule draw very narrow lines for the servient owner. 74 States
do, however, differ in their approach to the scope of the
easement. Some states adopt an approach that relies heavily on
the physical dimensions of the easement- the width, depth, and
height of the railroad corridor itself. The majority of states,
however, look to the railroad use and the intention of the original
parties to the grant to determine whether the railroad may grant
third-party licenses to use either the airspace or the sub-surface
estate for utilities. Some of the states within this majority will
limit third-party uses to ones having some relationship to
railroad operations, a relationship other than mere economics.
The federal courts and most states, however, adopt a fairly
liberal incidental use doctrine that gives railroads significant
power to grant third-party uses within the easement so long as
the uses are not inconsistent or do not interfere with the
railroad's common carrier duties.
Telegraph and telephone uses have caused a significant
371. See Selective Resources v. Superior Court, 700 P.2d 849, 851 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1984) (alleging potential harm from electromagnetic fields associated with the lines).
372. See Wilner, supra note 5, at 275. See generally Worldcom Network Services,
Inc. v. Thompson, 684 N.E.2d 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997); Kim Hooper, Cable Cutting
Violated Order, Court Rules, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Aug. 20, 1997; Kim Hooper,
Landowners Can't Touch WorldCom Cable .. , INDIANAPOLIS STAR, June 20, 1997, for
details on a dispute that led to a landowner digging up a WorldCom fiber-optic cable
and cutting it even though the cable had been located in an abandoned gas pipeline.
373. See infra. Part III.B (discussing exclusivity).
374. A servient owner may only use the easement for agricultural uses and may
not erect permanent structures. A servient owner may be given some slight control
over private grade crossings but if the railroad chooses to relocate them, the owner
has no say, and unless the owner reserved a right to enter the easement, only a
waiver will justify the owner's limited entry onto the easement. See infra Part III.B
(discussing exclusivity).
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amount of litigation, but a majority of courts continue to
recognize the close interrelationship between the railroads and
communications companies. Because the railroads require the
ability to communicate between stations, they have often been
active partners in providing communications services. Thus,
especially under statutory grants favoring telegraph
development, the distinction between utilities that provide
services to the railroads and those that are purely commercial
makes little sense, which may explain why telegraph and
telephone use is generally found to be within the scope of the
railroad easement.
In certain ways, the telegraph and telephone cases provide
logical precedents for the modern-day equivalent: the fiber-optic
line. But fiber optics are also substantially different in that they
impose a far lighter burden on the servient owner than telephone
poles and lines. Consequently, the split among the courts with
regard to fiber-optic lines raises some profound questions for
states that have not addressed the issue. Since there were over
10 million miles of fiber-optic lines deployed by 1995,"' 5 and that
number continues to grow, virtually every state must decide this
issue for itself. This Article attempts to provide some history for
the practice of third-party uses in rail corridors and a theory for
reconciling these disparate cases into a single, permissive
doctrine. We suggest that courts adopt a position that protects
fiber-optic lines in railroad corridors from claims by servient
landowners on the ground that rail corridors, like streets and
highways, are valuable public transportation corridors in which
the public has a vested right. So long as the rail corridor is
meeting the public needs of its common carrier status, the
minimal burden of a buried fiber-optic line is certainly consistent
with prior case law and statutes.
Unfortunately, we cannot end here, for railroads are
abandoning their lines at an unprecedented rate. In the 1920s
the nation had over 270,000 miles of rail corridor. By the early
1990s only half that mileage remained." What happens,
therefore, to telephone lines, electric lines, and fiber-optic cables
that were located in a functioning rail corridor when the railroad
picks up its tracks and ties and abandons its property interests?
That is the subject of the next Part.
375. See Wilner, supra note 5, at 276.
376. See CHARLES MONTANGE, PRESERVING ABANDONED RAILROAD RIGHTS-OF-WAYS
FOR PUBLIC USE: A LEGAL MANUAL FOR THE RAILS TO TRAILS CONSERVANCY 1 (1989);
Steven R. Wild, A History of Railroad Abandonments, 23 TRANSP. L.J. 1 (1995).
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ABANDONMENT
Because railroads are abandoning their corridors at
unprecedented rates and internet connections, cable television,
and multiple phone lines are becoming increasingly common in
the average household, it is important to reconcile the property
rights of utility companies with those of railroads, abutting
landowners, and the general public. We address in this Part,
first, the general law governing abandonment; second, the
emerging shifting public use doctrine: and third, the Rails-to-
Trails conversion of abandoned rail corridors.
A. Abandonment of a Common Law Easement
We are first confronted with the question of how a railroad
loses its easement through abandonment. Unlike fee simple title,
which cannot be abandoned even by an owner who no longer
wants the land, 377 an easement is merely a right to use and
occupy someone else's land. Because the easement owner does
not have title to the land, she can relinquish her rights through
release or abandonment, and the servient land becomes free and
unburdened from the servitude. Railroads are commonly held to
have abandoned their easements when they discontinue rail
services and remove their tracks and ties.378
Determining abandonment of the property right is not that
simple, however. In the first place, rail operations are governed
by the federal government through the Surface Transportation
Board (STB), the successor to the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC).3 79 A rail carrier simply cannot discontinue
services if there are shippers or passengers along a line who
require rail service.38 ° But rail service, which is the subject of
377. Although one can abandon personal property by, for instance, placing it on
the curb for the garbage collectors, one cannot abandon real property because the
law requires that there be an owner of the present estate of all real property at all
times. Property taxes, for instance, will be debited to the account of the owner until
the land is transferred, either by deed, or by court order.
378. See Connelly, supra note 111, § 5.
379. The Surface Transportation Board has taken over the duties of the Interstate
Commerce Commission with respect to railroad abandonments pursuant to the ICC
Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, §§ 101-02, 109 Stat. 803, 804-52
(19951 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-11908 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995)). The ICC Act,
however, does not cover all railroads, for it exempts short line and certain other
carriers. See 49 U.S.C. § 10501 (1994).
380. Prior to abandonment, the STB must grant a certificate that the present or
future public convenience and necessity permit such an abandonment.
Transportation Act of Feb. 28, 1920, ch. 91, § 402, 41 Stat. 456, 477.
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STB jurisdiction, is not directly related to the state-law property
rights that a railroad might have obtained in its land.
Prior to 1920, a railroad that found a particular line
unprofitable could not simply discontinue services and remove
its tracks because many states had imposed strict limitations in
their charters, had passed restrictive legislation, or had imposed
contractual obligations that bound the railroads to a variety of
administrative requirements before they could abandon a line.
Because these laws often forced them to operate unprofitable
lines and thus were affecting interstate commerce, Congress
intervened in 1920 with the Transportation Act,3 " effectively pre-
empting the myriad state laws in favor of a centralized system of
control over interstate shippers and carriers. Since 1920,
railroads have been permitted by the ICC to abandon
unprofitable lines when there was no showing of a "serious,
adverse impact on rural and community development."
38 2
Consequently, the "impact of federal preemption has been to
stultify the development of state law, leaving the case law in the
position it held prior to World War I when railroads were under
construction, and rail abandonments were rare birds indeed."
383
Since 1920, therefore, when a railroad determines that a line
is no longer profitable and it seeks to discontinue service along
that route, it may initiate proceedings before the STB for a
finding that "present or future public convenience and necessity
require or permit the abandonment or discontinuance." 4 If such
a finding is made, a certificate of discontinuance will issue from
the STB. The railroad then has one year to complete its
abandonment proceedings, which require that it notify the STB
that it has fully abandoned the rail line, at which time the
discontinuance certificate will become an abandonment
certificate. If the railroad does not notify the STB that it has
consummated abandonment procedures within the one year
period, the certificate of discontinuance will expire and the line
will remain on the STB's active carrier list."8 5
Prior to the acquisition of a discontinuance certificate from
381. See id. ("No carrier by railroad subject to this Act shall abandon all or any
portion of a line of railroad, or operation thereof, unless and until there shall first
have been obtained from the Commission a certificate that the present or future
public convenience and necessity permit such an abandonment."I.
382. 49 U.S.C. § 10903(d) (1994).
383. Montange, supra note 105, at 160.
384. 49 U.S.C. § 10903(d) (1994).
385. See generally Melons Grown in South Texas; Increased Expenses and
Establishment of Assessment Rate, 61 Fed. Reg. 248 (1996).
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the STB, federal railroad regulations preempt all state laws
dealing with railroads, including state property laws. Yet, some
courts have improperly applied state property law before STB
action, finding that the railroad had abandoned its easements
under state law prior to obtaining federal abandonment
authorization.3 6 Thus a railroad may be forced to provide
services along a corridor in which its property rights were
previously extinguished under state law." 7 At least one state has
codified the rule that abandonment of service shall not mean or
imply that the easements have been abandoned.38 8
Once a carrier has been authorized by the STB to
discontinue services and abandon a line, it may divest itself of its
property rights, which is a process governed by state property
law. Under state law, abandonment of a railroad easement
generally requires intent to abandon and consummation of that
intent through actions inconsistent with retaining the property
interest.38 9 Selling the corridor line is an unequivocal act of
abandonment, but railroads that retain the property may be
deemed to have abandoned their easements simply by virtue of
their discontinuance of services, removal of tracks and ties, or
nonuse. Abandonment of the property and discontinuance of
services are not the same thing.39 0 But these two distinct stages
are conflated by many courts.3 ' A railroad may discontinue
services and then divest itself of its property, or it may
discontinue services and remove tracks and ties but keep the
property by continuing to pay taxes, regulating grade crossings,
maintaining drainage, and generally continuing to act like an
owner.
3 92
Nonuse, by itself, is generally insufficient to constitute
386. See Kansas City Area Transp. Auth. v. 4550 Main Assoc., Inc., 742 S.W.2d
182, 191 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that regardless of ICC action, railroad had
already abandoned easement under state property law) (modified and readopted
1987). See Sennewald. supra note 147, at 1399, for a thorough discussion of the
illogic of this decision.
387. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. I.C.C., 850 F.2d 694, 703-04 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(noting that state law cannot cause the reversion of property rights in railroad
corridors prior to ICC-approved abandonment).
388. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 7105(B) (West 1998).
389. See generally Connelly, supra note 111.
390. See, e.g., id. § 10.
391. See i. § 7; cf. Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United States, 733 A.2d 1055, 1086
(Md. 1999); Kansas City Area Transp. Authority v. 4550 Main Assoc. Inc., 742 Sw.2d
182 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
392. See Connelly, supra note 111, § 9; cf. Cary Enter. v. CSX Transp. Inc., No.
95-0331 1-CH (Mich. 29th Cir. Ct. Apr. 19, 1996) (order granting summary judgment
for defendants).
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abandonment as nonuse is not the necessary "clear,
unequivocal, and decisive act of the party showing a
determination not to have the benefit intended [by the grant]." 93
Failure to use all of a granted easement likewise does not
constitute abandonment of the unused portion. 394 Fencing a
portion of a corridor and leaving unfenced an additional area has
been held to indicate intent not to abandon.395 Payment of taxes
has been held to indicate intent not to abandon even after over
nine years of nonuse.396
Where nonuse occurs with other circumstances,
abandonment may be found. Certainly where the terms of the
grant require termination after a certain period of nonuse,
nonuse by itself will support abandonment. 397  Failure to
construct the rail line once the corridor is initially obtained will
usually justify a finding of abandonment. 39 But in one state,
even failure to construct the line for over nineteen years after
condemnation of the land only raised a presumption of an
intention to abandon. 399 Offers for sale often are held to be
evidence of intent to abandon.4°° Adverse possession by another
in addition to nonuse by the railroad may be sufficient to find
abandonment. 01 But even where the railroad only enclosed a
portion of its right-of-way and an adverse user had constructed a
building on the remaining portion, the court held there was no
abandonment of the adversely-used land.4"2
Removal of tracks and ties have often been held to constitute
evidence of intent to abandon because the running of trains is
thereby rendered impossible.40 3 But there are numerous cases to
393. Townsend v. Michigan Cent. R.R. Co., 101 F. 757, 761 (6th Cir. 1900).
394. See Morgan v. Des Moines Union Ry. Co., 85 N.W. 902, 906 (Iowa 1901).
395. See Allard Cattle Co. v. Colorado & S. Ry. Co., 530 P.2d 503, 504 (Colo.
1974); Chicago & S.E. Ry. Co. v. Wood, 66 N.E. 923. 923 (Ind. Ct. App. 1903).
396. See People v. Southern Pac. Co., 158 P. 177, 180 (Cal. 1916).
397. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Sweat, 171 S.E. 123, 129 (Ga. 1933);
Lyman v. Suburban RR. Co., 60 N.E. 515 (Ill. 1901).
398. See Delaware, Lackawanna & W. R.R. Co. v. City of Oswego, 86 N.Y.S. 1027,
1031-32 (1904); cf Canadian River R.R. Co. v. Wichita Falls & N.W. Ry. Co., 166 P.
163, 167-68 (1917) (non-use relevant among other factors).
399. See Kuhiman v. Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co., 283 S.W. 571, 572 (rex.
Civ. App. 1926).
400. See Seventy-Ninth St. Improvement Corp. v. Ashley, 509 S.W.2d 121, 123
(Mo. 1974).
401. See, e.g., Oklahoma City-Ada-Atoka Ry. Co. v. City of Ada, 182 F.2d 293
(10th Cir. 1950); Denver & Rio Grande Ry. Co. v. Mills, 222 F. 481 (8th Cir. 1915).
But see Chesapeake Beach Ry. Co. v. Washington, Potomac & Chesapeake R.R. Co.,
199 U.S. 247 (1905); Dunford v. Dardanelle & R.R. Co., 287 S.W. 170 (Ark. 1926).
402. See Sheldon v. Michigan Cent. R.R. Co., 126 N.W. 1056 (Mich. 1910).
403. See, e.g., Faus v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 303 P.2d 814 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
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the contrary. 4 Removal of trash along the corridor or controlling
weeds are also signs that no abandonment was intended despite
the removal of tracks and ties.40 5 Obtaining governmental
authorization to discontinue or abandon is generally held to be
insufficient evidence of an intent to abandon the property rights
unless tracks and ties have also been removed." 6
The showing that must be made to prove abandonment of
the rail corridor thus varies radically across the states. Certain
states, pursuant to turn-of-the-century anti-railroad animus,
have terminated railroad corridor easements upon evidence that
would not justify termination of a private easement."7 Other
states establish a higher standard to demonstrate intent to
abandon and consummation of that intent because of the public
interest in the corridors.4 °8
For the utility company whose property rights depend on the
strength of the railroad's rights, the question of abandonment is
crucial. 09 Assuming arguendo that a railroad easement is
sufficiently broad to encompass a general utility license or sub-
easement while the railroad is operating, what effect does
abandonment have on the utility's rights if the railroad
subsequently abandons its easements or is found to have
abandoned its easements prior to granting the utility license? A
few general principles give us some initial guidance, but the law
at this time remains unclear.
First and foremost is the general principle that termination
1956); City Motel, Inc. v. Dep't of Highways, 336 P.2d 375 (Nev. 1959).
404. See, e.g., Ocean Shore R.R. Co. v. Spring Valley Water Co., 262 P. 53 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1927); O'Brien v. Best, 194 P.2d 608 (Idaho 1948); Sandy River Coal
Co. v. Champion Bridge Co., 48 S.W.2d 1062, 1064 (Ky. 1932).
405. See Cleveland & Pittsburgh Ry. Co. v. Ward, 40 Ohio C.C. 642 (1912).
406. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Corp. v. U.S.R.R. Vest Corp., 955 F.2d 1158 (7th Cir.
1992) (holding that state statute finding abandonment merely on obtaining of ICC
discontinuance certificate violated due process clause); Faus v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co..
303 P.2d 814 (Cal. Dist. App. Ct. 1956); Lacy v. East Broad Top R.R. & Coal Co., 77
A.2d 706 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1951).
407. See Cannco Contractors, Inc. v. Livingston, 669 S.W.2d 457, 459-60 (Ark.
19841; see also BRUCE & ELY. supra note 105, § 9, at 29 ("There is authority for the
proposition that courts more readily infer that a public easement has been
abandoned than that a private easement has been so relinquished.").
408. One commentator argued that public easements should be more carefully
guarded by the courts than private easements because there is no private landowner
available who will protect her property rights in the case of the former. 2 ELLIOTr &
ELLIorr, supra note 106, § 1175. Perhaps the most useful summary of the cases in
this area are found in Cornelly, supra note 111.
409. This is another reason why these class actions are inappropriate. The states
differ dramatically in their definitions of abandonment, so the classes will have to be
subdivided by state to determine which corridors have in fact been abandoned.
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of an easement will terminate a sub-easement, just as
termination of a head lease will destroy a sub-lease. If the
railroad's easement terminates, any rights dependent upon the
railroad's rights will fail41 unless some legal principle protects
the sub-easement from termination. Such legal principles
include prescription, prior use, estoppel, shifting public use
doctrine, or, as in at least three states, a statute that preserves
the utility's rights.4 ' Of course, this is unnecessary for those
parcels of the corridor owned by the railroad in fee simple
absolute; the utility's rights are already protected.'
The incidental use doctrine implies that, if railroads are
allowed to lease unused portions of their easements for financial
gain, then so long as they continue to collect revenues from a
utility license, they are still acting as the owner of the easement.
Thus, the act of leasing or granting utility sub-easements
evidences intent not to abandon the corridor in question, even if
all rail service has stopped. Similarly, if railroads do not lose
unused portions of their easements because they are lying
fallow, they should not lose them when they allow third parties
to use them.
Other methods of saving utility rights post-abandonment by
the railroad may be prescription, laches, or estoppel. If a servient
landowner has knowledge of the dual servitudes and takes no
action to remove the trespass of the utility company upon
termination of the railroad easement, she may find herself
subject to the utility's claim of easement by prescription. If she
undertakes an ejectment action, the utility may have a defense of
laches or estoppel if she acquiesced to the utility's use for a
sufficient period of time.412 Prescriptive rights depend, of course,
on whether utilities can acquire property rights by prescription
or are barred from doing so under state law. But laches and
estoppel may be sufficient to prevent a landowner who slept on
her rights from trying to eject a utility company whose lines were
410. See, e.g., Forwood v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 1998 WL 136572 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 16, 1998); State Highway Comm'n v. Union Elec. Co., 148 S.W.2d 503 (Mo.
1941); Hoffman v. Capitol Cablevision Sys., Inc., 383 N.Y.S.2d 674, 676 (1976);
Hinds v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 591 P.2d 697, 699 (Okla. 1979) (holding free
alienability of exclusive leasehold interests to sub-lessees); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY
§ 450 (1944); BRUCE & ELY, supra note 105, § 8.04; Hegi, supra note 44, at 128-29.
411. See infra notes 412-416.
412. See, e.g., Taylor Inv. Co. v. Kansas City Power & Light Co.. 322 P.2d 817,
826-28 (Kan. 1958); Potomac Edison v. Routzahn, 65 A.2d 580 (Md. 1949). But see
Pierce v. Cherry Valley Farms, Inc., 63 N.E,2d 46 (Ohio Ct. App. 1945) (holding no
adverse possession against the railroad or servient landowner by utility company that
remained thirteen years after railroad abandoned).
200
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known to the landowner.41 3
Also, Indiana, South Dakota, and Iowa have enacted statutes
to preserve the utility's rights to remain on the servient land after
the railroad has abandoned its corridor, although the statutes do
not extinguish the landowner's rights to seek monetary
compensation for continued use of the corridor after termination
of the railroad's rights.414 The Iowa law gives the utilities sixty
days to pay the landowner the fair market value of an easement
for such facilities.415 South Dakota allows the utilities to remain
for three years on an abandoned corridor.416 These statutes are
an important way for states to clarify their common law rulings
in this troublesome area.4 17
When railroad corridors were created by federal grants,
either as pre-1871 limited fees or post-1875 easements,
abandonment is regulated by federal statute. In 1922 Congress
enacted the Railroad Right of Way Abandonment Act,4"8 providing
that, upon railroad abandonment or forfeiture, as declared by a
court of competent jurisdiction, the corridor lands vest back in
the United States, or its successors in interest, except for lands
running through a municipality, which acquires the federal
interest.4 1
9
The Department of the Interior and the federal courts have
413. Cf. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Barker, 247 S.W.2d 943,
945 (Ky. 1952) (holding that owner could not contest mill's right to structure after
acquiescing for many years).
414. See IOWA CODE § 327G.77(3) (1997); IND. CODE. § 32-5-12-11 (1999); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 49-16A- 112 (Mlchie 1999).
415. See IOWA CODE § 327G.77(3) (1997).
416. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 49-16A-112-114 (Michie 1999).
417. As an aside, however, both the Indiana and the Iowa law require the utility to
negotiate with adjacent landowners who are granted by statute the fee title to the
center of the abandoned corridor if their deeds do not describe the actual corridor
land. See IOWA CODE § 327G.77 (1997): IND. CODE § 32-5-12-10(c) (1999). This
ignores the fact that the grantor's heirs or successors in interest to the grantor's
retained fee title may in fact be the land owner of the corridor land. The North
Carolina Supreme Court found that a similar law granting abandoned rail corridor
land to adjacent landowners was a taking under both the state and the federal
takings clauses. See McDonalds Corp. v. Dwyer, 432 S.E.2d 165 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
The Indiana and Iowa laws that allow adjacent landowners compensation, even when
their deeds do not describe the corridor land, may raise similar constitutional issues.
Ironically, the Iowa law requires compensation by utility companies to the servient
landowner, but does not require any compensation to the servient landowner for
drainage easements held by drainage districts. See IOWA CODE § 468.118 (1997). Why
drainage districts are deemed to hold permanent easements that survive the
destruction of the railroad's interests and utility companies is not entirely clear.
418. Act of Mar. 8, 1922, ch. 94, 42 Stat. 414.
419. See 43 U.S.C. § 912 (1994). The federal government retains all oil, gas, and
other mineral interests in the railroad lands, even if the government has sold to
successors in interest.
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determined that under both pre- and post-1871 federal railroad
grants, the railroad acquired the subsurface rights to their
corridor lands, although not the mineral rights, and could
subsequently authorize third-party use along the corridor
without requiring federal authorization.42 0 But what happens
upon abandonment? According to federal law on railroad
abandonment, the railroad's property rights revert to the United
States, which then regains control over the subsurface of the
corridor for purposes of laying utility lines.4 2 1 Utilities must
negotiate with the Department of the Interior for the rights to lay
fiber-optic cable along an abandoned railroad corridor. And if the
railroad granted the utility a sub-easement prior to abandoning
its subsurface rights and then later abandons; the Department
of the Interior has the power to decide whether to validate the
pre-existing leases between the now-defunct railroad and the
still-viable utility.
422
In sum, third party users must be cautious in locating their
facilities in a railroad corridor as the parcels of the corridor held
as easements may terminate upon abandonment and the leases
or licenses may thereby fail. Besides the statutory and common
law methods of preserving utility rights post-abandonment
mentioned above, public policy motives may preserve the use.
Even though the railroad may remove its tracks and ties and
discontinue services, the corridor still retains its public
character, and some states have taken efforts to preserve other
public uses even after the railroad leaves.2 3
B. Shifting Public Use of the Railroad Right-of-Way
Another way to deal with the question of utility rights in
railroad corridors is the shifting public use doctrine (SPUD).
Under this doctrine, public easements that are transformed to
meet changing technologies, but which arguably retain some
character of the original easement, will not be found to be
420. See generally PROPOSED INSTALLATION, supra note 121; United States v. Union
Pac. RtR. Co., 353 U.S. 112, 119 (1957) (holding that the United States retains rights
to underlying minerals in right-of-way grant to railroad).
421. See 43 U.S.C. § 912 (1994).
422. See generally PROPOSED INSTALATION, supra note 121.
423. West Virginia, for example, enacted a rails-to-trails program that provides
that -any and all abandoned railroad rights-of-way acquired by the state prior to the
effective date of this article are hereby declared held for railroad transportation
purposes as of the date of acquisition.... Such abandoned railroad rights-of-way
shall not revert by operation of law to any other ownership while being held for future
railroad use." W. VA. CODE § 5B- 1A-6 (1999).
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extinguished or abandoned. Thus a railroad easement may be
converted to a highway, and a canal easement may be converted
to a logging road without causing abandonment. But the states
differ on how they will allow changed uses to be classified within
the prescribed use limitations.4 24 Where a railroad corridor must
be converted to another use, for example, a road for automobiles,
a number of courts have held that this shift in use is permissible
because a road for automobiles- just like a railroad- is for the
purpose of public transportation.4 25 Those courts hold that the
shift in use does not constitute abandonment of the railroad
easement because the purpose behind the easement- public
transportation- is fulfiled by the new use. Servient landowners
to a public transportation easement nevertheless often claim that
a shift in use of that easement results in abandonment.4 2 The
shifting public use doctrine, however, would deny these plaintiffs
recovery:
In its broad outline, the shifting public use doctrine-
judicially created as part of the common law- provides that
the progression from the public use for which an easement is
originally granted to another public use will not constitute an
abandonment of the easement.., so long as the new use is
deemed permissible by the courts. Whether a new use is
deemed permissible entails analysis of the scope and purpose
of the original use, the relationship of the new use to the
original use, and the public interest considerations in the
relationship between the old and new uses.42 7
Although the actual phrase "shifting public use doctrine"
was not generally used, the common law has dealt with the issue
of changes or increases in utilization of an easement, both within
and without the railroad rights-of-way context, for over a
century.4 28 In Preseault v. United States, the court was asked to
decide whether the conversion of a railroad right-of-way to a
424. Compare Washington Wildlife Preservation, Inc. v. Minnesota, 329 N.W.2d
543 (Minn. 1983) (finding that a shift from a railroad to a recreational trail was within
the scope of the easement), with Lawson v. State, 730 P.2d 1308 (Wash. 1986)
(finding that a shift from a railroad to a recreational trail was not within the scope of
the easement).
425. See, e.g., Faus v. City of Los Angeles, 431 P.2d 849 (Cal. 1967); Kansas Elec.
Power Co. v. Walker, 51 P.2d 1002 (Kan. 1935); Fogle v. Richley, 378 N.E.2d 472
(Ohio 1978).
426. See, e.g., Connelly. supra note 11, § 9.
427. Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1559 (1996) (Clevenger, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
428. The Federal Court of Claims on a summary judgment decision was actually
the first court to use the phrase "shifting public use." Preseault v. United States, 24
Cl. Ct. 818, 832 (1992).
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hiking trail constituted a taking. That court attributed the
genesis of SPUD to railroad scholar Edward L. Pierce, who
stated:
The use of property taken by the right of eminent domain is
not confined to the precise mode or kind of use which was in
view at the time of the taking, but may extend to other modes
which were then unpracticed and unknown. When property
has been taken for a public use, and full compensation made
for the fee or a perpetual easement, its subsequent
appropriation to another public use- certainly if one of a like
kind- does not require further compensation to the owner.
Nor is such compensation required when there is a change in
the person or body enjoying or controlling the property taken,
or in the conditions upon which the public may use it.
The purpose of opening a highway or street is, to provide the
public with a right of passage for persons on foot or riding in
carriages or other kinds of vehicles. The use for which this
public right is obtained is not confined to the same species of
vehicles, drawn by the same kind of power that prevailed at
the time of the dedication or appropriation, but admits of the
passage and repassage of such other vehicles, operated in
such a mode and by such force as an advanced civilization
may require .... 429
The property [taken for the purposes of a railroad] is ... to be
deemed taken for a public use itself .... It does not therefore
revert to the owner upon a mere transfer of the railroad to
another company, nor upon its appropriation to another
similar public use.43 °
The Preseault court also cited as authority a later work-
published in 1888- by Chief Justice Isaac F. Redfield of the
Vermont Supreme Court, who wrote:
The mere possibility of reverter to the original owner, or his
heirs or grantees, is not regarded ... as any appreciable
interest requiring to be compensated .... The most the owner
of the fee could claim in such case is to recover compensation
for any additional land taken, and for any additional burden
imposed upon the land appropriated [above and beyond that
imposed by the original highway use], as well as for any
429. Id. at 833 (quoting EDWARD L. PIERCE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF RAILROADS
233, 234 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1881)).
430. Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525. 1568 (1996) (Clevenger, J.,
dissenting) (quoting PIERCE, supra note 429, at 235).
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additional damage to the adjoining lands of the same
owner.
4 3 1
In other words, new transportation methods should be permitted
without having to compensate the servient estate owners for
every new change.
In Faus v. City of Los Angeles,3 2 the Supreme Court of
California held that a shift in easement use from a railroad right-
of-way to a street is permitted without triggering abandonment.
The Faus Court found precedent in cases that allowed for change
in easement use from a street to a railroad,4 33 a park to a parking
lot,434 public park to a rubbish dump,435 and canals to streets. 3 6
In Bernards v. Link,437 the Oregon Supreme Court held that a
shift in use from a railroad right-of-way to a logging road did not
cause abandonment, citing a number of cases that supported
that result, including the shift in use from carriages to
automobiles,4 3 wagon to automobile,4 39 and street railroad to
motor bus. 4 0
The test for determining whether a shift in easement use is
permissible under SPUD is simple: determine whether the
purpose of the public easement is for transportation, and then
determine if the new use of the easement is also a method of
transportation. If so, then the new use is allowed. If the new use
is not a method of public transportation, then the easement is
deemed abandoned.
In the first step, the court must examine the purpose of the
original easement grant. As one court explained: "Itihere are
compelling policy reasons consistent with our past cases for
treating railroad easements more, rather than less, liberally than
other easements. For these reasons, I would look beyond the
language to the purpose of the deed.""' Under this reasoning,
railroad grants should be read to have a purpose of promoting
transportation, even if there is no specific transportation
431. Id. at 1568 (quoting Redfield, supra note 57).
432. 431 P.2d 849 (Cal. 1967).
433. See Montgomery v. Santa Ana & Westminster Ry. Co., 37 P. 786 (Cal. 1894).
434. See Abbot Kinney Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 36 Cal. Rptr. 113, 117 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1963).
435. See Griffith v. City of Los Angeles, 346 P.2d 49, 54 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
436. See Wattson v. Eldridge, 278 P. 236 (Cal. 1929).
437. 248 P.2d 341 (Or. 1952).
438. See Matteodo v. Capaldi, 138 A. 38, 39 (R.I. 1927).
439. See Strycker v. Richardson, 77 Pa. Super. 252 (1921).
440. See Kansas Elec. Power Co. v. Walker, 51 P.2d 1002 (Kan. 1935) (changing
electric street car line to motor bus line did not constitute abandonment).
441. Lawson v. State, 703 P.2d 1308. 1319 (Wash. 1986) (Utter, J., dissenting).
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language in the grant, because of their combined public and
transportation use.
Many other grants, however, contain specific language such
as "for railroad purposes only," "for the construction of a
railroad," "for transportation purposes only," and the like. On
one level, the purpose behind these grants and deeds to the
railroads is transportation. As another court stated: "a railroad is
a public highway, created for public purposes."442 This is also
true of other grants for roads, trolley lines, canals, horse-drawn
carriage roads, and possibly trails. But not all states view the
railroad use limitation expansively to imply general public
transportation use.
The second step in the analysis is identifying the new use to
see if it fits within the scope of the more broadly defimed public
transportation grant. If so, sound public policy dictates that the
easement should continue even if the technology of the use has
changed.
However, another test has been used by some states in place
of SPUD- the "reasonably foreseeable" test- which states that a
new use of an easement is within the original grant only if the
original grantors could "reasonably foresee" the new use. The
court in Preseault v. United States applied the reasonably
foreseeable test in a rails-to-trails case:
It is often said that the parties are to be presumed to have
contemplated such a scope for the created easement as would
reasonably serve the purposes of the grant . . .. This
presumption often allows an expansion of use of the
easement, but does not permit a change in use not
reasonably foreseeable at the time of establishment of the
easement. 1
3
The Preseault majority used the reasonably foreseeable test
to hold that a public trail is outside the scope of a railroad
easement, and that by converting to a trail the railroad easement
was abandoned. The court stated that:
[wihen the easements here were granted to the Preseaults'
predecessors in title at the turn of the century, specifically for
transportation of goods and persons via railroad, could it be
said that the parties contemplated that a century later the
easements would be used for recreational hiking and biking
trails, or that it was necessary to so construe them in order to
442. Id. at 1311 (citing Puget Sound Elec. Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 117 P. 739,
743 (191 1)).
443. 100 F.3d at 1542 (quoting RICHARD R. POWELL, 3 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY §
34.12121 (Patrick J. Rohan ed., 1996)).
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give the grantee railroad that for which it bargained? We
think not.44
Most courts have not adopted the reasonably foreseeable test
because it is unworkable and is bad public policy. The
reasonably foreseeable test is predicated on the fiction that
grantors of transportation easements have the ability to predict
the needs and methods of public transportation fifty or even a
hundred years in the future. One might ask how the grantor of a
railroad easement in a case like Preseault could possibly
"foresee" at the time he or she made the easement grant for a
railroad in 1899 that automobiles driving sixty-five miles an hour
would someday replace many trains and that there would be in
place a nation-wide highway system? Of whom is the court
thinking when it implies that the invention of the gasoline
automobile in 1889 was "reasonably foreseeable?" How exactly
does one go about the imaginative process to "reasonably
foresee" the invention of the airplane in 1903? Who could even
have "foreseen" in the beginning of the nineteenth century that
an easement for horse-drawn carriages might be replaced by a
steam locomotive, first built and operated in 1825? On this
point, the court in Carter v. Northwestern Telephone Exchange
Co. stated:
If there is any one fact established in the history of society
and of the law itself, it is that the mode of exercising [the
public] easement is expansive, developing and growing as
civilization advances.... Hence it has become settled law
that the easement is not limited to the particular methods of
use in vogue when the easement was acquired, but includes
all new and improved methods .... And it is not material that
these new and improved methods of use were not
contemplated by the owner of the land when the easement
was acquired, and are more onerous to him than those then in
use. 
4 4 5
This Article advocates the use of SPUD in cases concerning
the change in use of a public transportation easement. SPUD is
a far better test to use than the "reasonably foreseeable" test
because SPUD effectuates the public policy of allowing the public
transportation easement to evolve with time. SPUD is also
simpler to use; it does not require the court to second-guess
what was "reasonably foreseeable" to a grantor fifty or one
444. Id. at 1542.
445. Washington Wildlife Preservation, Inc. v. Minnesota, 329 N.W.2d 543, 546-47
(Minn. 1983) (quoting Carter v. Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co.. 63 N.W. 111. 112 (Minn.
1895)) (emphasis added).
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hundred years ago, and it is easy to apply. SPUD gives clarity to
the otherwise immensely complicated process of determining
property rights in transportation easements, particularly railroad
easements.
C. Rails-to-Trails
One extremely popular shift in the use of railroad easements
is the shift from railroads to recreational trails. While cases
involving use of a railroad easement as a trail are still being
litigated in the courts, as a general rule most new uses of
transportation easements are permitted under SPUD, the
incidental use doctrine, the reasonably foreseeable test, and the
exclusivity rights of the railroads. Courts have allowed shifts in
use from a trail to a railroad,446 canal to a railroad,44 railroad to
a road,448 railroad to a logging road, 4 9 and track to trackless
trolley450  without finding that the new use effected an
abandonment. But conversion from rails to trails arguably
stretches the concept more than usual. Instead of converting to
new and advanced vehicular technology, the conversion takes us
back to a simpler, more primitive form of transportation, a form
that some people argue is not transportation at all but rather
recreation. 45 1
A whole host of recent cases challenge the shift from railroad
use to a recreational trail. 4 2 The question in these cases is
whether trail use is sufficiently like railroad use, or is a
reasonably foreseeable transportation use, or does not deviate so
significantly from railroad use as to work an abandonment of
railroad easements. And the courts are split on whether they will
446. See Brainard v. Missisquoi R.R. Co., 48 Vt. 107 (1874) (plank road to
railroad).
447. See Hatch v. Cincinnati, & Ind. R.R. Co., 18 Ohio St. 92, 121-22 (1868)
(allowing railroad company to acquire canal easement with only compensating owner
for additional burdens beyond canal).
448. See, e.g., Faus v. City of Los Angeles, 431 P.2d 849, 850, 858 (Cal. 1967);
Faus v. County of Los Angeles, 64 Cal. Rptr. 181, 185 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967): Kansas
Elec. Power Co. v. Walker, 51 P.2d 1002 (Kan. 1935); Fogle v. Richley, 378 N.E.2d
472 (Ohio 1978).
449. See Bernards v. Link, 248 P.2d 341, 351-52 (Or. 1952).
450. See Anderson v. Knoxville Power & Light Co., 64 S.W.2d 204, 205 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1933).
451. The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA), the federal act
providing most funding for conversions of rails to trails, explicitly defines cycling and
walking as "transportation." 23 U.S.C. § 134 (1994); see also 49 U.S.C. § 5319
(1994).
452. See, e.g., Washington Wildlife Preservation v. Minnesota, 329 N.W.2d 543
(Minn. 1983): Lawson v. State, 730 P.2d 1308 (Wash. 1986).
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construe railroad easements to be general transportation
easements, in which case bicycle and pedestrian use easily fits
within the scope of the use, or whether they will construe the
easement narrowly to allow only railroad uses.
The issue of conversion of rail corridors to trails seems to
have first arisen in the late 1970s, before the current corridor
conversion trend began. In one early case, Pollnow v. State
Department of Natural Resources,4"3 the court declined to apply
the Faus SPUD analysis to a trail conversion, believing that
doing so would unreasonably stretch the limits of Wisconsin
state common law dealing with the scope of railroad
easements.4" The court determined, however, that Congress or
the state legislatures could preserve the rights of the public in
rail corridors for multiple public uses, including recreation and
conservation.455
In Schnabel v. County of DuPage,4 56 the Illinois Court of
Appeals held that the conversion of a railroad right-of-way to a
trail constituted abandonment, even though the court
acknowledged that "there is authority that an existing easement
may be altered or expanded in certain circumstances where no
increased burden is imposed upon the servient estate."45 7 The
court distinguished those cases because they did not involve
abandonment and because the use in those cases was not
deemed sufficiently different from railroad use to trigger
abandonment.4  Of course, the court fell into the fallacy of
believing that abandonment could be viewed independently of
the shift in use and not as a consequence of it.
As the rail-trail cases continued into the 1980s, many courts
followed Pollnow and Schnabel. For instance, in McKinley v.
Waterloo Railroad Co., ' the Iowa Supreme Court did not engage
in a SPUD analysis but instead held that a rail-to-trail
conversion constituted abandonment of parcels acquired by
condemnation.460 This holding was in spite of the Iowa Supreme
Court's earlier holding in McDonnell v. Sheets46' that the words
"team and wagon" in a deed clause did not restrict the type of
453. 276 N.W.2d 738 (Wis. 1979).
454. See id. at 746.
455. See id.
456. 428 N.E.2d 671 (111. App. Ct. 1981).
457. Id. at 678-79.
458. See id. at 679.
459. 368 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1985).
460. See id. at 134-35:
461. 15 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 1944).
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vehicular traffic to the exclusion of the use of automobiles." 2 In
fact, the McDonnell court stated that:
it is the general rule that where a right-of-way is granted it
may be used for any purpose to which the land
accommodated thereby may reasonably be devoted unless the
grant contains specific limitations and the grantee can avail
himself of modem inventions, if by so doing he can more fully
exercise and enjoy or carry out the object for which the
easement was granted.46 3
More importantly, the McKinley court did find that parcels
obtained by grant as defeasible fees were converted into fees
simple absolute by operation of the state marketable title act and
that, at least for those parcels, abandonment and conversion
were inapplicable. 4
By the mid-1980s, however, the tide was beginning to shift.
In Lawson v. State,465 the Supreme Court of Washington held
that a state statute authorizing a change in a railroad right-of-
way to a trail was unconstitutional insofar as it did not
compensate servient landowners for the additional burden, citing
only to Polnow and Schnabel, and failing to discuss the nature
of the railroad easement or the character of the trail use.466 But
although the conversion was struck down, the case generated
two strong dissents. Recognizing the problems with the
"reasonably foreseeable test," one dissenter pointed out that
"[plarties to a private easement are presumed to have considered
'a normal development under conditions which may be different
from those existing at the time of the grant.'"4 67
The Lawson dissenters cited to an important Minnesota
Supreme Court case, Washington Wildlife Preservation v.
Minnesota, the leading case allowing a rail-trail shift. The
Minnesota court had looked to the well-established proposition
that an easement is "not limited to the particular methods in
vogue when the easement was acquired" in deciding that the
462. Id. at 255.
463. Id. (citations omitted).
464. See McKinley. 368 N.W.2d at 138.
465. 730 P.2d 1308 (Wash. 1986). Lawson was cited in King County v. Squire Inv.
Co., 801 P.2d 1022 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990), for the proposition that a rail-trail
conversion was impermissible after abandonment. However, the court correctly noted
that as between the heirs of the original grantor and the adjacent landowners, the
heirs were the owners of the underlying fee, even though the court had to stretch to
re-interpret clear defeasible fee language to create merely an easement in the
railroad. See King County, 801 P.2d at 1025.
466. See Lawson, 730 P.2d at 1312-13.
467. Id. at 1319 (Utter, J., dissenting) (quoting Logan v. Broderick, 631 P.2d 429
(1981)).
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conversion of a railroad right-of-way to a trail did not constitute
abandonment.4" Moreover, the court stated that "railroads are
not viewed strictly as private corporations since they are publicly
regulated common carriers. Essentially, a railroad is a highway
dedicated to the public use.... As such, the rights and duties of
a railroad are in most instances determined by constant
consultation with the public interest."
469
This view has begun to take hold. In Rieger v. Pennsylvania
Central Corp.,470 an Ohio Appeals Court held that the shift in use
from a railroad right-of-way easement to a trail did not constitute
abandonment in light of precedent that allowed the use of an
easement to shift from a canal to a railroad, 47 1 and a railroad to
another railroad.4 7  Then in Barney v. Burlington Northern
Railroad Co.,4 7 the South Dakota Supreme Court held that
reversionary landowners should not be compensated for the shift
from a federally granted railroad right-of-way to a trail because,
under the federal abandonment statute, no abandonment occurs
if the right-of-way is converted to a public highway within one
year of abandonment.4 7 4 Because South Dakota law defines a
public highway to include "[elvery way or place of whatever
nature open to the public, as a matter of right, for purposes of
vehicular travel,"4 75 and bicycles and snowmobiles are vehicles,4 76
the public highway exception was held to save the corridor.4 77
Despite the trend in favor of allowing rail-trail shifts, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit struck down a rail-trail
shift in the recent Preseault v. United States saga. 7 8 In a poorly
reasoned opinion, the court held that a Vermont railroad right-
of-way could not be converted to a trail because it had been
abandoned due to disuse. The court did not apply SPUD, stating
that "[als an initial matter, we have found no Vermont case,
either in this century or the past, and the parties point to none,
in which the Vermont courts establish or apply something called
468. Washington Wildlife Preservation v. Minnesota, 329 N.W.2d 543, 547 (Minn.
1983).
469. Id. at 546.
470. 1985 WL 7919 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (unpublished opinion).
471. See i. at 4 (citing Hatch v. Cincinnati & L.R. Co., 18 Ohio St. 92 (1864)).
472. See id. (citing Garlick v. Pittsburgh & W.R. Co., 67 Ohio St. 223 (1902)).
473. 490 N.W.2d 726 (S.D. 1992).
474. See 43 U.S.C. § 912 (1994).
475. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 31 -1-1 (Michie 1999).
476. Id. § 32-14-1.
477. See Barney, 490 N.W.2d at 732.
478. 100 F.3d 1525 (1996); see WRIGHT, supra note 133, at 758. See generally
Sennewald. supra note 147.
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the 'shifting public use' doctrine."4 79 Technically the court is
correct, as no Vermont court had "established" or even "applied"
something "called" SPUD. But as the dissent vigorously pointed
out, Vermont courts, while not using the phrase "shifting public
use," have nevertheless routinely allowed for the shift in use of
railroad rights-of-way. 8 0
One such early Vermont case is West v. Bancroft.41 In West,
the Vermont Supreme Court permitted a reservoir, or cistern, to
be built on a public highway easement without compensation to
the servient landowner. The court stated that "[tihe power of the
public over highways is not confined to their use for sole purpose
of travel."4 82 In another Vermont case, Brainard v. Missisquoi
Railroad. Co.,"' the Vermont Supreme Court held that servient
owners of a plank road easement did not have to be
compensated when that plank road was converted into a
railroad. For a number of reasons mentioned throughout this
Article, the Preseault decision seems of questionable merit.
48 4
Indications are that the decision is limited on its facts and that
the other circuits are not following it.
4 15
The most recent and, hopefully, final word on rail-trail
conversions is Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United States.48 6 The
Maryland Court of Appeals reasoned that, because a railroad is
analogous to a public highway, and because Maryland highway
cases regularly acknowledge shifting uses to accommodate new
transportation technologies, a rail-to-trail conversion did not
work an abandonment. The court focused on the public
character of the railroad easement,48 7 the compatibility of trail
use with prior uses 88 and the reasonableness of the burden.
489
The court noted that "although use as a hiker/biker trail 'was
479. Presault, 100 F.3d at 1541.
480. See id. at 1569 (Clevenger, J., dissenting).
481. 32 Vt. 367 (1859).
482. 100 F.3d at 1569 (Clevenger, J., dissenting).
483. 48 Vt. 107 (1874).
484. This decision is particularly suspect as the abandonment issue had been
fully decided by the Vermont Supreme Court earlier when they found no
abandonment had occurred. Yet the Federal Circuit redecided the issue of
abandonment. Additionally, it did not appear that the Preseaults had title to the
corridor land in their deeds. See State v. Preseault, 652 A.2d 1001 (Vt. 1994).
485. The Eighth Circuit in Moore v. United States limited the takings challenge to
an opt-in class and the District Court for the District of Kansas dismissed the class
certification in Swisher v. United States.
486. 733 A.2d 1055 (Md. 1999).
487. See id. at 1074-76.
488. See id. at 1076-77.
489. See id. at 1077-79.
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not actually contemplated by any of the parties to the acquisition
and grant .... it may be said to have been within the legal
contemplation of all that it was to be used for all purposes by
which the object of its creation, as a public highway, could be
promoted.'"490 The Maryland court used the language of the
"instrumentality" of the easement to find that, just as fiber optics
have replaced telegraph lines as the instrumentality of
telecommunications easements, bicycles and skates have
replaced railroad cars as an instrumentality of the public
railroad easement. And unlike the courts in most previous
decisions, this court examined at length the relationship between
abandonment of state law property rights and abandonment
under federal ICC regulations.
49 1
When courts apply SPUD to decide whether the use of a
transportation easement as a trail is permitted, a great deal
hinges on the court's characterization of the trail. The concurring
opinion in Preseault stated: "Realistically, nature trails are for
recreation, not transportation. Thus when the State [of Vermont]
sought to convert the easement into a recreational trail, it
exceeded the scope of the original easement and caused a
reversion."492 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Washington in
Lawson, characterized the trail at issue as a "recreational trail or
a nature trail," and went on to hold that a rail-to-trail shift in
easement use constituted abandonment of the easement.4 93 Use
of a railroad corridor as a trail is not for transportation purposes
according to these courts. But as the dissent stated in Lawson:
Railroads have been used to haul freight and transport
travelers bent on business or social purposes. Those
purposes were often realized in the course of transit, as well
as after passengers debarked. The meeting in the club car,
the vacation spent sightseeing from a Domeliner, as well as
local tourist and commuter trains evidence the diversity of
legitimate "transportation purposes." Analogously, while
many might travel the proposed trails for recreation
purposes, others will use the right of way to commute to
work, thus easing pressure on our other severely pressed
transportation systems. My point in this comparison is to
underscore the insignificance of the difference in
transportation media. Just as with a railroad line, the
490. Id. at 1076-77 (citations omitted).
491. See id. at 1081-94.
492. 100 F.3d at 1554 (Rader, C.J., concurring).
493. Lawson v. State, 703 P.2d 1308 (Wash. 1986).
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maintenance of a trail is to furnish transportation.49 4
And the Chevy Chase court further explained that "Itihe fact
that the right-of-way may be used for recreational as well as
transportation purposes has no bearing on our analysis, since
the 'recreation' involved- biking and hiking- consists of the
enjoyment one may have in transporting oneself."4 5
When a court confronts the question of whether a new
transportation use is permitted in an existing transportation
easement without triggering abandonment, that court should
apply the SPUD and consult the abundant cases available in
each state. However, because a few courts have already held that
the shift from rails to trails is an impermissible shift in use and
therefore triggers abandonment of the railroad easement,4 9 there
are two alternative approaches. The first is to accept the railroad
abandonment and turn to state statutes that will preserve the
trail upon payment of damages to the servient estate owner or
condemn the parcels held in easement for nominal damages.
The second, if the railroad has not yet initiated STB
proceedings, is to railbank the corridor, which effectively
preempts state law property rights and holds the railroad
easements alive during the period of trail use. Railbanking is not
a difficult procedure, but it must be accomplished with the
cooperation of the railroad and concurrently with federal
abandonment procedures.
D. Railbanking
Responding to the rapid and unsettling rate of railroad
abandonments throughout the 1970s and to demands for more
parks and recreational spaces in our over-developing cities,
Congress passed an amendment in 1983 to the National Trails
Systems Act (NTSA) allowing railroads to dismantle their tracks
and relieve the financial burden of maintaining the corridor while
keeping the corridor intact.49 7 By doing so, the railroad has
"railbanked" its corridor. The easements remain alive for possible
future reactivation of rail service, which Congress has declared
to be a railroad purpose. As the Act states:
Consistent with the purposes of this Act, and in furtherance
of the national policy to preserve established railroad rights-
of-way for future reactivation of rail service, to protect rail
494. Id. at 1320 (Utter, J., dissenting).
495. 733 A.2d at 1078.
496. See Lawson, 730 P.2d at 1312.
497. See 16 U.S.C. q 1247(d) (1994).
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transportation corridors, and to encourage energy efficient
transportation use, in the case of interim use of any
established railroad rights-of-way. . , if such interim use is
subject to restoration or reconstruction for railroad purposes,
such interim use shall not be treated, for purposes of any law
or rule of law, as an abandonment of the use of such rights-
of-way for railroad purposes." 8
Therefore, Congress has determined that preservation of the
corridor, by itself, is a railroad purpose of the highest national
significance. Accordingly, the servient estate remains burdened
by the easement, even if it is not then in use.
The railbanking statute has been held by the United States
Supreme Court to constitute a legitimate exercise of Congress's
interstate commerce powers; the importance of preserving
corridors for future use easily met due process challenges that
had been leveled against the statute.49 9 It may sound odd that
"non-use" of a railroad corridor could in fact constitute a railroad
purpose, but that is indeed what Congress intended- that
maintaining the corridor intact during a period of nonuse, if
done to preserve the corridor for future railroad use, does not
constitute abandonment.
Servient landowners have leveled a series of challenges
against the railbanking statute, most recently in the Federal
Court of Claims, arguing that, by postponing the date the
railroad is deemed to have abandoned, they have suffered a
taking of their contingent reversionary rights or of the
unburdening of their estates that would have otherwise occurred
pursuant to state law."° They further argue that, because
surface use of the burdened land would have been transferred to
them upon the railroad's abandonment of the property, the
railbanking statute works a taking of that railroad easement into
perpetuity.50 l
Their argument, of course, begs the question of whether
preservation of the corridor can constitute a use for "railroad
498. Id.
499. See Preseault v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1990) (leaving open takings
question).
500. See, e.g., Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1550-51 (Fed. Cir.
1996); Glosemeyer v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 879 F.2d 316, 323 (8th Cir. 1989);
National Wildlife Fed'n v. I.C.C., 850 F.2d 694, 696 (D.C. Cr. 1988); Swisher v.
United States., 189 F.R.D. 638 (D. Kan. 1999); Seger v. United States, No. 4:99-CV-
03056 (D. Neb. filed Feb. 15, 1999).
501. See Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1550-51 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see
also Preseault v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 69 (1992); Preseault v. United States, 24
Ct. Cl. 818 (1992).
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purposes" and whether nonuse of the corridor under the relevant
state law would even work an abandonment. Hence, all the
issues of state law doctrines of abandonment arise, complicating
the question of whether the Trails Act actually took anything
that the landowners were entitled to under their state law. If, for
instance, their state common law recognized SPUD, the shift to a
trail would not be an additional burden, and no taking would
have occurred by operation of the federal railbanking law. 50 2
Although this is the first national program designed to preserve
rail corridors, the statute does nothing more than codify what is
at the heart of most state's laws on abandonment- that nonuse
alone, in the absence of intent to abandon, will not extinguish a
railroad easement. 50
3
The issue ultimately returns to intent. Prior to 1983, states
usually concluded that ICC abandonment authorization, along
with nonuse and removal of tracks and ties, was clear evidence
of intent to abandon the corridor property rights. 50 4 But with the
railbanking statute, preservation or nonuse is now identified as a
railroad use. Although this should not pose any great conceptual
difficulties to states trying to decide if a railbanked corridor has
been abandoned since railbanking clearly negates the requisite
intent,50 5 the statute does marginally change the rules of
abandonment by specifying that preservation is a legitimate
railroad use.0 6 If the railroad intends to preserve its property
rights for possible future reactivation, then it does not have the
requisite intent for abandonment.0 7  Railbanking is a
presumptive showing of intent not to abandon.
In addition to railbanking, the NTSA Amendments of 1983
permit the STB to authorize interim trail use on the railroad
502. See Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United States, 733 A.2d 1055, 1077-78 (Md.
1999).
503. The railroad's actions in railbanking its corridor would seem to disprove any
allegation of intent to abandon. Why railbank if the railroad could simply sell the
land and be done with it? See Birt v. Surface Transp. Bd., 90 F.3d 580 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (finding that negotiation for a trail showed intent not to abandon).
504. See, e.g., City of Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court, 914 P.2d 160, 163, 171
(Cal. 1996): St. Louis County v. St. Appalonia Corp., 471 S.W.2d 238, 240 (Mo.
1971).
505. See Birt, 90 F.3d at 586-87 (showing that negotiations and going through
railbanking procedures evidences intent not to abandon).
506. Maine, for example, has passed a statute declaring that abandonment of
services does not imply that the property rights have been abandoned, and that any
agency showing interest in the eventual restoration of services shall have priority and
the line will not be considered abandoned. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 7105(B)
(West 1998).
507. See Birt, 90 F.3d at 586-87.
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corridor. To approve trail use, the STB must find that the use is
"not inconsistent" with preservation of the corridor for possible
future rail reactivation; the trail use must give way if the corridor
is reactivated." 8 A trail operator who wishes to convert a railroad
corridor to a trail must work with the STB during the
abandonment proceedings to acquire approval to operate the
trail on the corridor. 50 9
Although the preservation of the corridor should
unquestionably be deemed a continuing railroad use, some cases
have argued that the conversion to a trail constitutes an
impermissible burden on the easement by adding a new use.
51 0
These arguments would seem to be defeated by the incidental
use doctrine; the trail use is just like the utility's use or a
warehouse lease, an additional use that is not inconsistent with
the railroad use. Trail use is somewhat more complicated,
however, because the railroad sells its property interests in the
corridor to the trail operator. That operator may go on to license
utility use alongside the trail. As one can imagine, litigation looks
to be quite active on whether this is permissible, though to date
utility licenses in railbanked corridors have not been addressed.
The legality of railbanking was firmly established by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Preseault v. ICC in 1990.51 The Court left open
the question of whether the postponement of the servient
landowners' reversionary interests under state law constituted a
taking of their property. The Federal Circuit later decided that
the plaintiffs had suffered a taking, but the checkered past of the
Preseault litigation, however, calls into question its applicability
to future litigation in this area."1 Nevertheless, with the
508. 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (1994).
509. See Melons Grown in South Texas; Increased Expenses and Establishment of
Assessment Rate, 61 Fed. Reg. 248 (1996), for a description of the distinctions
between Certificates of Interim Trail Use (CITUs) and Notices of Interim Trail Use
(NITUs) and the requirements the trail operator must meet in order to acquire the
railroad's railbanked property interests.
510. The Supreme Court held that the imposition of a trail use was within due
process and interstate commerce parameters, but left open whether the trail use
worked a taking. See Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 15-19 (1990). That issue has been
taken up at the lower levels in a variety of cases. See, e.g., Preseault v. United States,
100 F.3d 1525 (1996): Preseault v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 69 (1992); Preseault v.
United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 818 (1992); Glosemeyer v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 879
F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1989); Swisher v. United States, 189 F.R.D. 638 (D. Kan. 1999);
Seger v. United States, No. 4:99-CV-03056 (D. Neb. filed Feb. 15, 19991.
511. 494 U.S. 1 (1990).
512. The Supreme Court effectively sent the Preseaults to the Court of Claims for
pursuance of a remedy under the Tucker Act. In January 1992, the Court of Claims
held that under Vermont law the servient landowners had reversionary interests in
the railroad right-of-way and that the railroad was abandoned when tracks and
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Preseault victory under their belts, servient landowners in
Missouri and Nebraska have challenged the railbanking statute
under which the 200-plus mile Katy Trail and 300-plus mile
Cowboy Trail were built.51 3 Those cases are still being litigated
and will generate enormous controversy if successful. Both of
these cases are being litigated under the auspices of Nels
Ackerson's Washington, D.C., group, the team responsible for
the vast majority of these class action suits against the railroads
and the utility companies."'
Ultimately the determination of whether the railbanking
statute works a taking is a matter of whether state property law
deems that the servient landowner's reversionary rights are
compensable property interests. For a variety of reasons, we
believe that such rights are not compensable. The property
interest at stake in the case of railroad easements is the
contingent possibility that one's burdened land will become
unburdened. That contingency is much like a contingent
remainder. Yet contingent remainders are routinely extinguished
under the rule against perpetuities,"'5 marketable title acts,
equipment were removed from the corridor. See Preseault v. United States. 24 Ct. Cl.
818, 832 (1992). Ten months later the Court handed down a second decision in the
.case, holding that the servient landowner's reversionary interests were not
compensable property interests because they acquired their title to the servient land
after federal laws had been passed regulating their future interests and because they
had no reasonable investment-backed expectations with regard to being able to
develop the encumbered corridor. See Preseault v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 69, 89
(1992). These decisions were upheld in 1996 by the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit in a 2-1 decision. See Preseault v. United States. 66 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir.
1996). A few months after that decision was issued, five members of the Federal
Circuit bench were treated to an all-expenses paid, five-day seminar on property
rights at a resort in Montana paid for by the Foundation for Research on Economics
and the Environment. Those justices were Rader, Michel, Plager, Newman. and
Mayer. See Marcus, supra note 9, at Al. This Foundation receives funding from the
John M. Olin Foundation, which is also a financial backer of the New England Legal
Foundation, which litigated the Preseault cases. Upon returning from the seminars,
the Federal Circuit reopened the case, sua sponte, and reversed 5-4, finding that a
taking had occurred. See Preseault v. United States 100 F.3d 1525. 1550-51 (Fed.
Cir. 1996). Under a blistering dissent the Court found that the railroad's property
interests had been abandoned pursuant to state law before federal abandonment had
been authorized by the ICC. See id. at 1550. The Department of Justice chose not to
litigate the issue to the Supreme Court again, and it went back down for a
determination of damages.
513. See Glosemeyer v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 771 (2000); Swisher v. United
States, 189 F.R.D. 638 (D. Kan. 1999); Seger v. United States, No. 4:99-CV-03056 (D.
Neb. filed Feb. 15, 1999).
514. See generally Amon, supra note 7.
515. Although possibilities of reversion in the grantor are not subject to the rule
against perpetuities, the reversionary interest was generally not transferable to third
parties which would allow grantors to avoid the workings of the rule. Because an
inter vivos transfer of a possibility of reverter effectively defeats the purpose of the
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presumptions against forfeiture, and rules against alienation of
possibilities of reverter. 516 These are all well-established property
rules that inevitably cause the extinction of contingent future
interests. Hence, reversionary interests in railroad corridors
remain in the grantor or the grantor's heirs, and generally
should not be shifted to successors in interest of the adjacent
land.
517
A variety of basic property law principles support the gradual
extinction of reversionary rights after the conditions restricting a
piece of property have been satisfied for a sufficient period of
time. Although easements function differently, the presumption
is the same, namely that the removal of the encumbrance is a
contingent future interest to which most servient landowners
have no investment-backed expectations, so that postponement
of the removal of the encumbrance does not work a taking. In
the vast majority of cases, the current servient landowners do
not have deeds that describe the actual corridor land claimed to
be encumbered." 8 Hence, most of these class action suits are
proceeding contrary to the basic premise in property law that one
must prove rights to land based on the strength of one's own
title, not the weaknesses in the opponent's title.51 9
Even if the basic principles of property law justified these
takings claims, the plaintiffs would still be unlikely to show that
the conditions of the easement had been violated. Any trail
constructed pursuant to the National Trails Systems Act
Amendments of 1983 should be deemed a continuing public
transportation use under SPUD. In the alternative, any
railbanked easement cannot be deemed abandoned because
railbanking is a "railroad purpose." Thus, the trail constructed in
the ralbanked corridor would not be deemed a shift in use but
rule against perpetuities, such transfer would generally destroy the interest.
Recently, however, many states have allowed for inter vivos transfers of possibilities
of reverter and rights of re-entry but have gotten around the perpetuities problem by
also enacting marketable title acts that destroy all future interests after a specified
period of time, generally thirty years. Thus, the marketable title act serves to equalize
the rather arbitrary limitations on dead hand control that were effected by the rule
against perpetuities.
516. See CUNNINGHAM ETAL., supra note 77, at 104-07, 126-34, 148-54.
517. See, e.g., Paul v. Connersville & Newcastle Junction R.R. Co., 51 Ind. 527
(1875); McDonalds Corp. v. Dwyer, 432 S.E.2d 165, 169 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
518. See, e.g., Rockwell v. State, 291 N.E.2d 894, 896-97 (Ind. 1973); King County
v. Squire Inv. Co., 801 P.2d 1022, 1027 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (describing deed as
"metes and bound" deed with reference to railroad right-of-way as boundary).
519. Adjacent landowners who try to claim title to abandoned railroad corridors
without showing evidence of their own title have had their claims dismissed. See, e.g.,
Rockwell v. State, 291 N.E.2d 894, 896-97 (Ind. 1973).
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rather preservation of the rail use with an additional incidental
use.
Furthermore, even if the courts determine that the servient
landowners have suffered a taking, they are entitled only to the
difference in value between a railroad easement alone and a
railroad easement with the additional servitude of a trail or a
utility line. The government must pay only for the additional
interest actually taken. 52" But a railroad easement is
presumptively the greatest burden possible to encumbered
land.52 ' As the Ohio Supreme Court noted, "There can be no
greater burden upon property than that which results from a[l
[railroad's] appropriation of a right to exclusive use."522 Therefore,
the additional trail use is a nominal burden at best. Realistically,
the trail is far less burdensome than when trains ran over the
easement. Not only may the servient owner enter the easement
(by using the trail) as she could not while rail service was active,
but the owner is also relieved of liability for any injuries that
might occur on the easement, thus imposing a smaller burden
on the servient estate than if it were extinguished.5 23
v
A UNIFIED THEORY OF MULTIPLE-USE RAILROAD EASEMENTS
From the foregoing, it is quite clear that the states are split
on the multiple uses of railroad easements, either by utilities or
trail groups, both pre- and post-abandonment. Yet the purpose
of this Article is to draw together the different issues that face
the parties with interests in a railroad easement to enable
lawyers and judges to better understand how the different issues
relate to one another.
520. See Branson West, Inc. v. Branson, 980 S.W.2d 604, 607 (Mo. Ct. App. 19981
(holding that an easement holder who, "while lawfully on the servient land, exceeds
his rights under the easement... becomes a trespasser to the extent of the
unauthorized use").
521. See Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United States, 733 A.2d 1055, 1078 (Md. 1999)
(stating that railroad easement is most burdensome use): see also Montange, supra
note 105, at 158 (same).
522. Fogle v. Richley, 378 N.E.2d 472, 475 (Ohio 1978).
523. See Sennewald, supra note 147, at 1423-24.
[The Rails-to-Trails Act includes future railroad use as a railroad purpose
and that the establishment of a recreational trail could actually be less
burdensome than an active railroad easement, most notably because the
characteristics of exclusive occupancy disappears. Thus, there is no "shift"
in use because the easement is still being used for a railroad purpose
[railbanking], and there is no taking because the additional use is less
burdensome than the original use for rail traffic.
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Because of the public interest invested at the creation of
these corridors and the importance of railroad corridors to future
transportation needs, railroads should be given fairly broad
powers while operating on the easements. Furthermore, courts
should apply a relatively stringent test on abandonment, so that
the railroads are not deprived of their property rights merely for
a brief period of nonuse. Courts should take very seriously the
most important element in abandonment determinations: intent.
In doing so, they would understand how continued maintenance,
tax payment, or railbanking evidences an intent not to abandon
the easements. Hence, utility and other public uses could
continue on these corridors without reacquisition of new
corridors at tremendous costs.
Railbanking and interim trail use deal logically with the
problems posed by the alarming number of corridors in peril of
being abandoned and fractionated. These corridors were
constructed in large part with significant public funding and the
public's needs in mind. The fact that they have been privately
owned should not derogate their importance to the public and
their vital role in bringing communications, electric, and gas
services to communities that could not afford to attract the
utilities on their own. Because the public helped pay for the
railroads and were the prime cause for the railroads' existence,
the public should have a right to redefine the uses of railroad
easements. This is not to say that whatever actions the railroad
takes should be permitted, with no reference to the rights and
needs of the servient landowners. But it does suggest that
corridors that have operated for over one hundred years as
transportation and utility corridors should continue to serve the
public's changing needs, without fear of damage awards to
landowners who may not even own the land underlying the
railroad corridor, or who purchased their land with no
expectations of the servitude ever being removed.
While the railbanking statute does postpone contingent
reversionary future interests, the rule against perpetuities,
marketable title acts, and rules against alienation of possibilities
of reverter are all well-established and important laws that
similarly postpone such interests. Not even the most
conservative of property rights advocates has suggested that the
five hundred-year-old rule against perpetuities works a taking.
Yet all of these rules, as well as the doctrine of shifting public
uses, reflect the law's consistent antipathy to contingent future
interests. Because of their contingency, they can be legitimately
destroyed without raising takings claims.
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A number of policy reasons justify the courts' protecting the
rights of the railroads, the utilities, and the public to put these
corridors to changed public uses. First, these corridors are
quasi-public assets. Although they are held in private ownership,
the common carrier duties imposed on the railroads require
them to maintain and use the land in particular ways. Railroad
liability is far higher than is the liability of the average private
landowner. Hence it is not enough to simply find that railroads
are privately owned entities, unlike public streets and highways,
for they cannot enter into contracts regarding their land that are
contrary to the public interest. 24 As the Ninth Circuit explained:
[The railroad's] franchise from the state ... made it to a
certain extent a public agent endowed with part of the
sovereign power of the commonwealth; and a railroad
constructed in this state by a corporation organized under
the laws of the state .... must necessarily be a highway for
public use, in and to which the public have rights limited and
regulated by law. There is no statute authorizing such a
transfer of property in the right of way and control thereof as
the plaintiff now claims was made to it by said contract, and,
without express authority conferred by a statute, no transfer
of such property, or of the right to control the same, could be
made, whereby the rights of the public, or a third party...
could be in any manner abridged.525
Even the Tennessee Supreme Court, a court that has
traditionally been stingy in its grant of powers to the railroads,
found that:
[The railroad] is created by the law to serve the public in
transportation of freight and passengers. The main object of
this creation is the public service. Of course, the stockholders
are permitted to make a profit upon the investment; but this
is incidental to the granting of the charter, and is not the
reason impelling the Legislature to create the company. It has
been given its extraordinary powers for the benefit of
civilization.
526
This important public character has motivated some courts
to construe rules liberally in favor of the railroads. 27 And
although the railroads have not always been considerate of the
524. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Postal Tel. Co., 217 F. 533, 538 (9th Cir.
1914); Pacific Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 50 F. 493, 494-95
(C.C.D. Wash. 1892).
525. Pacific Postal, 50 F. at 495.
526. Southern Ry. Co. v. Vann, 216 S.W. 727, 731 (Tenn. 1919).
527. See Midland Valley R.R. v. Sutter, 28 F.2d 163 (10th Cir. 1928); Midland
Valley R.R v. Jarvis, 29 F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1928).
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needs and feelings of servient landowners, there is no question
that they are under tremendous duties as public carriers and
thus cannot always operate with the needs of only their
neighbors in mind.
Furthermore, the federal railbanking policy reflects a
national commitment to preserving these valuable assets. And
although branch lines between two rural communities may not
seem of vital national importance, we cannot foresee the public's
needs fifty or one hundred years from now. Local branch lines
may become crucial inter-state links in a future transportation
system. A century ago no one would have imagined that Los
Angeles and Phoenix would be two of the five largest cities in the
country that would benefit tremendously from a high-speed train
linking the two. The railbanking statute is one step in what we
predict will be greater and greater efforts to preserve rail
corridors for future transportation needs. Our roads and
highways cannot expand indefinitely, nor can our atmosphere
handle the air pollution from trucks and commuters. One way or
another, the railroad corridors are going to be part of the
solution.
Railbanking may also benefit those very parties who are
filing suit; adjacent landowners ultimately benefit more from
having well-maintained rail and utility corridors than from
abandoned garbage dumps, dangerous wastelands, or a slightly
larger backyard. Where the landowner had little or no
expectation of the railroad burden being removed, he or she
receives a windfall of questionable value. In many cases, rail
corridors are polluted by overspraying of pesticides and weed
killers or by leaching of creosote into the ground. Often the land
is overly compacted or has been excavated and replaced with
rock ballast that would prevent agricultural use of the land.
Where the land poses these liabilities, transferring the corridor to
public or municipal control can guarantee continued
maintenance, use, and vitality of a corridor of land that would
otherwise lie fallow or become a nuisance if returned to the
hands of adjacent landowners.
Moreover, where recreational trail easements or utility
easements exist along abandoned rail corridors, adjacent
landowners are immune from liability for personal injuries to
users and trespassers on the easement when they would not be
immune if they absorbed the land back into their own private
holdings. Moreover, trail use is likely to raise the value of the
servient land. Numerous studies have shown that recreational
trails bring tremendous return on their investment, both in
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terms of revenues to local businesses and increases in property
values along the trail. An abandoned railroad bed is a magnet for
illegal dumping of garbage, trespassing, and illicit activities. Trail
uses have been proven to revitalize the land, reduce crime along
the corridor, create an ecological greenway that helps clear
pollution from the neighboring land, and provide venues for
exercise that lead to a healthier and happier citizenry. 28
Servient landowners also benefit from the utility uses to
which rail corridors are put. They benefit from increased 911
services, emergency communications and linkages, clear and
inexpensive long distance services, and lower local telephone
rates made possible by competition among providers. Such
competition cannot occur without multiple uses of utility
corridors.
In addition, the burden imposed by utility uses, like that
imposed by trail uses, is nominal. Where the burden is
substantial, the landowner should be compensated. The Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court, would require compensation when there
are interferences with property rights that, in all fairness, are so
extensive that they should be borne by the public at large.52 9 But
trail use and utility use provide more benefits to adjacent land
than burdens.
Finally, using rail corridors to lay fiber-optic cable actually
hews more closely to the original purposes of the land grants to
the railroads than is first apparent. Where we once had the Pony
Express, we evolved to railroad carriage of the mail, then
telegraph, then telephone, and now internet linkages between
people. If a horse and buggy trail can be converted into a road for
automobile traffic, then a fiber-optic cable ought to be permitted
in a rail corridor where the mail was originally carried from town
to town. Although nineteenth-century landowners could hardly
expect that we would be communicating through instantaneous
computer linkages all over the world, the fact is that new
technology has replaced the railroad for certain of its once vital
public services. As one judge explained in a highway case:
If it is sound reasoning to say that since telephone and
telegraph messages take the place of the messenger and
relieve the street of much of the use to which it would
528. See Rails-to-Trails Conservancy, ISTEA & Trails: Enhancement Funding for
Bicycling and Walking (1996).
529. See generally Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104 (1978); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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otherwise be subjected, and, therefore, the telephone and
telegraph poles and lines are not an additional servitude, why
is it not just as sound to hold that electric power lines are not
an additional servitude because the electricity takes the place
of the coal, kerosene, and wood that would otherwise have to
be hauled to the residences and businesses and industries
along the highway?"53 '
When modem courts blindly follow such out-dated doctrines
as the reasonably foreseeable test for shifting easement uses,
they ultimately frustrate rather than further the rights of
everyone. Laws do not remain static. They must evolve with new
circumstances without doing injustice to the rights of those
whose expectations relied on the old doctrines. We do not
advocate stripping servient landowners of all rights to control
uses of their land, but there are limits to how far property rights
should be held static in the face of changing needs and
expectations. Property rights have never been absolute, and
Justice Holmes' warning in 1922, that when a regulation "goes
too far" it will require compensation, still holds sway. 3 ' By
understanding the full complex array of issues and interests,
judges may better evaluate whether applications of certain laws
will "go too far."
CONCLUSION
The question of the exact scope of the railroad easement and
the power to grant licenses to utilities for placement of fiber-optic
cables in the railroad corridor may seem like an arcane,
technical, and esoteric legal question. But as the above
discussion has demonstrated, the legal issues are terribly
important for the future development of telecommunications
services. The property rights acquired to assemble these valuable
corridors may go back one hundred fifty years, but as with the
land itself, they will continue for hundreds of years more.
Properly understanding these rights, therefore, should be a
principal concern to judges and legislators. But proper
understanding necessarily entails looking back to the original
granting documents to try to fathom the intent of the parties in
light of case law at that time. It means understanding the land
acquisition practices of the railroads and the role the railroads
played in providing public services and using public powers to
530. Berry v. Southern Pine Elec. Power Ass'n, 76 So. 2d 212, 221 (Miss. 1954)
(Gillepsie, J., dissenting); see also Crawford v. Alabama Power Co., 128 So. 454, 457-
58 (Ala. 1930).
531. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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build their roads. It means understanding how changed times
have led to changed legal rules and, more importantly, how to
distinguish among the rules that should be kept and those that
should be further changed to accommodate the growth of the
next century.
It also means recognizing that property rights fluctuate with
the changing needs of the people. No one should have to suffer
unfairly the loss of property for the benefit of the greater good
without just compensation. But the legal rules the courts and
legislatures adopt define those property rights and necessarily
permit their modification to meet everyone's needs.
It is our position that the one relevant party that has been
left out of most of these property disputes is the public, for these
rights-of-way are ultimately public highways and public utility
corridors. By adopting a comprehensive approach to these cases,
we believe the courts can fairly balance the demands and rights
of everyone. But doing so cannot occur in ignorance. The goal of
this Article has been to provide the background to these disputes
among servient landowners, railroads, utility companies, local
municipalities, trail groups, and the general public to help create
logical, fair-minded rules that will enable interested parties to
move into the next century with some certainty of their rights
and obligations.
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